Determinants of Financial Development by Huang, Yongfu

HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE i — #1
Determinants of Financial Development
HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE ii — #2





HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE iv — #4
© Yongfu Huang 2010
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.
Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2010 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN: 978–0–230–27367–2 hardback
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the
country of origin.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE v — #5
To Benrun and Benpei
HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE vi — #6
HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE vii — #7
Contents
List of Figures x
List of Tables xi








1.2.4 Other variables 7
1.3 Structure of the book 7
2 General Determinants of Financial Development 10
2.1 Introduction 10
2.2 The data 13
2.2.1 Samples 14
2.2.2 Measures of financial development 14
2.2.3 The potential determinants 16
2.3 Empirical strategy 20
2.3.1 Bayesian Model Averaging 21
2.3.2 General-to-specific approach 22
2.4 Empirical results (I): Overall financial development 24
2.4.1 Some stylized facts 24
2.4.2 What are the main determinants of FD? 27




3 Private Investment and Financial Development 64
3.1 Introduction 64
3.2 The data 67
3.3 Analysis on data for five-year averages 69
vii
HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE viii — #8
viii Contents
3.3.1 Methodology: System GMM 69
3.3.2 Empirical results 73
3.4 Analysis on annual data 77
3.4.1 Methodology: Common factor approach 78
3.4.2 Panel unit root tests 81
3.4.3 Panel cointegration tests 84




4 Political Institutions and Financial Development 101
4.1 Introduction 101
4.2 Institutions, democratization and finance 102
4.3 The measures and data 104
4.3.1 The sample 104
4.3.2 The measure and data for financial development 105




4.5.1 Preliminary evidence 109
4.5.2 Regression results 114
4.6 Conclusion 121
Appendix tables 123
5 Financial Reforms for Financial Development 125
5.1 Introduction 125
5.2 Methodology 127
5.2.1 Model specifications 127
5.2.2 Econometric methods 131
5.3 Empirical evidence 133
5.3.1 Analysis on the original dataset 134




6 Geographic Determinants of Carbon
Markets (CDM) 161
6.1 Introduction 161
6.2 Data and stylized facts 164
HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE ix — #9
Contents ix
6.3 Econometric method: Spatial econometric approach 168
6.4 Empirical evidence 171






HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE x — #10
Figures
2.1 Scatter plots of institutions and financial development 25
2.2 Scatter plots of policy and financial development 26
2.3 Scatter plots of geography and financial development 27
2.4 Median Liquid Liability by different country group over
1960–2003 28
4.1 Financial development ten years before and after
democratization 113
4.2 Volatility of financial development ten years
pre/post-democratization 113
6.1 Scatter plots of CDM and geography 166
6.2 CDM and resource endowments 167
6.3 CDM and distance to biggest and smallest host countries 172
x
HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE xi — #11
Tables
2.1 Determinants of FD by using BMA 30
2.2 Determinants of FD 32
2.3 Top ten models and their posterior probabilities for FD 34
2.4 Geography, policy, institutions and FD 35
2.5 Determinants of FDBANK 38
2.6 Determinants of FDSTOCK 40
2.7 Determinants of FDEFF 42
2.8 Determinants of FDSIZE 44
3.1 Does private investment cause financial development?
1970–98 (five-year-average data) 74
3.2 Does financial development cause private investment?
1970–98 (five-year-average data) 75
3.3 Unit root tests in heterogeneous panels 83
3.4 Panel cointegration tests between FD and PI 85
3.5 Does private investment cause financial development?
1970–98 (Annual data) 90
3.6 Does financial development cause private investment?
1970–98 (Annual data) 91
4.1 Change in FD standardized before and after
democratization 111
4.2 Institutional improvement and financial development
(whole sample), 1960–99 115
4.3 Institutional improvement and financial development
(lower-income countries), 1960–99 117
4.4 Institutional improvement and financial development
(ethnically diverse countries), 1960–99 119
4.5 Institutional improvement and financial development
(French legal origin countries), 1960–99 120
5.1 Within estimates: Benchmark specification (Equation 4)
(A, B) 135
5.2 Within estimates: Alternative specification (Equations 5
and 6) 137
5.3 Within estimates: Alternative specification (Equation 8) 138
5.4 Error dependence across countries and over time
considered separately (A, B, C) 140
xi
HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE xii — #12
xii Tables
5.5 Augmented dataset with Chinn-Ito measure (2006)
(A, B, C) 145
6.1 Moran’s I and Geary’s C for CDM 173
6.2 Geography and CDM (by inverse-distance weights) 175
6.3 Geography and CDM (by binary weights) 177
HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE xiii — #13
Abbreviations
2SLS two-stage least squares estimator
ADF augmented Dickey-Fuller test
AM Abiad and Mody (2005)
AREA land area of a country in square km
AR(1) first-order autoregression
ARDL autoregressive distributed lag
ASIA dummy variable for Asian countries
BACE Bayesian averaging of classical estimates
BMA Bayesian model averaging
BMP black market premium (%)
BTOT index of commercial/central bank
CCE common correlated effect approach
CCEMG common correlated effect mean group estimator
CCEP common correlated effect pooled estimator
CDM clean development mechanism
CER certified emission reductions
CIVLEG dummy variable for civil law legal origin
COMLEG dummy variable for common-law legal origin
CRIGHT index of creditors’ rights
CTRADE natural log of the Frankel-Romer measure of
predisposition to external trade
DGP data-generating process
DURABLE index of political stability
EBA extreme bounds analysis
ELEV elevation in metres above sea level
ETHNIC index of ethnic fractionalization
ETHPOL index of ethnic polarization
EURFRAC index of European first language
EURO1900 percentage of population in 1900 European or of
European descent
EXPMANU dummy variable for manufactured goods exporting
countries
EXPPRIM dummy variable for fuel and non-fuel primary goods
exporting countries
EXPSERV dummy variable for service exporting countries
xiii
HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE xiv — #14
xiv Abbreviations
FD index of overall financial development
FDBANK index of extent of bank-based intermediation
FDBOND index of bond market development
FDEFF index of financial efficiency
FDSIZE index of size of financial system / financial depth
FDSTOCK index of measure of stock market development
FL index of financial liberalization
FREE averaged indices of civil liberties and political rights
GDN World Bank Global Development Network Database
GDP gross domestic product
GDP03 initial GDP per capita in 2003
GDP90 initial GDP per capita /initial income in 1990
Gets General-to-specific approach
GMM generalized method of moments estimator
GS2SLS generalized two-stage least squares estimator
GUM general unrestricted model
HINFL dummy variable for periods of high inflation
INCLOW dummy variable for low-income countries
INCMID dummy variable for middle-income countries
IC information criterion
KKM index of governance
LAC dummy variable for Latin American countries
LANDLOCK dummy variable for landlocked countries
LANGUAGE index of language fractionalization
LATITUDE absolute latitude of a country from the Equator
LEG_FR dummy variable for French legal origin countries
LEG_GE dummy variable for German legal origin countries
LEG_SC dummy variable for Scandinavian legal origin countries
LEG_UK dummy variable for British legal origin countries
LLY index of liquid liabilities
LR long-run
LSDV Least Squares Dummy Variable estimator
LSDVC corrected LSDV estimator
MC3 Markov Chain Monte Carlo technique
MCAP index of stock market capitalization
MEDSHARE index of market share of state-owned media
MG mean group estimator
MINDIST minimum distance from USA, Japan and Belgium
NIM index of net interest margin
OLS ordinary least squares estimator
HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE xv — #15
Abbreviations xv
OPENC trade openness (at current prices) or the sum of exports
and imports over GDP
OVC index of overhead costs
PC principal components
PcGets Gets computer algorithm
PCI index of political constraints
PIPs posterior probabilities of inclusion
PMG pooled mean groups estimator
PMP posterior model probabilities
POLITY2 index of democracy from Polity IV Database
POP03 initial population in 2003
POP90 initial population in 1990
POP100CR share of population in 1994 within 100 km of coast or
ocean-navigable river
PMP posterior model probability
PRIVO index of private credit
R a free software environment for statistical computing
and graphics.
REGEAP dummy variable for East Asian and Pacific countries
REGLAC dummy variable for Latin American countries
REGEMENA dummy variable for Middle Eastern and North African
countries
REGSA dummy variable for South Asian countries
REGSSA dummy variable for Sub-Saharan African countries
REGWENA dummy variable for Western European and North
American countries
RELIGION index of religious fractionalization
RESCOFF dummy variable for coffee/cocoa natural resources
exporting countries
RESDIFF dummy variable for diffuse natural resources exporting
countries
RESPOINT dummy variable for point source natural resource
exporting countries
RMSE root mean square error
RSS residual sum-of-squares
SDBMP std. dev. (or volatility) for the black market premium
SDGR std. dev. for annual growth rate real, chain-weighted
GDP 1960–89
SDPI std. dev. for annual inflation 1960–89
SDTP std. dev. for volatility of GDP per capita growth of
trading partners
HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE xvi — #16
xvi Abbreviations
SDTT std. dev. for volatility of the terms of trade index for
goods and services
SRIGHT index of shareholders’ rights
SSA dummy variable for Sub-Saharan countries
SYS-GMM System generalized method of moments estimator
TOPEN index of trade openness policy
TOR index of turnover ratio
TVT index of total value traded
USINT index of US Treasury Bill rate
WG within groups estimator
YRSOFFC dummy variable for the first year in office
HUANG: “FM” — 2010/9/30 — 18:48 — PAGE xvii — #17
Preface
While it is clear that financial depth has a positive effect on economic
growth, the questions of what determines financial development and
how to develop financial markets remain imperfectly understood. More
specifically, economists still have an insufficient understanding of the
following key issues. What brings about the emergence and develop-
ment of financial markets? What are the reasons why different financial
structures, bank-based or market-based, exist in countries where similar
levels of economic development have been reached? What accounts for
the differences in the levels of financial development in countries like
the OECD member countries which have similar income levels, and geo-
graphic conditions? The world witnessed the worst financial crisis and
climate crisis of our age during the period 2007–09. This highlights the
significance of the research into what is essential to the development of
financial markets and what is key to develop carbon markets for tackling
climate change.
Against this background, my book seeks to investigate the fundamen-
tal determinants of the development of financial markets and carbon
markets. It starts with a general examination of the determinants of
financial development in Chapter 2 and moves on to specific studies
in the following chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 examine two specific deter-
minants of financial development in the context of globalization. To be
more specific, Chapter 3 provides an exhaustive analysis of the causality
between aggregate private investment and financial development from
the economic point of view while Chapter 4 explores the determinants of
financial development from a political perspective, namely, the impact
of institutional improvement on financial development. Chapter 5 looks
at what induces governments to undertake reforms aimed at boosting
financial development. Chapter 6 is concerned with the development of
carbon markets, which is a newly developed/recently emerging area for
both research and practice. It examines what could explain the uneven
development of carbon markets in developing countries from a geo-
graphic point of view, with an aim of encouraging further research into
other determinants of carbon market development.
This book constitutes a unique addition to the expanding literature
in this field, and its contribution is highlighted by its title. It could be
xvii
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the first comprehensive book of this kind to explore this subject sys-
tematically by using various recently developed econometric methods.
It provides a very general but comprehensive overview of modern finan-
cial development theory and incorporates cutting-edge research in this
field, along with a huge number of relevant literature citations. This book
also presents the latest thinking on how to develop financial and carbon
markets. The findings of this book have rich implications for the con-
duct of macroeconomic policies in developing countries in an integrated
global economy.
This book is suitable for the students of financial development and
climate change at the advanced undergraduate or graduate level, for
economists and applied econometricians who are interested in economic
and financial development, financial liberalization and climate change
and for policy-makers and government agencies. This research topic will
continue to be of great interest to academics and practitioners across
the globe, which is underlined by the number of recent international
conferences and symposia devoted to the financial and climate crises.
I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to extend my sincere
thanks to all those who have made my research into these issues and
my writing of this book a truly fulfilling and unforgettable experience. It
goes without saying, or it should, that there are various people without
whom this book would never have been possible.
A great debt of gratitude is owed to my PhD supervisor, Professor
Jonathan Temple, for giving me his time, insights, enthusiasm, incred-
ible help and constant support. His remarkable insights into various
development issues, his erudition in economics and his willingness to
discuss and blue-sky with me, have enriched both my academic life and
this book. Also, high tribute should be paid to my Centre Director at
Cambridge University, Dr Terry Barker, who has kindly advised me on
various climate change issues, for example, the last chapter of this book.
His generous support and assistance have been of inestimable worth to
the conduct of my research and the accomplishment of this book. If this
book looks good, it is only because of their insightful suggestions and
invaluable help.
A number of academic members were no less critical to my research
during the years of the preparation of this book. It would be impos-
sible to give a comprehensive list, but I would like to thank Professor
Stephen Bond and Professor Frank Windmeijer for their expert com-
ments and advice. Dr Sonia Bhalotra, Dr Edmund Cannon, Dr David
Demory and Dr Andy Picking (in alphabetical order) kindly provided
thought-provoking input during my research at Bristol. I am also deeply
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indebted to Professor Philip Arestis, Professor Hashem Pesaran, Dr Mark
Roberts and other colleagues at Cambridge from whom I have greatly
benefited in terms of valuable suggestions.
I owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor Yuguang Yang at Fudan
University, who has played an important role in the course of my career
development. His professional conscientiousness (or rigorousness), pos-
itive attitude and strong thirst for knowledge have inspired me to go
forward over the years. My appreciation also goes to my close friends
from Fudan University, Youqiang Li, Zhiqun Lin, Zhuwu Xu, Muqing
Zheng and Xiaoxin Zhou (in alphabetical order) among others for their
heartfelt sincerity, encouragement and help in various circumstances.
I would like especially to acknowledge Taiba Batool and Gemma Papa-
georgiou at Palgrave Macmillan and Cathy Lowne, who have been
remarkably patient and helpful and whose expert jobs have helped to
make this book a reality. I also highly appreciate the contribution to the
book made in various ways by other people at Palgrave Macmillan. The
stamp of their illuminating advice and careful checking appears on every
page of my book.
On a personal note I wish as always to thank my beloved family for
their constant encouragement, unwavering support and love. From the
earliest time I can remember, my parents have instilled in me a love
of learning that has only grown over time. The incredible help and
love of my sister and brother enabled me to go through frustration and
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Among the profound evolutions in development economics in recent
decades has been the renewed interest in, and growing contributions
on, the role of financial systems in economic development. While it is
clear that a positive effect exists between financial depth and economic
growth, the questions of what determines financial development and
how to develop financial markets remain imperfectly understood.
Research on the role of financial development in growth can be
traced back at least to Bagehot (1873) who claims that large and
well-organized capital markets in England enhanced resource alloca-
tion towards more productive investment. Other historical antecedents
before 1970 include, among others, Schumpeter (1911), Hicks (1969) and
Goldsmith (1969). Schumpeter (1911) emphasizes the critical role of a
country’s banking system for economic development in mobilizing sav-
ings and encouraging productive investment. Hicks (1969) highlights the
importance of financial markets in the process of industrial revolution
with an observation that the development of financial systems facilitates
the applications of new technologies and innovations. Goldsmith (1969)
finds evidence of a positive link between financial development and eco-
nomic growth from a comparative study with data for 35 countries over
the period 1860–1963.
Over the past three decades, the financial repression and finan-
cial development framework proposed by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw
(1973) has been the main intellectual basis of financial market analy-
sis and policy advice. Before the 1970s most developing countries had
been financially repressed in the sense that their financial systems had
imposed upon them discriminatory taxation in the form of low interest
1
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2 Determinants of Financial Development
rate policies, high reserve requirements and high inflation rates. Keynes
(1936) and Tobin (1956) are among the various justifications for main-
taining these policies. The McKinnon-Shaw model of financial repression
formulates the phenomenon of financial repression and points out that
financial repression reduces both the quantity and quality of aggregate
investment in the economy in the sense that a lower deposit rate of
interest discourages households from holding deposits that would be
used to finance productive investment. The policy implication of the
McKinnon-Shaw model is that government’s repressive policies towards
financial systems (such as interest rate ceilings, high reserve require-
ments and credit control) retard financial development, and therefore
economic growth. On the contrary, financial liberalization and financial
development can stimulate investment and its productivity, and ulti-
mately foster economic growth. Since 1973, the McKinnon-Shaw model
has influenced financial sector policies in many developing countries
considerably.
Motivated by the McKinnon-Shaw model, a number of studies in this
area have been undertaken, such as Kapur (1976) and Mathieson (1980)
among others. However, these works in general treat financial intermedi-
ation and financial institutions as exogenous. The last two decades have
witnessed a resurgence of interest in the relationship between financial
development and economic growth which incorporates the insights of
endogenous growth models. These works include Townsend (1979), Dia-
mond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Williamson (1986, 1987), Ben-
civenga and Smith (1991), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Saint-Paul
(1992), King and Levine (1993) and Bernanke et al. (1999) among others.
Apart from a standard Arrow-Debreu framework, these studies make
use of the assumption of information asymmetry between lenders and
borrowers, producing significant findings. Due to the presence of infor-
mation asymmetries, the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard
might arise, since the borrowers (typically entrepreneurs) have incentives
to hide their actual (or expected) return on their investment, calling for
costly state verification. The financial contract and financial intermedi-
ation are therefore endogenously determined. Not only do these models
demonstrate how financial intermediaries emerge, they also analyse how
financial intermediation promotes economic growth. The inherent func-
tions of financial systems, including mobilizing savings to their highest
valued use, acquiring information, evaluating and monitoring invest-
ment projects and enabling individuals to diversify away idiosyncratic
risk, have been widely believed to encourage productive investment and
therefore total factor productivity.1
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Given the broad consensus on the substantial role of financial devel-
opment in economic growth, it is of great practical importance to
understand the origins of financial development. Economists still have
an insufficient understanding of what brings about the emergence and
development of financial markets, what are the reasons why different
financial structures, bank-based or market-based, exist in countries where
similar levels of economic development have been reached and what
accounts for the differences in the level of financial development in
countries like the OECD member countries which have similar income
levels and geographic conditions.
This research seeks to investigate the political, economic, policy and
geographic determinants of the development of financial markets. In
addition, it attempts to examine the causality between financial devel-
opment and another important aspect of economic activities, namely
aggregate private investment. It also aims to explore the consequences
of political liberalization in terms of institutional improvement for finan-
cial development and whether we should expect any changes in the
political system, from autocracy to democracy for example, to exert
any influence on the speed of financial development. It then stud-
ies what stimulates governments to initiate reforms aimed at financial
development. This research ends up in the last chapter by studying
the determinants of carbon markets in developing countries from a
geographic perspective.
The following section provides a brief review on the determinants of
financial development. Section 1.3 describes the structure of the book.
1.2 Origins of financial development: A review
Recent years have witnessed burgeoning research into the potential
determinants of financial development. This section briefly outlines the
main possible determinants of financial development, including insti-
tutional factors, macroeconomic factors, geographic factors and others
which have been studied in the literature.
1.2.1 Institutions
Research on the role of institutions in financial development has been
considerable, especially research on the effects of the legal and regu-
latory environment on the functioning of financial markets. A legal
and regulatory system involving protection of property rights, contract
enforcement and good accounting practices has been identified as essen-
tial for financial development. Most prominently, La Porta et al. (1997,
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1998) have argued that the origins of the legal code substantially influ-
ence the treatment of creditors and shareholders, and the efficiency of
contract enforcement. They document that countries with a legal code
like Common Law tend to protect private property owners, while coun-
tries with a legal code like French Civil Law tend to care more about
the rights of the state and less about the rights of the masses. Countries
with French Civil Law are said to have comparatively inefficient contract
enforcement and higher corruption, and less well-developed financial
systems, while countries with a British legal origin achieve higher lev-
els of financial development. Among others, Mayer and Sussman (2001)
emphasize that regulations concerning information disclosure, account-
ing standards, permissible banking practice and deposit insurance do
appear to have material effects on financial development.
Beck et al. (2003)’s application of the settler mortality hypothesis
of Acemoglu et al. (2001) to financial development is another signifi-
cant work in this context. They argue that colonizers, often named as
extractive colonizers, in an inhospitable environment aimed to estab-
lish institutions which privileged small elite groups rather than private
investors, while colonizers, often named as settler colonizers, in more
favourable environments were more likely to create institutions which
supported private property rights and balanced the power of the state,
therefore favouring financial development. Both the legal origin the-
ory of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Beck et al. (2003)’s application
are related to colonization, but the former is more concerned with how
colonization determines the national approaches to property rights and
financial development, whereas the latter is more about the channel via
which colonization influences financial development.
The recently developed “new political economy” approach regards
“regulation and its enforcement as a result of the balance of power
between social and economic constituencies” (Pagano and Volpin, 2001).
It centres on self-interested policy-makers who can intervene in financial
markets by either overall regulation or individual cases for purposes such
as career concerns and group interests. Rajan and Zingales (2003) empha-
size the role of interest groups, and especially the incumbent industrial
firms and the domestic financial sector, in the process of financial devel-
opment. They argue that, in the absence of openness, incumbents have
strong incentives to block the development of a more transparent and
competitive financial sector which undermines the incumbents’ vested
interests and relationships. When both trade openness and financial
openness are encouraged, the incumbents have incentives to support
financial development from which more funds can be sought to meet
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foreign competition and new rents can be generated to compensate
partially for their loss of incumbency.
Generally speaking, institutions might have a profound impact on the
supply side of financial development. The level of institutional develop-
ment in a country to some extent determines the sophistication of the
financial system.
1.2.2 Policy
The policy view highlights the importance of some macroeconomic poli-
cies, openness of goods markets and financial liberalization in promoting
financial development. The significant effect of policy on financial devel-
opment could be working through either its demand side or its supply
side.
Some major national macroeconomic policies such as maintaining
lower inflation and higher investment have been documented as being
conducive to financial development. Huybens and Smith (1999) the-
oretically and Boyd et al. (2001) empirically investigate the effects of
inflation on financial development and conclude that economies with
higher inflation rates are likely to have smaller, less active and less effi-
cient banks and equity markets. Some recent work has supported the
view that policies which encourage openness to external trade tend to
boost financial development (Do and Levchenko, 2004).
In addition, research has been carried out to study the effects of finan-
cial liberalization on financial development over the past three decades,
following the McKinnon-Shaw model (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973),
which concludes that while financial repression reduces the quantity
and quality of aggregate investment, financial liberalization can foster
economic growth by increasing investment and its productivity. The
positive link between domestic financial liberalization and financial
development is supported by evidence (World Bank, 1989), although
domestic financial liberalization is not without risks (Demirgüç-Kunt
and Detragiache, 1998). Research on the positive correlation between
external financial liberalization, especially capital account openness, and
financial development is discussed in the panel data studies of Bailliu
(2000) and Chinn and Ito (2006), although potential destabilizing effects
may also exist. Claessens et al. (1998) present evidence that opening
banking markets improves the functioning of national banking systems
and the quality of financial services, with positive implications for bank-
ing customers and lower profitability for domestic banks. Laeven (2000)
examines whether the liberalization of the banking sector may help to
reduce financial restrictions and the external cost of the capital premium,
HUANG: “CHAP01” — 2010/9/29 — 20:05 — PAGE 6 — #6
6 Determinants of Financial Development
stimulating investment and financial development. Bekaert et al. (2002)
provide evidence that opening up the stock market to foreign investors
renders stock returns more volatile and more highly correlated with the
world market return.
1.2.3 Geography
There is less work directly addressing the potential correlation between
geography and financial development in comparison to that for pol-
icy and institutions. However, much research attention has been paid
to the importance of geography for general economic development,
emphasizing three aspects in particular.
The first group is concerned with the correlation between latitude and
economic development. Countries closer to the equator typically have
a more tropical climate. On the one hand, research by Kamarck (1976),
Diamond (1997), Gallup et al. (1999) and Sachs (2003a, 2003b) suggests
that tropical location may lead directly to poor crop yields and produc-
tion due to adverse ecological conditions such as fragile tropical soils,
unstable water supply and prevalence of crop pests. On the other hand,
tropical location can be characterized as an inhospitable disease environ-
ment, which is believed to be a primary cause for “extractive” institutions
(Acemoglu et al., 2001).
A second strand of research relates to countries being landlocked, dis-
tant from large markets or having only limited access to coasts and rivers
navigable to the ocean (Sachs and Warner, 1995a, 1995b, 1997; East-
erly and Levine, 2003; Malik and Temple, 2009). As natural barriers to
external trade and knowledge dissemination, geographic isolation and
remoteness to some extent determine the scale and structure of external
trade in which countries engage. The potential to enter a large economic
market and exploit economies of scale may be limited by particular
geographic circumstances. The ability to develop a competitive man-
ufacturing sector may be constrained when some intermediate inputs
for the production of manufactured goods need to be imported from
distant markets. As the main feature of external trade for these coun-
tries, the limited range of primary commodities exported determines the
vulnerability of these countries to external shocks.
The last strand of research focuses on the link between resource
endowment and economic development. Diamond (1997) suggests that
countries with a richer endowment of grain species have more potential
for high-yielding food crops and technological development. Isham et al.
(2005) argue that a developing country’s natural resource endowment
affects its economic development through an unique channel in which
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natural resource endowment is linked to different export structures,
different export structures determine institutional capacities towards
coping with external shocks and finally institutional quality is reflected
in the level of GDP per capita. Easterly and Levine (2003) argue that
the natural endowment of tropics, germs and crops indirectly influences
income through the impacts of these on institutions.
In general, geography is likely to work mainly through the demand
side of financial development, although it may affect its supply side
by influencing the quality of institutions. For instance, the production
of particular agricultural products or primary goods and exploitation of
some natural resources could reduce the demand for external finance,
relative to other countries at a similar level of GDP per capita.
1.2.4 Other variables
Other variables considered as determinants of financial development
are economic growth, the income level, population level and religious,
language and ethnic characteristics, etc. Greenwood and Jovanovic
(1990) and Saint-Paul (1992) document that as the economy grows, the
costs of financial intermediation decrease due to intensive competition,
inducing a larger scale of funds available for productive investment.
The importance of income levels for financial development has been
addressed in Levine (1997, 2003, 2005). In considering banking sector
development in 23 transition economies, Jaffee and Levonian (2001)
demonstrate that the level of GDP per capita and the saving rate have
positive effects on the banking system structure as measured by bank
assets, numbers, branches and employees.
Stulz and Williamson (2003) stress the impact of differences in cul-
ture, proxied by differences in religion and language, on the process
of financial development. They provide evidence that culture predicts
cross-country variation in protection and enforcement of investor rights,
especially of creditor rights. The evidence also shows that the influence
of culture on creditor rights protection is mitigated by the introduction
of trade openness. Djankov et al. (2003) shed light on the role of state
ownership of the media in the extent of financial development.
1.3 Structure of the book
This research starts from a general examination of fundamental deter-
minants of financial market development, and moves on to specific
studies as to the effects of aggregate private investment and institutional
improvement on financial development. It ends up with a study on the
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geographic determinants of carbon market development in developing
countries, mainly the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) markets.
The structure of this book is outlined as follows:
Chapter 2 is concerned with the main determinants of cross-country
differences in financial development. Two prominent tools for address-
ing model uncertainty, Bayesian Model Averaging and General-to-
specific approaches, are jointly applied to investigate the financial
development effects of a wide range of variables taken from various
sources. The analysis suggests that the level of financial development in a
country is mainly influenced by the latter’s overall level of development,
the origins of its legal system and the quality of its institutions.
Chapter 3 provides an exhaustive analysis of the causality between
financial development and another important aspect of economic activ-
ities, namely aggregate private investment. It uses recently developed
panel data techniques on data for 43 developing countries over the
period 1970–98. GMM estimation on averaged data, and a common fac-
tor approach on annual data allowing for global interdependence and
heterogeneity across countries, suggest positive causal effects going in
both directions. This finding has rich implications for the development
of financial markets and the conduct of macroeconomic policies in devel-
oping countries in an integrated global economy. GMM results based on
averaged data appear in the Journal of Statistics: Advanced in Theory and
Applications, 2009, 2(2), whilst GMM results based on annual data appear
in an Empirical Economics Special Issue on “New Perspectives on Finance
and Development”, 2010.
Chapter 4 studies the effect of institutional improvement on financial
development in two steps. It examines whether political liberalization
in terms of institutional improvement promotes financial development,
using a panel dataset of 90 developed and developing countries over the
period 1960–99, revealing a positive effect on financial development at
least in the short run, particularly for lower-income countries, ethnically
divided countries and French legal origin countries. The results of this
chapter appear in World Development, 2010 38(12).
Chapter 5 studies what induces governments to undertake reforms
aimed at financial development. Its starting point is Abiad and Mody
(2005). Rather than their ordered logit technique, it uses a within groups
approach allowing for error dependence across countries and over time.
This chapter finds that policy change in a country is negatively rather
than positively associated with its liberalization level, while the regional
liberalization gap appears less relevant. On the effects of shocks and
crises, it suggests that some of the Abiad and Mody (2005) findings are
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robust, but others are fragile. Furthermore, it claims that the extent of
democracy is important for this analysis, and identifies a negative effect
of the extent of democracy on policy reform. Some results of this chapter
appear in the Journal of Applied Econometrics, 2009, 24(7).
Chapter 6 examines whether certain geographic endowments matter
for the CDM market development. It suggests that CDM credit flows in
a country are positively affected by those in its neighbouring countries.
Countries with higher absolute latitudes and elevations tend to initiate
more CDM projects, whereas countries having richer natural resources
do not seem to undertake more CDM projects. This finding sheds light
on the geographic determinants of uneven CDM development across
countries, and has implications for developing countries in terms of
international cooperation and national capacity building for effective
access to the CDM.





This chapter attempts to examine systematically the factors that might
account for cross-country differences in financial development. It
employs two modern quantitative methods, Bayesian Model Averaging
(BMA) and General-to-specific (Gets) approaches, to gauge the robust-
ness of a selection of possible determinants of financial development.
Special emphasis has been placed on the contributions that institutions,
policy and geography may have in developing financial markets.
First, we take a look at some simple contrasts in the financial develop-
ment experience. The United Kingdom and France have similar levels of
GDP per capita, democratic institutions and geographic characteristics
in terms of latitude, access to the sea and distance from large markets.
Nevertheless, they follow different legal traditions, reflected in different
legal practices towards the protection of private property rights. In the
1990s, stock market capitalization to GDP ratio in the UK was more than
three times higher than that in France, while the ratio of private credit
to GDP in the UK (112%) was noticeably higher than the same ratio in
France (89%). How much of the difference in financial depth between
the UK and France is due to the difference in their legal traditions and
practices?
The financial development experience in Latin American countries
provides an enlightening example of the possible role of macroeconomic
policies in financial development given the similarities of geographic
conditions, institutional development and cultural characteristics. After
implementing market-oriented policies in the 1970s and establishing
prudential regulations in the 1980s, Chile achieved remarkable growth
in financial intermediary development and stock market capitalization,
10
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and has been regarded as the financial leader in Latin America since the
mid-1980s. In the 1990s both the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and the
ratio of private credit to GDP in Chile were 50 percentage points higher
than those of Brazil, the second best country in the region. Stock market
capitalization as a fraction of GDP in Chile in the 1990s was 78%, at least
three times larger than that in any other Latin American country. How
much of the success of Chilean financial development is due to better
macroeconomic policies?
In the 1990s the ratio of credit issued to the private sector to GDP
in Canada was 94%, more than four times higher than that in Mexico
of 23%. Stock market capitalization as a fraction of GDP in Canada in
1990s was 65%, more than twice as high as in Mexico (31%). Canada and
Mexico share a number of similarities in terms of geographic endow-
ments and institutional development. More specifically, both of them
have access to the sea, have a long border with the biggest developed
country, have a large land area and a democratic political system, etc.
However, among other factors, Canada and Mexico apparently differ in
income level and latitude, which is associated with historical dominance
of tropical cash crops in Mexico and grain in Canada. How much of the
difference in financial depth between Canada and Mexico is due to the
difference in income level and how much is due to their geographic
endowment, and its long-run effects on institutions?
Exploring what determines financial development has become an
increasingly significant research topic in recent years. Examples are La
Porta et al. (1997, 1998), Beck et al. (2003), Rajan and Zingales (2003)
and Stulz and Williamson (2003) to mention a few. La Porta et al. (1997,
1998) have made a significant contribution to this topic with regard to
the legal determinants of financial development. By applying the settler
mortality hypothesis of Acemoglu et al. (2001) to financial development,
Beck et al. (2003) address how institutions matter for financial develop-
ment. The Rajan and Zingales (2003) interest groups theory argues that
politics matter for financial development. Stulz and Williamson (2003)
illustrate that culture matters, although it may be tempered by open-
ness. As to the role of policy, among others, Baltagi et al. (2009) study
the importance of trade openness, whilst Chinn and Ito (2006) focus on
the effect of financial openness.
Besides this, there is a large body of research aiming to identify the
determinants of financial development, ranging from some emphasizing
macroeconomic factors such as inflation, the income level (in terms of
GDP per capita) and the saving rate to others stressing institutional and
geographic factors. Since the relevant economic theories provide limited
HUANG: “CHAP02” — 2010/9/29 — 20:05 — PAGE 12 — #3
12 Determinants of Financial Development
guidance on the specification of a cross-country regression for finan-
cial development, it is not clear which of these factors, acting relatively
independently, plays the primary role in determining financial devel-
opment when they are all taken into consideration. Formally speaking,
there is a model uncertainty problem concerning which variables should
be included in the model to capture the underlying data-generating
process.
When facing a situation where a vast literature suggests a variety
of economic policy, political and institutional factors as determinants
of long-run average growth rates, Levine and Renelt (1992) raised a
concern over the robustness of existing conclusions in cross-section
growth regressions. They found that only a few variables can be regarded
as robust determinants of growth and almost all results are “fragile”.
They suggested applying a version of “extreme bounds analysis” to the
problem of model uncertainty. Motivated by this influential work, Sala-
i-Martin (1997a, 1997b), Fernandez et al. (2001) and Sala-i-Martin et al.
(2004) are significant works among others that have investigated the con-
tributions of various factors to cross-country growth. These works have
emphasized the Bayesian method as a potential technique for addressing
model uncertainty.
Empirical research on the determinants of financial development
encounters a similar model uncertainty problem to that on economic
growth. This chapter is the first attempt to study extensively the struc-
tural determinants of financial development using a large array of
variables, by jointly applying BMA and the so-called LSE Gets approach,
which is another modern method aiming to recover the true data-
generating process. The Gets method has been recently developed and
advocated by David Hendry and other practitioners (Hoover and Perez,
1999; Krolzig and Hendry, 2001 and Hendry and Krolzig, 2005 for exam-
ple). To date, BMA and Gets have become more and more popular for the
purpose of model selection, although the theory of econometric model
selection is still underdeveloped.
Not only will this chapter look at each individual factor, but it also
pays special attention to the roles of institutions, policy and geography
in the process of financial development.2 There has been substantial
research on the role of institutions, policies and geography in the pro-
cess of economic development in which much work regards institutions
as the fundamental factor in long-run growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001;
Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Easterly and Levine, 2003 and Rodrik et al.,
2004). In particular, research by Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik
et al. (2004) highlights the dominant role of institutions over those
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of geography and policy. They argue that geography and policy affect
economic development through institutions by influencing institutional
quality, and the direct effect of geography and policy on development
becomes weaker once institutions are controlled for. Is this also the case
for financial development?
In three aspects, this chapter exhibits distinct innovations and
strengths. First, it considers a wider assortment of economic, political
and geographic variables than any previous study. The second aspect
is its joint application of the BMA and Gets procedures, which com-
bines the strengths of each method. By jointly applying two modern
methods using a wide range of variables, more reliable conclusions can
be expected. Third, since, as pointed out by Levine (2005), there is
no uniformly accepted proxy for financial development currently avail-
able, this paper constructs a composite index of financial development
using principal component analysis, which enables us to look at different
dimensions of financial development including overall financial devel-
opment, financial intermediary development, stock market develop-
ment, financial efficiency development and financial size development
(usually called “financial depth”).
The analyses based on the BMA and Gets procedures lead to the follow-
ing findings. Institutions, macroeconomic policies and geography, when
taken as groups, together with cultural characteristics and the income
level of a country, are significantly associated with the level of financial
development. Of 39 variables taken individually, legal origins, a govern-
ment quality index, a trade policy index, land area, initial GDP, initial
population and the population fraction of speakers of the main Western
languages are found to be important determinants of financial develop-
ment. In particular, this research highlights the dominant roles played
by initial GDP, legal origin and institutional quality in the process of
financial development.
The following section includes a description of the data. Section 2.3
discusses the empirical strategy and is followed by the empirical results
of both BMA and Gets in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 summarizes the
conclusions.
2.2 The data
This section describes the sample of countries on which this study is
undertaken, and the measures of financial development and potential
determinants. Appendix Table A2.1 contains the description and sources
of these variables and Appendix Table A2.2 presents summary statistics.
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2.2.1 Samples
This study mainly investigates key determinants of five specific indices
of financial development discussed in more depth below. For each finan-
cial index, there are three samples on which the investigation is based:
the whole sample, a developing country sample and a smaller sample for
which the La Porta et al. (1998) data are available. The whole sample is the
main focus of the analysis. The developing countries in the settler mortal-
ity dataset of Acemoglu et al. (2001) form the main part of the developing
country sample here. Looking at the smaller La Porta et al. (1998) sam-
ple makes it possible to examine whether differences in legal tradition,
reflected in the protection of shareholders’ and creditors’ rights, deter-
mine cross-country differences in financial development. The countries
included are listed in Appendix Table A2.3.
Note that the transition economies and small economies with a pop-
ulation of less than 500,000 in 1990 are excluded from the sample. The
information on the transition economies and population size is from
the World Bank Global Development Network Database (GDN) and the
Penn World Table 6.2 from Heston et al. (2006), respectively.
2.2.2 Measures of financial development
Since there is no single aggregate index for financial development in the
literature, we use principal component analysis based on widely used
indicators of financial development to produce new aggregate indices.
Essentially the principal components analysis takes N specific indica-
tors and produces new indices (the principal components) X1, X2,...XN
that are mutually uncorrelated. Each principal component, as a linear
combination of the N indicators, captures a different dimension of the
data. Typically the variances of several of the principal components are
low enough to be negligible, and hence the majority of the variation
in the data will then be captured by a small number of indices. This
chapter uses the first principal component, which accounts for the great-
est amount of the variation in the original set of indicators, in the sense
that the linear combination corresponding to the first principal compo-
nent has the highest sample variance, subject to the constraint that the
sum-of-squares of the weights placed on the (standardized) indicators is
equal to one.
The conventional measures of financial development on which the
principal component analysis is based are as follows.3
The first measure, Liquid Liabilities (LLY), is one of the major indi-
cators used to measure the size, relative to the economy, of financial
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intermediaries, including three types of financial institutions: the central
bank, deposit money banks and other financial institutions. It is calcu-
lated as the liquid liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermedi-
aries (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities) over GDP.
The second indicator, Private Credit (PRIVO), is defined as the credit
issued to the private sector by banks and other financial intermediaries
divided by GDP, excluding credit issued to government, government
agencies and public enterprises, as well as the credit issued by the mon-
etary authority and development banks. It measures general financial
intermediary activities provided to the private sector.
The third, Commercial-Central Bank (BTOT), is the ratio of commer-
cial bank assets to the sum of commercial bank and central bank assets. It
proxies the advantage of financial intermediaries in channelling savings
to investment, monitoring firms, influencing corporate governance and
undertaking risk management relative to the central bank.
Next are two efficiency measures for the banking sector. Overhead
Costs (OVC) is the ratio of overhead costs to total bank assets. The
Net Interest Margin (NIM) equals the difference between bank inter-
est income and interest expenses, divided by total assets. A lower value
of overhead costs and net interest margin is frequently interpreted as
indicating greater competition and efficiency.
The last are three indices for stock market development.4 Stock Market
Capitalization (MCAP), the size index, is the ratio of the value of listed
domestic shares to GDP. Total Value Traded (TVT), as an indicator to
measure market activity, is the ratio of the value of domestic shares traded
on domestic exchanges to GDP, and can be used to gauge market liquidity
on an economy-wide basis. Turnover Ratio (TOR) is the ratio of the value
of domestic share transactions on domestic exchanges to the total value
of listed domestic shares. A high value of the turnover ratio will indicate
a more liquid (and potentially more efficient) equity market.
The data are obtained from the World Bank’s Financial Structure and
Economic Development Database (2008) and averaged over 1990–2001.
Any country for which fewer than three years of data are available is
omitted from the sample.
Appendix Table A2.4 presents the eigenvalues, proportion explained
and the eigenvector of each first principal component from which the
new indices of financial development are defined. It reports the sam-
ple variance of each first principal component (linear combination), the
proportion of the variance in the raw data the first principal component
accounts for and the coefficient (weight) of each existing standardized
measure in the linear combination.
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(1) The first is a measure of overall financial development, denoted by
FD. This is based on eight components, namely Liquid Liabilities, Private
Credit, Commercial-central Bank, Overhead Cost, Net Interest Mar-
gin, Stock Market Capitalization, Value Traded and Turnover. The first
principal component accounts for 49% of the variation in these seven
indicators. In Appendix Table A2.4 the coefficients of each financial
indicator for FD indicate the negative correlations between the Over-
head Cost and Net Interest Margin and FD, and the positive correlations
between the rest and FD.
(2) A second measure, FDBANK, captures the extent of bank-based
intermediation. It uses five indicators, Liquid Liabilities, Private Credit,
Commercial-central Bank, Overhead Costs and Net Interest Margin.
FDBANK accounts for 61% of the variation in these five indicators.
(3) A third measure, FDSTOCK is a measure of stock market develop-
ment, based on Stock Market Capitalization, Value Traded and Turnover.
FDSTOCK accounts for 66% of the variations in these financial indices.
(4) A fourth measure, FDEFF, captures financial efficiency. The four
indicators of financial efficiency used are Overhead Cost, Net Interest
Margin, Value Traded and Turnover. FDEFF accounts for 54% of the total
variation in these indicators. Lower values of this index indicate a higher
level of financial efficiency.
(5) A fifth measure, FDSIZE, based solely on Liquid Liabilities and Stock
Market Capitalization, captures the size of financial system (also called
“financial depth”). The first principal component of these two measures
accounts for 81% of the variation.
2.2.3 The potential determinants
Potential determinants of financial development considered in this anal-
ysis are widely selected from various sources. To discover the structural
determinants of financial development, they are either those “predeter-
mined” like fixed factors, or those “evolving slowly over time” like some
institutional factors which are averaged over 1960–89. All variables that
could potentially cause serious endogeneity problems are excluded.5 The
candidate determinants are grouped into four categories as showed in
Appendix Table A2.1. The problem of missing data has been addressed
by using a set of fixed factors as independent variables to impute the
missing data. The fixed factors used include some regional dummies,
dummies for income levels and geographic factors for which we have
a complete set of data. The imputation procedure is summarized in
Appendix Table A2.5.
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2.2.3.1 Institutional variables
This analysis firstly considers legal origin dummies from the GDN dataset
in the work by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) on the legal determinants
of financial development. The relevant variables are the common law
legal origin dummy (COMLEG) for countries with British legal origin
and a civil law legal origin dummy (CIVLEG) for countries with French,
Germany and Scandinavian legal origins. Two variables closely related
to the financial system itself are also considered.6 Taken from the dataset
of La Porta et al. (1998), SRIGHT is the aggregate index for shareholders’
rights ranging from 0 to 6, while CRIGHT is the aggregate index for
creditors’ rights ranging from 0 to 4. These variables measure directly
the extent to which the government protects the rights of shareholders
and creditors.
In addition, this research makes use of some general institutional indi-
cators. POLITY2 and DURABLE are taken from the PolityIV Database
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2009), and averaged over 1960–89. POLITY2 is
an index of democracy, seeking to reflect government type and institu-
tional quality based on freedom of suffrage, operational constraints and
balances on executives and respect for other basic political rights and civil
liberties. It is called the “combined polity score”, equal to the democracy
score minus the autocracy score. The democracy and autocracy scores
are derived from six authority characteristics (regulation, competitive-
ness and openness of executive recruitment, operational independence
of chief executive or executive constraints and regulation and competi-
tion of participation). Based on these criteria, each country is assigned a
democracy score and autocracy score ranging from 0 to 10. Accordingly,
POLITY2 ranges from -10 to 10 with higher values representing more
democratic regimes. DURABLE is an index of political stability, using the
number of years since the last transition in the type of regime or inde-
pendence. The next variable is FREE, the average of the indices of civil
liberties and political rights from the Freedom House Country Survey
(2008) over 1972–89. Higher ratings indicate better civil liberties and
political rights such as freedom to develop views, institutions and per-
sonal autonomy from government. I also employ KKM and PCI . The
KKM measure from Kaufmann et al. (2008) is a widely used indicator of
the quality of government in a broader sense, derived by averaging six
measures of government quality: voice and accountability, political sta-
bility and absence of violence, government effectiveness, light regulatory
burden, rule of law and freedom from graft. The variable PCI , mea-
suring narrowly the constraints on the executive, is derived by Henisz
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(2000). The last institutional variable I use is EURO1900, the percentage
of population that was European or of European descent in 1900, taken
from Acemoglu et al. (2001).
Although missing values for EURO1900, SRIGHT , CRIGHT and the
market share of state-owned media (discussed below) are imputed, the
variable EURO1900 appears only in the developing country sample while
the others appear only in the La Porta sample.
2.2.3.2 Policy variables
To examine whether macroeconomic policy variables explain cross-
country variation in financial development, this research makes exten-
sive use of five economic volatility indicators and three trade openness
indicators. It uses output volatility and inflation volatility to capture
macroeconomic mismanagement and fluctuations. The output volatil-
ity measure (SDGR) is defined as the standard deviation of the annual
growth rate of real, chain-weighted GDP per capita over 1960–89 from
the Penn World Table 6.2. Inflation volatility (SDPI) is defined as the
standard deviation of the annual inflation rate over 1960–89 from the
World Development Indicators (2008). Taken from the GDN, the volatil-
ity of the black market premium (SDBMP), volatility of the terms of trade
(SDTT) and trading partners’ output volatility (SDTP) are used to reflect
the extent of external shocks. SDBMP is defined as the standard devia-
tion of the annual black market premium (BMP) over 1960–89. SDTT is
defined as the standard deviation of the first log-differences of a terms
of trade index for goods and services. SDTP is the standard deviation
of trading partners’ GDP per capita growth (weighted average by trade
share).
To assess the role of trade factors, this research uses dummies for fuel
and non-fuel primary goods exporting countries (EXPPRIM) and manu-
factured goods exporting countries (EXPMANU ) from the GDN. A trade
openness policy index, TOPEN, available from the database of Har-
vard University’s Center for International Development (Gallup et al.,
1999), is utilized to measure the extent of openness to external trade
in the presence of government intervention over 1965–90, while the
trade share proposed by Frankel and Romer (1999), denoted by CTRADE,
is employed to capture natural openness to external trade. CTRADE is
derived by Frankel and Romer (1999) by summing up all bilateral trade
with all potential trading partners from a bilateral trade equation that
controls for population and land area of the home country and trading
partners, the distance between any two trading partners and whether or
not the home country is landlocked.
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2.2.3.3 Geographic variables
To examine the role of geography, this study takes six regional dum-
mies from the GDN for East Asian and Pacific countries (REGEAP),
Middle Eastern and North African countries (REGMENA), Western Euro-
pean and North American countries (REGWENA), South Asian countries
(REGSA), Sub-Saharan African countries (REGSSA) and Latin American
and Caribbean countries (REGLAC), respectively. It also uses the follow-
ing two geographic variables from the GDN. The landlocked variable
(LANDLOCK) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the coun-
try has no coastal access to the ocean, and 0 otherwise. There are 17
landlocked countries in the whole sample. Absolute latitude (LATITUDE)
equals the absolute distance of a country from the Equator. The closer to
the equator the countries are, the more tropical climate they have.7 Lati-
tude potentially has an institutional interpretation since smaller absolute
latitudes are associated with more unfavourable environments, which
are associated with weaker institutions according to the settler mor-
tality hypothesis of Acemoglu et al. (2001). The land area (AREA) in
square kilometres for each country, taken from Hall and Jones (1999), is
in logs.
This study also makes use of three additional geographic variables.
One is POP100CR from the database of Harvard University’s Center for
International Development. It is the 1994 share of population within
100 km of a coast or navigable river for a country. Another is MINDIST ,
based on data from Jon Haveman’s International Trade website. This
captures the minimum distance from the three capital-goods-supplying
centres in the world (USA, Japan and the EU, the centre of the latter
represented by Belgium). The study uses the logarithm of the minimum
distance from the three capital-goods-supplying centres plus one. These
variables might be highly correlated with external trade and manufac-
turing, since lack of access to coasts or rivers navigable to the ocean
and geographic remoteness constitute natural disadvantages to exter-
nal trade. A further variable for geographic endowment is a dummy
for the point source natural resource exporting countries (RESPOINT)
from Isham et al. (2005), who find that, in comparison to manufactur-
ing exporters and exporters of “diffuse” natural resources (e.g. wheat, rice
and animals) and coffee/cocoa natural resources, the exporting countries
of “point source” natural resources (e.g. oil, diamonds and plantation
crops) are more likely to have severe social and economic divisions,
and less likely to develop socially cohesive mechanisms and effective
institutional capacities for managing shocks.
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2.2.3.4 Other variables
Other variables included in this analysis are initial income (GDP90), ini-
tial population (POP90), an ethnic fractionalization index (ETHNIC),
an ethnic polarization index (ETHPOL), a religious fractionalization
index (RELIGION), a language fractionalisation index (LANGUAGE),
a European first language index (EURFRAC) and the market share of
state-owned media, either television or newspapers (MEDSHARE).
The inclusion of the level of GDP per capita in 1990 (GDP90) is stim-
ulated by work such as Greenwood and Smith (1997) on the feedback
from growth in the economy to the development of financial markets.
Population size is also closely related to indices of financial development
since small countries tend to have higher ratios of liquid liabilities and
private credit, having the potential to affect the overall results substan-
tially. GDP90 and POP90, the level of the population in 1990, are from
the GDN and used in logs.
The variables ETHNIC, RELIGION and LANGUAGE, taken from Alesina
et al. (2003), characterize social divisions and cultural differences, as does
the variable ETHPOL, which is taken from Reynal-Querol and Montalvo
(2005) to capture the extent to which a large ethnic minority faces an
ethnic majority in a society. The EURFRAC measure, taken from Hall and
Jones (1999), is the fraction of population speaking one of the major
languages of Western Europe (English, French, German, Portuguese or
Spanish) as a mother tongue. To some extent, this variable reflects not
only the culture of the country, but also the history of colonization. It is
therefore closely linked to some other variables like EURO1900, CIVLEG
and COMLEG.
The market share of stated-owned media (MEDSHARE) is from Djankov
et al. (2003), which shows that greater state ownership of the media is
associated with less political and economic freedom, inferior governance,
less developed capital markets and poor health outcomes. Djankov et al.
(2003) consider two kinds of media state ownership. One is press state
ownership, the market share of state-owned newspapers out of the aggre-
gate market share of the five largest daily newspapers (by circulation), and
the other is television state ownership, the market share of state-owned
television stations out of the aggregate market share of the five largest
television stations (by viewer). The index used here is the average of the
two media state ownerships.
2.3 Empirical strategy
This section discusses the empirical strategies for dealing with model
uncertainty faced by research on the determinants of financial develop-
ment, with the central focus placed on BMA and Gets approaches.
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As summarized in the Introduction, substantial research has been
done to explore the origins of financial development, leading to a large
number of candidate determinants. Essentially the associated theories,
developed under specific settings, are not mutually exclusive, raising
concern over the robustness of these candidate determinants in any
cross-section regression used to explain financial development.
Usually, the uncertainty about the composition of a regression model
is called “model uncertainty”. To handle the model uncertainty issue,
a number of methodologies have been proposed and widely debated.
Among others, the Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA), BMA and Gets are
the most famous methods.
To handle the model uncertainty issue, a number of methodologies
have been proposed and widely debated. Among others, the EBA,8 BMA9
and Gets10 are the most widely used methods. Although the BMA and
Gets procedures have respective advantages in handling model uncer-
tainty, neither of them is without limits or exempt from criticism.11 This
research chooses to apply the BMA and Gets procedures jointly to handle
model uncertainty in this context. The combination of Gets and BMA
analyses has the advantage of incorporating their merits while circum-
venting some of their limitations. In what follows, I set out the methods
of BMA and Gets in more detail.
2.3.1 Bayesian Model Averaging
This section begins with a brief review of the development of BMA
approach.
Following the seminal work by Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin
(1997a,b)12, Fernandez et al. (2001)13 and Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004)
are among the significant works using BMA to study the robustness
of cross-country growth regressions. Based on work by Raftery (1995),
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) propose a version of BMA called Bayesian Aver-
aging of Classical Estimates (BACE), in which diffuse priors are assumed
for the parameters and only one other prior, relating to the expected
model size, is required. This approach has generated evidence in favour
of Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b)’s original findings as well.
Essentially, BMA treats parameters and models as random variables
and attempts to summarize the uncertainty about the model in terms
of a probability distribution over the space of possible models. More
specifically, it is used to average the posterior distribution for the param-
eters under all possible models, where the weights are the posterior
model probabilities (PMPs). To evaluate these, the BMA uses the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) to approximate the Bayes factors which are
needed to compute the posterior model probability, whose derivation is
described in the Appendix Text.
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Typically, the number of possible models, 2p given p candidate vari-
ables, is large. Most applications of BMA to larger datasets do not average
over all possible models, but use a search algorithm to identify the sub-
set of models with greatest relevance. The Occam’s Window and Markov
Chain Monte Carlo techniques can be adopted for this purpose.14 The
approach developed by Hoeting et al. (1996) has the advantage of select-
ing variables and identifying outliers simultaneously, but requires a larger
sample size relative to the regressor set, and so this method will be applied
only in Table 2.1 below. The simpler version of BMA used elsewhere in
this study follows Raftery et al. (1997) which focuses only on the subset
defined by the Occam’s Window technique and treats all the worst-
fitting models outside the subset as having zero posterior probability.
Embodying the principle of parsimony,15 the use of the Occam’s Win-
dow technique considerably reduces the number of possible models, and
in the meantime encompasses the inherent model uncertainty present.
Once the Occam’s Window technique excludes the relatively unlikely
models, the posterior model probabilities for the well-fitting models are
then calculated.
Once we have posterior model probabilities, we are ready to imple-
ment a systematic form of inference for different quantities of interest.
For example, when the interest is one of the regression parameters being
present, whether positive or negative, what we need to do is to sum up
the posterior model probabilities for all models in which the parameter
is non-zero, be it positive or negative. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5 below, on
the empirical results, the output of the BMA analysis includes the poste-
rior inclusion probabilities for variables and a sign certainty index. The
posterior inclusion probability (PIP) for any particular variable is the sum
of the posterior model probabilities for all of the models including that
variable. The higher the posterior probability for a particular variable,
the more robust that determinant for financial development appears to
be. For PIPs greater than 0.20, a sign certainty index rather than sign
certainty probability is presented, indicating whether the relationship
appear to be either positive or negative.16
2.3.2 General-to-specific approach
The Gets modelling strategy starts from the most general unrestricted
model (GUM), which is assumed to characterize the essential data-
generating process (DGP), applies standard testing procedures to elim-
inate statistically insignificant variables and ends up with a “congruent”
final model, which should be free of significant mis-specification. Hoover
and Perez (1999) make important advances in practical modelling, like
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the multiple-path approach to Gets model selection. Based on these, the
PcGets algorithm has been developed to embody the principles of the
underlying theory of Gets reductions extensively discussed in Hendry
(1995).
The selection of models by PcGets roughly includes three stages.17
The first stage concerns the estimation and testing of the GUM. The
GUM should be formulated carefully based on previous empirical and
theoretical findings, institutional knowledge and data characteristics.
The specification of the GUM should be sufficiently general with a rel-
atively orthogonal parameterization for the N candidate regressors. The
next step is to conduct a mis-specification test for “congruence” of the
initial GUM. The congruence of the initial GUM is maintained through
the selection process to ensure a congruent final model. Once the congru-
ence of the GUM is established, pre-search reduction tests are conducted
at a loose significance level. The statistically insignificant variables are
eliminated both in blocks and individually, and the GUM reformulated
as the baseline for the next stage.
The second stage is the search process. Many possible reduction paths
are investigated to avoid path-dependent selection. The terminal model
emerges from each path when all reduction diagnostic tests are valid and
all remaining variables are significant. At the end of the path searches,
all distinct terminal models are collected and tested against their union
to find an un-dominated encompassing contender. If a unique model
results, it is selected; otherwise, the “surviving” terminal models form
a union as a new starting point for reduction. The search process con-
tinues until a unique model occurs, or the union coincides with either
the original GUM or a previous union. If a union made up of mutually
encompassing and un-dominated models results, PcGets employs the
BIC to select the unique final model.
The third stage is the post-search evaluation. At this stage PcGets uses
post-selection reliability checks to evaluate the significance of variables
in the final model selected in two overlapping subsamples.
Obviously, the choice of critical values for pre-selection, selection
encompassing tests and subsample post-selection is important for the
success of the PcGets algorithm. It provides two basic strategies, liberal
and conservative, for the levels of significance, degree of pretesting and
so on. The liberal strategy tries to equate the probability of deleting rel-
evant and retaining irrelevant variables, whilst the conservative strategy
tries to reduce the chance of retaining irrelevant variables. The choice of
different strategies hence affects the chance of either retaining irrelevant
variables or dropping relevant variables. Throughout the chapter, PcGets
HUANG: “CHAP02” — 2010/9/29 — 20:05 — PAGE 24 — #15
24 Determinants of Financial Development
is conducted with a more liberal strategy than the default setting of the
“liberal strategy” as presented in Appendix Table A2.6,18 aiming to keep
all promising variables in the final model. The final conclusions are then
based on the intersection of the BMA and Gets results.
2.4 Empirical results (I): Overall financial development
This section begins studying the determinants of various indices of finan-
cial development. The BMA and Gets methods are applied and compared
in three different samples (the whole sample, the developing country
sample and the La Porta sample) for each index. This section, the central
contribution of this analysis, studies the determinants of overall finan-
cial development (FD). Section 2.5 is concerned with the determinants
for four specific indexes of financial development, followed by a study
of the determinants of bond market development.
2.4.1 Some stylized facts
As a starting point, it might be useful to look at some stylized facts on
the links between some important institutional, policy and geographic
variables and FD. These figures are based on the whole sample.
Figure 2.1 presents two scatter plots for the links between institu-
tions and financial development. Better institutional quality, captured
by KKM , and a more democratic regime, captured by POLITY2, are associ-
ated with higher values for FD. The trade policy index denoted by TOPEN
and Frankel-Romer trade share denoted by CTRADE are positively related
to FD in Figure 2.2. The upper chart of Figure 2.3 indicates that coun-
tries closer to the main world market centres achieve a higher level of FD,
while the lower chart shows that financial markets in countries further
from the equator are relatively more advanced.
Figure 2.4 portrays the evolution of averaged liquid liability (LLY) over
1960–2003 by different country groups. Note from the upper-left chart
that countries in all income groups experienced an increase in LLY ,
although higher-income countries remain at a higher level of financial
development than lower-income countries throughout. The upper-right
chart shows considerable differences in averaged LLY between manufac-
tured goods exporting countries and primary goods exporters in which
the latter remain at lower levels or at least partially financially repressed.
The lower-left chart shows that the level of LLY in West European and
North American countries was much higher and more stable than that in
other country groups. The development process of LLY in East Asian and
Pacific countries was much more pronounced relative to that in any other
country group. In the lower-right chart, the development performance
HUANG: “CHAP02” — 2010/9/29 — 20:05 — PAGE 25 — #16







































































−2 −1 0 1 2
Institutional quality denoted by KKM







































−10 −5 0 5 10
Democracy index POLITY2
Democracy and new index FD
Figure 2.1 Scatter plots of institutions and financial development
Note: Variables and data sources are described in Appendix Table A2.1. These
figures show scatter plots of the institutional quality denoted by KKM, and the
democracy index POLITY2, against the new index FD.
of LLY in common law countries was in general much more gradual, with
the whole process stretching over four decades compared to that in civil
law countries, which experienced surges in the 1970s and late 1990s, but
a decline in the late 1980s.
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Frankel−Romer trade share and new index FD
Figure 2.2 Scatter plots of policy and financial development
Note: Variables and data sources are described in Appendix Table A2.1. These
figures show scatter plots of the trade policy index from Gallup et al. (1999),
and the trade share constructed by Frankel and Romer (1999), against the new
index FD.
The figures above have shown some interesting facts on the deter-
minants of FD. However, a clear conclusion on the robustness of any
variable presented cannot readily be drawn. The task of the subsequent
Section 2.4.2 is to examine these links more systematically.
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Figure 2.3 Scatter plots of geography and financial development
Note: Variables and data sources are described in Appendix Table A2.1. These
figures show scatter plots of the logarithm of minimum distance, and the absolute
latitude, against the new index FD.
2.4.2 What are the main determinants of FD?
As mentioned earlier, much research regards institutions as the funda-
mental factor in long-run growth, and some even argue that the only
effect of geography on development is via institutions (Acemoglu et al.,
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Figure 2.4 Median Liquid Liability by different country group over 1960–2003
Note: Variable descriptions are from Appendix Table A2.1. These figures plot the
median liquid liabilities by different income groups in the upper-left chart, coun-
tries with different law traditions in the upper-right chart, different exporting
countries in the lower-left chart and different regions in the lower-right chart
over 1960–2003.
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2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Easterly and Levine, 2003 and Rodrik
et al., 2004). Before proceeding to study the main determinants of over-
all FD, this section starts by testing the hypothesis of whether any of
three determinants (institutions, policy and geography), considered as a
whole, dominates the other two.
Table 2.1 reports the BMA results for determinants of FD, which is mea-
sured over 1990–99, for 64 countries in the whole sample. All possible
explanatory variables are grouped into four blocks in the order of “other”
variables, geographic variables, policy variables and institutional vari-
ables. In addition to including the “other” variables, models 1–3 include
any two of the three blocks (geographic variables, policy variables and
institutional variables) to examine the combined effects of any two types
of determinants on FD.19
The BMA analysis yields posterior inclusion probabilities (either “PIPs”
or “MC3”),20 the total posterior model probabilities for the set of mod-
els which include a given variable of interest and the sign certainty
index (“Sign”) of a relationship discussed above. The PIPs are the poste-
rior inclusion probabilities calculated by using the method from Raftery
(1995). A sign certainty index is provided where the PIPs are above
0.2. The MC3 denotes the posterior inclusion probabilities computed
by using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques due to Hoeting
et al. (1996), which conduct variable selection and outlier identification
simultaneously. Any MC3 greater than 0.2 is shown in bold.
Looking at the first block of “other” variables across models, we note
that initial income, GDP90, appears to be important in almost all models
with a high posterior probability of inclusion, meaning that, as expected,
the level of GDP per capita is fundamental in explaining the cross-
country variation in FD. Other variables in this block exhibit varying
explanatory power for FD. Models 1 and 2 present the effect of geography
on FD when policy and institutions, respectively, are controlled for. The
effect of geography on FD doesn’t seem to disappear when the institu-
tional variables are present, implying that the usual claim that geography
works through institutions is not necesarily true in this context. The two
BMA methods show that two regional dummies (REGSSA and REGLAC)
appear to be closely related to FD, meaning that a number of developing
countries in these regions are associated with higher levels of financial
development in the 1990s, conditional on other variables. The regional
dummy REGEAP and land area (AREA) also appear to be important pre-
dictors of FD when institutions are controlled for. Similarly, policy has
a significant effect on FD in the presence of geography and institutions
(Models 1 and 3). Among others, at least EXPPRIM is significant in both
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Variable PIPs Sign MC3 PIPs Sign MC3 PIPs Sign MC3
CONSTANT 1.000 (−) 1.000 (−) 1.000 (−)
GDP90 0.466 (+) 0.342 0.941 (+) 0.488 0.744 (+) 0.689
POP90 0.000 0.026 0.969 (+) 0.839 0.941 (+) 0.517
ETHPOL 0.004 0.039 0.649 (+) 0.070 0.906 (+) 0.035
ETHNIC 0.000 0.028 0.014 0.962 0.000 0.333
RELIGION 1.000 (+) 0.029 0.056 0.071 0.099 0.029
LANGUAGE 0.000 0.056 0.036 0.995 0.000 0.962
EURFRAC 0.000 0.992 0.706 (−) 0.040 0.982 (−) 0.089
REGEAP 0.186 0.132 0.726 (+) 0.958
REGMENA 0.314 (+) 0.176 0.006 0.060
REGSA 0.186 0.110 0.053 0.037
REGSSA 0.879 (−) 0.946 0.642 (−) 0.049
REGLAC 0.872 (−) 0.942 0.385 (−) 0.071
REGWENA 0.204 (−) 0.175 0.036 0.094
LANDLOCK 0.000 0.065 0.003 0.208
LATITUDE 0.000 0.056 0.386 (−) 0.063
AREA 0.073 0.034 0.975 (−) 0.831
MINDIST 0.030 0.032 0.012 0.623
POP100CR 0.051 0.027 0.400 (−) 0.056
RESPOINT 0.037 0.005 0.025
TOPEN 0.850 (+) 0.927 0.045 0.309
CTRADE 0.099 0.049 0.215 (+) 0.050
EXPMANU 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.025
EXPPRIM 0.409 (−) 0.175 0.999 (−) 0.964
SDGR 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.069
SDBMP 0.252 (−) 0.192 0.000 0.126
SDPI 0.076 0.030 0.064 0.053
SDTP 0.000 0.023 0.398 (+) 0.228
SDTT 0.329 (−) 0.201 0.045 0.026
CIVLEG 0.589 (−) 0.740 0.461 (−) 0.867
COMLEG 0.361 (−) 0.358 0.128 0.467
POLITY2 0.291 (+) 0.051 0.258 (+) 0.050
DURABLE 0.300 (+) 0.058 0.022 0.031
FREE 0.020 0.069 0.006 0.084
KKM 0.988 (+) 1.000 1.000 (+) 0.999





Note: The dependent variable FD is the aggregate index of overall financial development over period, 1990–
99. Variable description is in Appendix Table A2.1. BMA yields the posterior probabilities of inclusion (either
“PIPs” or “MC3”), the total posterior model probabilities for all models including a given variable and the
sign certainty index of a relationship (“Sign”). A sign is given to PIPs greater than 0.2. No sign givern means
the sign of estimated relationship being uncertain. Any MC3 greater than 0.2 is in bold. The PIPs is taken
from Raftery (1995) while the MC3 is due to Hoeting et al. (1996) who also identify the outliers.
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cases. Neither does the usual claim that policy works through institutions
by affecting their quality apply to this context. Models 2 and 3 show
that the role of institutions is not altered when geography and policy
are controlled for. Note that most of the institutional variables appear
to be significant predictors of FD, in particular, the KKM (governance
index) and PCI (political constraints index) have a posterior probability
of inclusion close to 1.
Overall, Table 2.1 has demonstrated that geography, institutions and
policy as a group are all important in the process of financial develop-
ment, although their effects may be picked up by varied predictors when
conditioning on other factors is in place. These results clearly suggest that
it would be more appropriate to include all of them in the analysis.
Table 2.2 contains a thorough study of determinants of FD by using
BMA and Gets in which the above conclusion (in terms of geography,
institutions and policy all being important) is embodied. The BMA anal-
ysis reports PIPs and the sign certainty index (“Sign”) discussed above.
The Gets analysis produces the coefficients and t-values for possible
determinants in the final model. It also reports the residual sum-of-
squares (RSS), the equation standard error or residual standard deviation
(sigma), the squared multiple correlation coefficient (R2) and its val-




, the log-likelihood value and
three information criteria: the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the
Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQ) and the Schwarz Criterion (SC). The out-
put also includes three mis-specification tests (Chow test, Normality
test and Heteroscedasticity test).21 The Gets results in Table 2.2 are the
final models for three samples, respectively, in Appendix Table A2.7,
which clearly shows the variables included in the GUM and in the final
model.
In Table 2.2, the BMA analysis for the whole sample yields a sub-
set inclusive of four “other” variables (GDP90, POP90, ETHPOL and
EURFRAC), two geographic variables (REGEAP and AREA), four policy
variables (CTRADE, EXPPRIM , SDBMP and SDPI) and five institutional
variables (CIVLEG, COMLEG, DURABLE, KKM and PCI). Given no rejec-
tion of the mis-specification tests, the Gets analysis for the whole sample
yields a subset inclusive of three “other” variables (GDP90, POP90 and
EURFRAC), two geographic variables (LATITUDE and AREA), one pol-
icy variable (SDTT) and three institutional variables (CIVLEG, KKM and
PCI). Both the BMA and Gets analyses on the whole sample unanimously
suggest that three “other” variables (GDP90, POP90 and EURFRAC), one
geographic variable (AREA) and three institutional variables (CIVLEG,
KKM and PCI) are the main determinants for FD.
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Table 2.3 Top ten models and their posterior probabilities for FD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
GDP90 * * * * * * * * * *
POP90 * * * * * * * * * *
ETHPOL * * * * * * * * * *
EURFRAC * * * * * * * * * *
REGEAP * * * * * * * * * *
AREA * * * * * * * * * *
CTRADE * * * * *
EXPPRIM * * * * * * * * * *
SDBMP * * * * *
SDPI * * * * * * * * *
SDTT
CIVLEG * * * * * *
COMLEG * * *
DURABLE * * * * * * * *
KKM * * * * * * * * * *
PCI * * * * * * * * * *
PMP 0.048 0.042 0.042 0.037 0.030 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.025
Note: This table presents the top ten models for FD, ranked by their posterior model probability
(PMP) in the whole sample. The variable description is in Appendix Table A2.1.
In Tables 2.1 and 2.2, the BMA procedure has yielded PIPs for all can-
didate variables. A natural question to ask is about the structure of the
models, especially the models with higher explanatory power. Table 2.3
lists the structure of the top ten models for FD in the whole sample
in terms of posterior model probabilities, serving as a concrete illustra-
tion of model selection. A noteworthy point is that all these models
have more than ten possible predictors with geographic variables (such
as REGEAP, AREA), policy variables (such as EXPPRIM) and institutional
variables (like KKM and PCI) and “other” variables (like GDP90, POP90,
ETHPOL and EURFRAC) present in all models. However, one should be
aware of the dramatic model uncertainty, reflected by less than 5% pos-
terior model probabilities for all top ten “best” models, which indicates
the potential importance of the BMA and Gets procedures for model
selection as a systematic response to pervasive model uncertainty.
Moving on one step further, OLS regressions are used to estimate some
of the best performing models in Table 2.4. The best model, that is the
model with highest posterior probability in Table 2.3, is presented in
column 4. The “other” variables, like GDP90, POP90 and EURFRAC, are
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Table 2.4 Geography, policy, institutions and FD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT −15.159 −8.220 −10.874 −8.056
[5.87]∗∗ [2.95]∗∗ [3.33]∗∗ [3.16]∗∗
GDP90 1.312 0.990 1.000 0.958
[6.25]∗∗ [2.65]∗ [2.93]∗∗ [3.01]∗∗
POP90 0.521 0.584 0.371 0.512
[3.66]∗∗ [4.75]∗∗ [3.12]∗∗ [4.72]∗∗
ETHPOL 1.117 1.584 1.029 1.496
[1.88] [2.89]∗∗ [1.65] [3.17]∗∗
EURFRAC −0.801 −1.138 −1.143 −1.100
[2.32]∗ [3.84]∗∗ [3.68]∗∗ [4.16]∗∗
REGEAP 1.961 1.277 1.239
[4.61]∗∗ [3.29]∗∗ [3.92]∗∗
















DURABLE 0.018 0.011 0.017
[1.66] [0.73] [1.54]
KKM 1.489 1.237 1.445
[4.40]∗∗ [3.30]∗∗ [5.12]∗∗
PCI −4.006 −3.791 −4.258
[4.29]∗∗ [3.98]∗∗ [4.90]∗∗
Standardized coefficients
ETHPOL 0.49 0.72 0.45 0.68
EURFRAC −0.46 −0.62 −0.63 −0.61
AREA −0.15 −0.29 −0.26
CTRADE −0.04 −0.05
SDBMP −0.06 −0.06
SDPI −0.06 −0.06 −0.06
SDTT −0.07 −0.07
DURABLE −0.05 −0.06 −0.05
KKM 0.68 0.55 0.66
PCI −2.05 −1.94 −2.17
Observations 64 64 64 64
R-square 0.740 0.820 0.790 0.860
Note: The models are estimated by OLS. The dependent variable is FD, over 1990–99. The t-values are reported
in brackets. Variable descriptions are from Appendix Table A2.1. The standardized coefficients show the
change of a standard deviation of FD due to a one standard deviation change in a variable for those other
than initial GDP and population, binary variables.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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found significant in every model. The regional dummy REGEAP is sig-
nificant in all relevant models, showing that the East Asian and Pacific
countries are positively associated with higher FD. While AREA is sig-
nificant in Models 2 and 4, the standardized coefficient for it is rather
small. For the policy variables, EXPPRIM is significant in Models 3 and
4, but not for Model 1. SDPI is significant in all relevant models, but the
standardized coefficient for it is negligible. Three institutional variables,
CIVLEG, KKM and PCI , are found to be significantly associated with
FD in all relevant models. The effects of KKM and PCI on FD are very
strong, as shown by the standardized coefficients in the lower section
of the table: a one standard deviation change in KKM translates into a
more than 0.5 standard deviation of the FD measure, and even stronger
effects for PCI .
In sum, on the one hand, the analyses above further confirm that
institutions, policy and geography, taken as a group, jointly explain
a substantial proportion of the variation in FD. On the other hand,
the above analyses show that, in comparison to policy and geography,
institutions could play a fundamental role in the process of financial
development. When taken individually, at least CIVLEG, KKM , PCI ,
GDP90, POP90 and EURFRAC are found to have a significant influence on
financial development. This finding explicitly suggests that, in addition
to initial GDP and initial population, the legal origin22 and institutional
quality are the most fundamental determinants of financial development
in a country.
2.5 Empirical results (II): Specific financial developments
This section turns to study briefly the determinants of four specific
indices for financial development derived by using principal compo-
nent analysis, namely, financial intermediary development (FDBANK),
stock market development (FDSTOCK), financial efficiency development
(FDEFF) and financial size development (FDSIZE). Bond market devel-
opment (FDBOND) is also studied afterwards. The three samples are
investigated for each index in which EURO1900 is available only for the
developing country sample while SRIGHT , CRIGHT and MEDSHARE are
available only for the La Porta dataset sample.
As in the previous section, the Gets model search is conducted with
the relatively liberal strategy presented in Appendix Table A2.6.
The determinants of financial intermediary development (FDBANK)
are reported in Table 2.5. The whole sample has 91 observations, the
developing country sample has 70 and the La Porta sample has 40.23
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The BMA and Gets analyses on the whole sample suggest FDBANK is pos-
itively related to initial income. East Asian and Pacific countries, Middle
Eastern and North African countries and South Asian countries witness
relative success in financial intermediary development. MINDIST is sug-
gested to be important as well. The trade open policy index (TOPEN)
and Frankel-Romer index (CTRADE) are significantly positively signed,
suggesting financial intermediary development is boosted by more open
trade policies. Three institutional variables (POLITY2, KKM and PCI) are
suggested to be determinants for FDBANK, consistent with a conven-
tional view that better institutions are associated with better financial
intermediary development. The analyses based on the developing coun-
try and La Porta samples in general confirm the findings for GDP90,
REGEAP, REGMENA, TOPEN, KKM and PCI . In addition, the analyses
from the La Porta sample show that shareholders’ right and creditors’
rights may be closely related to financial intermediary development.
The determinants of stock market development (FDSTOCK) are
reported in Table 2.6. The whole sample has 81 observations, the devel-
oping country sample has 50 and the La Porta sample has 49. The BMA
and Gets analyses on the whole sample indicate that FDSTOCK is posi-
tively related to the initial population and the ethnic polarization index,
while it is negatively related to the language fractionalization index
(EURFRAC).24 East Asian and Pacific countries experience a rise in stock
market development. Land area is also important for FDSTOCK. Among
other policy factors, TOPEN and SDGR are almost suggested by two meth-
ods to be in the model – this finding is also supported in the developing
country and La Porta samples. The usual claim concerning the posi-
tive impacts of open trade policy on financial development applies here.
The significantly negative effect of output volatility on FDSTOCK means
that macroeconomic mismanagement might exert an adverse effect on
FDSTOCK. Three institutional variables (DURABLE, KKM and PCI) are
suggested to be the main determinants for FDSTOCK. The analyses based
on the developing country and the La Porta samples support the idea that
more open trade policies and better institutions promote stock market
development.
The determinants of financial efficiency (FDEFF) are reported in
Table 2.7. The whole sample has 79 observations, the developing country
sample has 48 and the La Porta sample has 49. Note that the lower value
of FDEFF is associated with a higher level of financial efficiency develop-
ment as discussed in Section 2.2.2. The BMA and Gets analyses on the
whole sample suggest that RELIGION is significantly related to FDEFF.
East Asian and Pacific countries, South Asian countries, Middle Eastern
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and North African countries tend to have more efficient financial mar-
kets. Financial markets are more efficient in countries where institutional
quality (captured by KKM) is higher. The results from two subsamples
show that initial GDP and population are also important for FDEFF.
The determinants of financial size development (FDSIZE), also called
financial depth, are reported in Table 2.8. The whole sample has 73 obser-
vations, the developing country sample has 51 and the La Porta sample
has 42. The BMA and Gets analyses on the whole sample suggest that
financial depth in a country is positively related to the initial popula-
tion. The West European and North American countries – including most
developed countries – witnessed a decline in financial depth. Countries
with a larger land area experience relatively less financial size develop-
ment. Countries with a more open trade policy are found to have better
financial development in terms of size. Financial depth is also associated
with a stable political system (captured by DURABLE) and fewer political
constraints on the executive (captured by PCI). Most of these findings
are supported by analyses based on the developing country and the La
Porta samples. In addition, the analyses from the La Porta sample show
that financial depth might be closely related to shareholders’ rights.
We now turn to the case of bond market development. Since there
are only size measures for bond market development and bond mar-
ket capitalization available in the World Bank Financial Development
and Financial Structure Database (2008) with incomplete data for many
developing countries, the above financial development measures do not
include indexes of bond market development. Appendix Table A2.8
presents the specific BMA and Gets analyses for bond market devel-
opment, denoted by FDBOND, which is the sum of the private and
public bonds share over GDP in 1990s. The analyses are based on
the La Porta sample of 35 countries subject to data availability. The
results show that initial GDP level (GDP90), language fractionalization
index (LANGUAGE), East Asian and Pacific countries (REGEAP), popula-
tion proportion in coastal areas25 (POP100CR), terms of trade volatility
(SDTT) and governance index (KKM) may influence bond market devel-
opment. The results support previous findings in terms of institutions,
policy and geography being important for financial development, but
further study critically depends on the availability of additional data.
2.6 Conclusions
The analysis jointly applies the BMA and Gets methods to study
what drives financial development using 39 institutional, policy and
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geographic variables. The combination of these two methods has the
potential for incorporating the merits of each method and minimiz-
ing their limits, showing advantages in mitigating arbitrary choices
and increasing precision in model selection. To explore the structural
causes of financial development, the variables considered here are either
predetermined or evolving slowly over time.
Of 39 individual variables, this research finds that the legal origin
and institutional quality are significantly associated with financial devel-
opment, as are the initial income and population. These findings are
consistent with the literature.
The finding that the legal origins influence financial development sup-
ports the emphasis on the legal determinants of financial development
of La Porta et al. (1998), who argued that the origins of the legal code
substantially influence the treatment of creditors and shareholders, and
the efficiency of contract enforcement. They document that countries
with French Civil Law are said to have comparatively inefficient contract
enforcement and higher corruption, and less well-developed financial
systems, whilst countries with British legal origin achieve higher levels
of financial development.
On the role of institutions in financial development, Beck et al. (2003)
is a significant work among others. By applying the settler mortality
hypothesis of Acemoglu et al. (2001) to financial development, Beck et al.
(2003) argue that extractive colonizers in an inhospitable environment
aimed to establish institutions that privileged small elite groups rather
than private investors, while the settler colonizers in more favourable
environments were more likely to create institutions that supported
private property rights and balanced the power of the state, therefore
favouring financial development.
The importance of income levels for financial development has been
addressed in Levine (1997, 2003, 2005). In considering the banking sec-
tor development in transition economies, Jaffee and Levonian (2001)
demonstrate that the level of GDP per capita and the saving rate have pos-
itive effects on the banking system structure as measured by bank assets,
numbers, branches and employees for 23 transition economies. On the
impact of differences in culture on the process of financial development,
Stulz and Williamson (2003) provide evidence that culture, proxied by
differences in religion and language, predicts cross-country variation in
the protection and enforcement of investor rights, especially for creditor
rights.
Taken as a whole, whilst this research shows the significant roles played
by institutions, policy and geography, it highlights the dominant role of
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institutions over policy and geography in the process of financial devel-
opment. The findings on the significant effects of these structural factors,
which are relatively time-invariant, tend to suggest that efforts by the
government to better institution quality, implement more open trade
and sound macroeconomic policies and improve geographic infrastruc-
ture can stimulate financial development in the long run. An efficient
and transparent institutional and legal system and a free and just society
are especially important for the development of financial markets. Fur-
ther research, as in Abiad and Mody (2005) and Chapter 5, is needed to
explore what causes governments to undertake financial reforms aimed
at financial development.
Appendix text
Here is the derivation of the posterior model probability in BMA.26 We suppose
there are many models, {M1, . . . MK} for the data D. Every model is specified by
a vector of d unknown parameters θi = (θi1,θi2, . . . θid), i = 1, 2 . . . K. These mod-
els may be nested or not. Bayesians treat the unknown parameters as random
variables.
Let  denote a quantity of interest such as a parameter. The posterior





where P(Mk|D) are the posterior model probabilities, and P(|D, Mk) is the
posterior distribution of  given the data D and model Mk.
The equation contains all information needed to make inferences about ,
indicating that the posterior distribution of  given data D is a weighted average
of its posterior distributions given data D and a specific model. The weights are the







where P(Mk) is the prior probability of model i (i = 1, 2 . . . K), and P(D|Mi) is the
probability of the data given Mi, also called the integrated (marginal) likelihood
for model Mi or marginal (predictive) probability of the data given Mi.
To represent no prior preference for any model, each will start on an equal
footing, that is P(M1) = P(M2) = · · · P(MK) = 1K . Therefore the posterior model
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To identify the value of P(D|Mk), it is useful to compare model Mk with a base-
line model. A null model (M0) in which no independent variables are included is
usually used as a baseline model.27






2 log Bk0 = 2 log P(D|Mk) − 2 log P(D|M0) (2.5)
Using an approach developed by Raftery (1995), twice the log of the Bayesian
factor, “2 log Bk0”, can be expressed as the approximation of the difference
between BIC0 and BICk, the values of BIC for the null model, M0, and model,
Mk, respectively
2 log Bk0 ≈ BIC0 − BICk (2.6)



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































HUANG: “CHAP02” — 2010/9/29 — 20:05 — PAGE 56 — #47
56 Determinants of Financial Development
Table A2.3 The list of countries in the full sample
Middle East &
East Asia & Pacific North Africa South Asia
AUS Australia BHR Bahrain BGD Bangladesh
CHN China DZA Algeria IND India
FJI Fiji EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. LKA Sri Lanka
HKG Hong Kong, China GRC Greece NPL Nepal
IDN Indonesia IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. PAK Pakistan
JPN Japan ISR Israel
KOR Korea, Rep. JOR Jordan
MAC Macao KWT Kuwait
MNG Mongolia LBN Lebanon
MYS Malaysia MAR Morocco
NZL New Zealand MLT Malta
PHL Philippines OMN Oman
PNG Papua New Guinea PRT Portugal
SGP Singapore QAT Qatar
THA Thailand SAU Saudi Arabia
TWN Taiwan, China TUN Tunisia
VNM Vietnam
Latin America & Western Europe &
Sub-Saharan Africa Caribbean North America
BDI Burundi ARG Argentina AUT Austria
BEN Benin BOL Bolivia BEL Belgium
BFA Burkina Faso BRA Brazil CAN Canada
BWA Botswana BRB Barbados CHE Switzerland
CIV Cote d’Ivoire CHL Chile CYP Cyprus
CMR Cameroon COL Colombia DEU Germany
ETH Ethiopia CRI Costa Rica DNK Denmark
GHA Ghana DOM Dominican Rep. ESP Spain
KEN Kenya ECU Ecuador FIN Finland
MDG Madagascar GTM Guatemala FRA France
MLI Mali GUY Guyana GBR United Kingdom
MOZ Mozambique HND Honduras IRL Ireland
MRT Mauritania HTI Haiti ISL Iceland
MUS Mauritius JAM Jamaica ITA Italy
MWI Malawi MEX Mexico LUX Luxembourg
NAM Namibia NIC Nicaragua NLD Netherlands
NGA Nigeria PAN Panama NOR Norway
RWA Rwanda PER Peru SWE Sweden
SDN Sudan PRY Paraguay USA United States
SEN Senegal SLV El Salvador
SLE Sierra Leone TTO Trinidad and Tobago
SWZ Swaziland URY Uruguay
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Table A2.6 Setting for PcGets
expert significance: 0.075 0.075 0.75 0.075 0.01 0.005
expert presearch: 0.75 1 0.5 0.075 0.075 0.05 0.05 1
expert block search: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
expert choose specific: “HQ”
expert split sample: 0.075 0.75 0.2 0.4 0.4
expert outlier dection: 2.56
expert tests: 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
expert test options: 0.5 0.9 12 1 4 1 4







estimate: “Gets”, 1 1 n 1
Note: A change has been made to the “liberal strategy” default setting by increasing the F
pre-search testing (top-down) at step 1 from 0.75 to 1. “n” denotes the sample size.
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Table A2.8 Determinants of FDBOND
La Porta Sample
BMA Gets







































SRIGHT 0.197 0.0751 2.717
CRIGHT 0.838 (+)
(continued)
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Note: The dependent variable FDBOND is the index of bond market develop-
ment over the period 1990–99. The variable description is in Appendix Table
A2.1. This study is based on La Porta sample with 35 countries. The BMA anal-
ysis yields posterior probabilities of inclusion (PIPs), the total posterior model
probabilities (PMPs) for all models including a given variable, and the sign cer-
tainty index of a relationship (Sign). No sign given means the sign of estimated
relationship being uncertain. The Gets analysis yields coefficients and t-values
for the variables in the final model.





In recent decades there has been a large body of literature studying
the substantial roles that investment and financial development play in
long-run economic growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992; King and Levine,
1993 among others). This chapter aims to provide an exhaustive analysis
of the existence of and directions of causality between these two impor-
tant aspects of economic activities, namely aggregate private investment
and financial development. By exploiting the time series variation in
both private investment and financial development, and allowing for
global interdependence and heterogeneity across countries, this chapter
suggests positive causal effects going in both directions.
As is well known, in the absence of asymmetric information, financial
markets can function efficiently in the sense that, for any investment
project, the financial contract provides the borrowers and investors
with expected payments determined by the prevailing economy-wide
interest rate. However, in reality, entrepreneurs are always much better
informed than investors as to the outcome of investment projects and
their actions, calling for costly state verification conducted by financial
intermediaries (Townsend, 1979),28 and the corresponding contracting
problem between financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs (Diamond,
1984; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; Williamson, 1986, 1987 and Bernanke
and Gertler, 1989). Does entrepreneurs’ investment behaviour exert
any effect on the expansion of financial systems or the reduction of
agency costs? Does the increase in private investment as a whole con-
tribute to financial development? On the other hand, another natural
question could be whether more efficient financial markets encourage
64
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entrepreneurs’ investment behaviour, or whether financial development
brings about a surge of private investment.
Economic theory in general predicts that private investment and finan-
cial intermediary development contribute in a significant way to each
other. On the one hand, an increase in private investment constitutes
rising demand for external finance, enlarging the extent of financial
intermediation by directly encouraging financial intermediaries to per-
suade savers to switch their holdings of unproductive tangible assets
to bank deposits. Levine and Renelt (1992) suggest that more invest-
ment raises the rate of economic growth, which could stimulate financial
development (Greenwood and Smith, 1997). On the other hand, the
endogenous finance-growth models (for example Diamond, 1984; Dia-
mond and Dybvig, 1983; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga
and Smith, 1991 and Greenwood and Smith, 1997) suggest that finan-
cial markets have an important role in channelling investment capital
to its highest valued use. Financial intermediaries tend to induce a port-
folio allocation in favour of productive investment by offering liquidity
to savers, easing liquidity risks, reducing resource mobilization costs and
exerting corporate control. It seems natural to wonder if what is possible
in theory is consistent with what has happened in reality.
The causes of financial development have become an increasingly
significant research area in recent years.29 Following the renowned
Solow-Swan growth model, much research has been undertaken to exam-
ine the long-run determinants of economic growth. Levine and Renelt
(1992) emphasize the critical role of investment in growth, leading to
investment being included in most growth regressions. However, there
has been little work on the role of investment in the determination of
financial development.
Much work has been done to investigate the determinants of invest-
ment since the 1990s.30 Following the influential work of King and
Levine (1993), who find a positive effect of financial development on
various aspects of economic activity, several empirical studies provide
evidence in support of a positive impact of financial development on
capital formation in the private sector.31 However, existing research
in general assumes error independence across countries, which is a
highly restrictive assumption to make, particularly in the context of
globalization.
This background has motivated research into the interactions between
aggregate private investment and financial development in this chapter.
The econometric analysis is based on a dataset for 43 developing coun-
tries over the period 1970–98. Since commercial banks dominate the
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financial sector and stock markets play only very minor roles in most
developing countries, this research focuses on the level of financial
intermediary development, for which a new index is constructed by
using principal component analysis based on three banking develop-
ment indicators32 widely used in the literature. This research has become
more important as since the 1970s many developing countries have
sought to stimulate economic growth by choosing to encourage private
investment, while abandoning import-substitution policies led by the
public sector.
It is worth noting that this analysis focuses on the period when, after
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the world economy has expe-
rienced “a new and deeper version of globalization” following “a gradual
liberalization of trade and capital flows” (Crafts, 2000). The increase in
global trade and financial integration33 has been found to induce closer
interdependence in the global economy through its implications for the
properties of business cycle fluctuations. Imbs (2003), using data for a
group of developed and developing countries over 1983–98, finds that
the intensity of financial linkages and the volume of intra-industry trade
have a positive impact on cross-country business cycle co-movement.
Frankel and Rose (1998) show that trading partners have a higher degree
of business cycle co-movement. Kim et al. (2003) observe a high degree of
business cycle co-movement for a set of Asian emerging market countries
over 1960–96.
The phenomenon of business cycle co-movement has often been
explained by using a common factor analysis in which macroeconomic
variables such as aggregate output, consumption and investment are
decomposed into common observed global shocks (like sharp fluctua-
tions of oil prices), common unobserved global shocks (like technologi-
cal shocks), specific regional shocks and country shocks (Gregory et al.,
1997; Kose et al., 2003 and Bai and Ng, 2004). It is these shocks that lead
to a closer real and financial interdependence across countries.
The 1990s witnessed growing research on the stochastic properties
of panel datasets where the time dimension and cross section dimen-
sion are relatively large, and, especially, the issue of cross section error
dependence has received a great deal of attention in recent years. The
application of unit root and cointegration tests to panels is motivated
by the possible increase of statistical power through pooling informa-
tion across units. However, the power of tests is increased only when the
cross section units are independent, which is an assumption that may
be hard to justify given the rising degree of financial market integration
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and business cycle synchronization. This research attempts to explore
this issue by fully taking into account the effects of global shocks causing
cross section dependence across countries.
The analysis in this chapter includes two steps. The first step is an
analysis on data for five-year averages, which is commonly used in the
literature. It applies the system GMM estimation method due to Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) allowing for possible
correlations between regressors, and both individual effects and global
shocks. It then moves on to the second step, an analysis using meth-
ods on pooled annual data assuming a common factor structure in the
error term from Bai and Ng (2004). Before proceeding to estimation, the
time series properties of the panel dataset are carefully examined. The
so-called “second-generation tests” are applied, which allow for cross
section dependence, including a panel unit root test of Bai and Ng (2004)
and a panel cointegration test of Pedroni (2004) on defactored data. The
models are then estimated by the Pesaran (2006) Common Correlated
Effect approach.
The analysis on averaged data produces significant findings of positive
causal effects going in both directions, and indicates a high degree of per-
sistence exists in the averaged data of financial development and private
investment. The annual data study suggests that the series of both private
investment and financial development are integrated, and two-way posi-
tive long-run causal effects exist in the cointegrated system. The findings
of this chapter support the view that a private investment boom typically
follows further financial development, while the demand for external
finance is reflected in the subsequent level of financial development.
This has significant policy implications for the development of finan-
cial markets and the conduct of macroeconomic policies in developing
countries in a global economy.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds in Section 3.2 to describe the
data. Section 3.3 analyses this link using system GMM estimation on data
for five-year averages. Section 3.4 employs the common factor approach
to examine this link with annual data, including panel unit root testing
panel cointegration testing and estimation. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The data
This section outlines the measures and data for private investment and
financial development. Appendix Table A3.1 summarizes the variable
description and sources.
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The measure of private investment, denoted by PI , is the ratio of nom-
inal private investment to nominal GDP. The data are taken from the
World Bank Global Development Network Database (2002).34
The measure of financial development, denoted by FD. Since com-
mercial banks dominate the financial sector and stock markets play very
minor roles in most developing countries, this research focuses on the
level of financial intermediary development, for which a new index is
constructed by using principal component analysis35 based on three
banking development indicators widely used in the literature.
The principal component analysis is based on the following three
popular banking development indicators:36
The first measure, Liquid Liabilities (LLY), is one of the major indi-
cators used to measure the size, relative to the economy, of financial
intermediaries including three types of financial institutions: the central
bank, deposit money banks and other financial institutions. It is calcu-
lated by the ratio of liquid liabilities of banks and non-bank financial
intermediaries (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities)
over GDP.
The second indicator, Private Credit (PRIVO), is defined as credit issued
to the private sector by banks and other financial intermediaries divided
by GDP. This excludes the credit issued to government, government
agencies and public enterprises, as well as the credit issued by the mon-
etary authority and development banks. It is a general indicator of
financial intermediary activities provided to the private sector.
The third, Commercial-Central Bank (BTOT), is the ratio of commer-
cial bank assets to the sum of commercial bank and central bank assets.
It reflects the advantage of financial intermediaries in dealing with lend-
ing, monitoring and mobilizing saving and facilitating risk management
relative to the central bank.
Data on these financial development indicators are obtained from the
World Bank’s Financial Structure and Financial Development Database
(2008). FD is the first principal component of these three indicators
above and accounts for 74% of their variation. The weights resulting from
principal component analysis over the period 1990–98 are 0.60 for Liq-
uid Liabilities, 0.63 for Private Credit and 0.49 for Commercial-Central
Bank.37 Since these indicators are used to measure the size of financial
intermediary development,38 the composite index, FD, mainly captures
the depth of bank-based intermediation.
Appendix Table A3.2 presents descriptive statistics for private invest-
ment, the measure of financial development, real GDP and trade
openness. The panel dataset contains 43 developing countries over the
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period 1970–98. The countries in the full sample are listed in Appendix
Table A3.3. The transition economies are omitted. We also exclude
countries with fewer than 20 observations over 1970–98.
3.3 Analysis on data for five-year averages
To examine the relationship between private investment and finan-
cial development, this chapter conducts panel data estimation for
43 developing countries over 1970–98, based on averaged data over
non-overlapping, five-year periods in this section, and annual data in
Section 3.4. Panel data estimation tends to produce more convincing
findings than cross section analysis and classical time series analysis since
it exploits both the cross section and time dimensions of the data.39 It
allows us to control for unobserved country-specific effects and omitted
variables bias, and look at both long-run and short-run effects.
This section mainly focuses on the system GMM method proposed by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), using aver-
aged data (with a maximum of six observations per country). As widely
used in the growth literature (Islam, 1995; Caselli et al., 1996; Levine
et al., 2000), averaging data over fixed intervals has the potential for
eliminating business cycle fluctuations and makes it easier to capture
the relationships of interest. Section 3.3.1 briefly describes the system
GMM approach, and section 3.3.2 presents the empirical results.
3.3.1 Methodology: System GMM
The following AR(1) model has been found appropriate for this
application:40
FDit = α11FDi,t−1 + PIi,t−1β11 + ηi1 + φ1t + vit1 (3.1)
PIit = α12PIi,t−1 + FDi,t−1β12 + ηi2 + φ2t + vit2 (3.2)
i = 1, 2, . . . , 43 and t = 2, . . . , 6
For the sake of convenience, denote by y the dependent variable (either
FD or PI) and by x the explanatory variables other than the lagged
dependent variable:
yit = αyi,t−1 + x,i,t−1β + ηi + φt + vit (3.3)
i = 1, 2, . . . , 43 and t = 2, . . . , 6
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where ηi is an unobserved country-specific time-invariant effect not cap-
tured by xi, t−1, and can be regarded as capturing the combined effects
of all time-invariant omitted variables.
φt captures the global shocks. Recently a large body of literature has
indicated that the existence of common factors, either global, cyclical or
seasonal effects, has the potential for causing co-movements of variables
in the world economy. Since common factors are likely to be partially
cancelled out when the data are averaged, for simplicity this section
considers only common time effects or a single global shock having an
identical effect on each cross section unit. Section 3.4 explores the effects
of common factors in more depth.
vit is the transitory disturbance term, assumed to satisfy sequential
moment conditions of the form
E(vit | yt−1i , xt−1i , ηi, φt ) = 0 (3.4)
where yt−1i = (yi1, yi2 . . ., yi,t−1),, xt−1i = (xi1, xi2 . . ., xi,t−1),.
This assumption implies that (1) the transient errors are serially
uncorrelated; (2) xs are predetermined variables with respect to the time-
varying errors in the sense that xi, t−1 may be correlated with vi, t−1 and
earlier shocks, but is uncorrelated with vi t and subsequent shocks; (3)
the individual effects are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic shocks, but
correlations between individual effects and lagged y and lagged x are not
ruled out and (4) the global shocks are uncorrelated with the idiosyn-
cratic shocks, while correlations between global shocks and lagged y and
lagged x are possible.
The assumption of the explanatory variables xs being predetermined
rules out a potential endogeneity bias, but allows for feedbacks from
the past realizations of y to current xs. This assumption is believed to
be appropriate given that financial development is potentially both a
consequence and an origin of private investment, and vice versa.41
For the stability of the estimated model, the autoregressive coefficient
is assumed to lie inside the unit circle, | α| < 1.
The coefficient β reflects the existence and direction of Granger causal-
ity going from lagged x to y. According to work by Chamberlain (1984)
and Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) on Granger non-causality tests in the
general setting of dynamic panel data estimation, the non-causality
hypothesis can be tested by checking whether the coefficients of the
lagged values of the independent variables are zero or the coefficients
on the lagged difference of independent variables in the transformed
equations are zero, that is β = 0. Given that the model is stable, a point
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estimate for the long-run effect can be calculated as follows:
βLR = β
(1 − α)
The standard error for the long-run effect can be approximated by
using the delta method (for example Papke and Wooldridge, 2005).
This analysis employs the system GMM method, which is proposed
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to improve
upon the Arellano and Bond (1991) first-differenced GMM method,
which may be plagued with weak instrument problems. There have
been a number of methods proposed to estimate dynamic panel data
models with a short time dimension, in which first-differencing is
used to eliminate the individual effects. Below is Equation (3.3) in first
differences:
yit = αyi,t−1 + x,i,t−1β + φt + vit (3.5)
i = 1, 2, . . . , 43 and t = 3, . . . , 6
where yit = yit − yi,t−1, xi,t−1 = xi,t−1 − xi,t−2, φt = φt − φt−1 and
vit = vit − vi,t−1.
The sequential moment conditions above imply that all lagged values
of yit and xit dated from t − 2 and earlier are suitable instruments for
the differenced values of the original regressors, yi,t−1 and xi,t−1.
While the first-differenced 2SLS estimator taken from Anderson and
Hsiao (1981, 1982) uses yit−2 and xit−2, the first-differenced GMM
estimator uses all lagged values of yit and xit dated from t − 2 and
earlier. The moment conditions for errors in differences on which the






(yit − αyi,t−1 − x,i,t−1β − φt )
]
= 0 (3.6)
t = 3, . . . , 6
where yt−2i = (yi1, yi2 . . ., yi,t−2), and xt−2i = (xi1, xi2 . . ., xi,t−2),.
Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that in the standard AR(1) model
when the time series becomes highly persistent in the sense that “the
value of the autoregressive parameter approaches unity or the variance
of the individual effects increases relative to the variance of the distur-
bances”, the lagged values of the series may be weak instruments for
first differences. The first-differenced GMM estimator employing these
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weak instruments has been found to have poor finite sample properties
in terms of bias and imprecision.
To tackle the weak instruments problem, Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998) develop a “system GMM” estimator42 by
considering a mean stationarity assumption on initial conditions in the
sense that the mean of the distribution of the initial observations coin-
cides with the mean of the steady-state distribution of the process. For
the multivariate autoregressive model, Blundell and Bond (2000) show
that a sufficient condition for the additional moment conditions to be
valid is the joint mean stationarity of the series.
For this context the additional mean stationarity condition of (yit , xit )
enables the lagged first differences of the series (yit , xit ) dated t-1 as instru-
ments for the untransformed equations in levels. In addition to the
moments for errors in differences described before, the system GMM esti-
mator, denoted by SYS-GMM, is also based on the additional moments






(yit − αyi,t−1 − x,i,t−1β − φt )
]
= 0 (3.7)
t = 3, . . . , 6
As suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998), combining the first-
differenced equations using suitably lagged levels as instruments, with
levels equations using suitably lagged first differences as instruments, the
SYS-GMM estimator is expected to have much smaller finite sample bias
and greater precision in the presence of persistent data.
Apart from the orthogonality conditions (3.6) and (3.7) stated above,
the SYS-GMM estimator also makes use of the following moments for
the period-specific constants due to the existence of global shocks:
E(yit − αyi,t−1 − x,i,t−1β − φt ) = 0 (3.8)
t = 3, . . . , 6
To avoid the possible over-fitting bias associated with using the full
Arellano and Bond (1991) instrument set, this analysis uses restricted
instrument sets suggested by Bowsher (2002), who proposes selectively
reducing the number of moment conditions for each first-differenced
equation. More specifically, we use only lagged values of yit and xit from
t − 2 to t − 4 as instruments. Accordingly, for SYS-GMM estimators the
number of orthogonality conditions reduces to 31 in total, so that there
are 24 over-identifying restrictions. Another way to avoid the possible
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over-fitting bias is the introduction of the two additional versions of
SYS-GMM discussed below.
3.3.2 Empirical results
This section presents the SYS-GMM estimates for Equations (3.1) and
(3.2). Two additional versions of SYS-GMM are also considered in order
to circumvent over-fitting and the possibility that the mean stationarity
assumptions may be incorrect. While SYS-GMM-1 uses only yi,t−1 as
instruments in levels, SYS-GMM-2 uses only xi,t−1 in the same way.
The OLS and within group estimates are also reported. Conventional
wisdom has revealed that, although both of them are inconsistent for
short panels, the OLS and within group (WG) estimates of the first-order
autoregressive parameter act as two extremes of the interval in which a
consistent estimate of this parameter is expected to lie.43
Three specification tests are conducted to address the consistency
of SYS-GMM estimator, which mainly depends on the validity of the
instruments. The first is a Serial Correlation test, which tests the null
hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation and no second-order serial
correlation in the residuals in the first-differenced equation. The second
is a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which is used to examine
the overall validity of the instruments by comparing the moment condi-
tions with their sample analogue. A finite sample correction is made to
the two-step covariance matrix using the method of Windmeijer (2005).
The third is a difference Sargan test, denoted by Diff-Sargan, proposed
by Blundell and Bond (1998), which examines the null hypothesis of
mean stationarity for the SYS-GMM estimator. This statistic, called an
incremental Sargan test statistic, is the difference between the Sargan
statistics for first-differenced GMM and SYS-GMM. It would be asymp-
totically distributed as a χ2 with k degrees of freedom, where k is the
number of additional moment conditions.
Table 3.1 presents the results for causality going from private invest-
ment to financial development. The OLS level and WG estimates for the
lagged dependent variable form an interval in which the system GMM
estimates fall. The specification tests for the three versions of SYS-GMM
used indicate that we can reject the null that the error term in first dif-
ferences exhibits no first-order serial correlation and cannot reject the
hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation. The Sargan
tests in three models do not signal that the instruments are invalid. The
difference Sargan for SYS-GMM cannot reject the null of the additional
moment conditions being valid. These results indicate that every model
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Table 3.1 Does private investment cause financial development? 1970–98
(five-year-average data)
Dependent
variable: FDit OLS WG SYS-GMM SYS-GMM-1 SYS-GMM-2
FDi,t−1 0.880 0.597 0.806 0.741 0.578
[16.46]∗∗∗ [8.32]∗∗∗ [8.87]∗∗∗ [6.87]∗∗∗ [2.82]∗∗∗
PIi,t−1 2.785 5.091 5.286 6.745 3.779
[5.08]∗∗∗ [5.62]∗∗∗ [4.27]∗∗∗ [4.58]∗∗∗ [2.21]∗∗
M1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.05
M2 (p-value) 0.89 0.92 0.69







0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
LR effect point
estimate
23.21 12.63 27.22 26.02 8.96
(Standard error) [9.70]∗∗ [2.84]∗∗∗ [12.53]∗∗ [9.04]∗∗∗ [7.61]
Observations 212 212 212 212 212
Notes: 43 developing countries. Robust t statistics in brackets below point estimates.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The system GMM results are two-step estimates
with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics; the standard errors are based on
finite sample adjustment of Windmeijer (2005). The M1 and M2 test the null of no first-order and
no second-order serial correlation in first-differenced residuals. The Sargan tests the over-identifying
restrictions for GMM estimators, asymptotically X2. The Diff-Sargan tests the null of mean sta-
tionarity for system GMM estimators in which SYS-GMM uses standard moment conditions, while
SYS-GMM-1 only uses lagged first-differences of FD dated t − 1 as instruments in levels and SYS-
GMM-2 uses only lagged first-differences of PI dated t − 1 as instruments in levels. The Granger
causality test is used to examine the null hypothesis that private investment doesn’t cause financial
development. LR measures the long-run effect of private investment on financial development. Its
standard error is approximated using the delta method.
from column 3 to column 5 is well specified and the SYS-GMM estima-
tor is indeed preferable to the first-differenced GMM estimator for this
context. SYS-GMM estimates provide strong evidence for the positive
impact of private investment on financial development. This result is
supported by the Granger non-causality test, which clearly rejects the
null hypothesis, suggesting that there is a causal effect going from pri-
vate investment to financial development. The Long-Run (LR) effect
estimate of SYS-GMM indicates that this effect tends to persist into the
long run. The SYS-GMM-1 estimates further confirm the findings, while
SYS-GMM-2 estimates support the short-run effect only, not the long-run
effect. Moreover, SYS-GMM and SYS-GMM-1 estimates indicate that a
high degree of persistence exists in the averaged data.
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Table 3.2 Does financial development cause private investment? 1970–98 (five-
year-average data)
Dependent
variable: PIit OLS WG SYS-GMM SYS-GMM-1 SYS-GMM-2
PIi,t−1 0.744 0.232 0.521 0.490 0.424
[14.04]∗∗∗ [3.12]∗∗∗ [4.27]∗∗∗ [3.75]∗∗∗ [3.00]∗∗∗
FDi,t−1 0.008 0.010 0.015 −0.008 0.022
[2.09]∗∗ [1.67]∗ [2.32]∗∗ [0.85] [2.11]∗∗
M1 (p-value) 0.00 0.01 0.01
M2 (p-value) 0.34 0.51 0.26







0.04 0.10 0.03 0.40 0.04
LR effect point
estimate
0.03 0.01 0.03 −0.02 0.04
(Standard error) [0.01]∗∗ [0.01]∗ [0.01]∗∗ [0.02] [0.01]∗∗
Observations 198 198 198 198 198
Notes: 43 developing countries. The Granger causality test is used to examine the null hypothesis
that financial development doesn’t cause private investment. See Table 3.1 for more notes.
In Table 3.2 we turn to whether financial development Granger causes
private investment. The specification tests indicate that the models
associated with the three types of SYS-GMM are well specified. More
specifically, we can reject no first-order serial correlation but cannot
the hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation. Sargan
tests and difference Sargan tests suggest that neither the instruments
and mean stationarity conditions are invalid. Both SYS-GMM and SYS–
GMM-2 show a positive causal effect going from financial development
to private investment, not only in the short run but also in the long run.
Both SYS-GMM-1 in Table 3.1 and SYS-GMM-2 in Table 3.2 produce
consistent findings with their counterparts, respectively. However, using
the lagged first differences of PI dated t–1 as instruments in levels, SYS-
GMM-2 in Table 2.1 and SYS-GMM-1 in Table 3.2 do not confirm the
findings by their respective SYS-GMMs, especially the latter, perhaps sug-
gesting that the moment conditions using lagged first differences of PI
dated t–1 may not contain much information.
The SYS-GMM-1 and SYS-GMM-2 above potentially serve as the robust-
ness tests to the SYS-GMM in the two tables. In addition, a set of
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experiments are conducted to test whether the above findings are robust
to various model specifications. We first consider including GDP per
capita in logs and trade openness separately as additional regressors,
with the results reported on Appendix Tables A3.4 and A3.5, respectively.
Second, we introduce the second lags of dependent and independent
variables into the related models and report the results in Appendix
Table A3.6.
In part A of Appendix Table A3.4, with GDP in log every model is still
well specified. Both SYS-GMM and SYS-GMM-1 estimates indicate the
positive short-run and long-run effects of private investment on financial
development. SYS-GMM-1 estimates also show a positive effect of GDP
in log on financial development. SYS-GMM-2 estimates find that both
PI and LGDP in log are significantly positively associated with FD in the
short run, but not in the long run. In part A of Appendix Table A3.4, with
GDP in log in the models SYS-GMM and SYS-GMM-2 estimates suggest
that GDP in log enters the models significantly while FD is no longer
significant. GDP in log seems to pick up the short-run effects of financial
development on private investment.
In part A of Appendix Table A3.5, when trade openness (OPENC) is
included the SYS-GMM estimates continue to show a positive effect of
private investment on financial development, not only in the short run
but also in the long run. The model for SYS-GMM-1 is not well spec-
ified. The SYS-GMM-2 estimates find that both PI and OPENC have
been found to exert significantly positive effects on financial develop-
ment in the short run, but not in the long run. In part B of Appendix
Table A3.5, SYS-GMM estimates suggest that the inclusion of OPENC
doesn’t change the significantly positive effect of financial development
on private investment, in either the short run or the long run.
In Appendix Table A3.6 we investigate the causality with AR(2) models.
Models for SYS-GMM and SYS-GMM-1 in both parts A and B of Appendix
Tables A3.6 and A3.6 are well specified, as supported by the specification
tests. Both SYS-GMM and SYS-GMM-1 estimates in part A of Appendix
Table A3.6 continue to support the first lag of PI to enter the models
significantly; in addition the second lag of PI is also observed to be sig-
nificantly associated with financial development. The second lag of FD
has been found to be insignificant in the models. The SYS-GMM esti-
mates in part B of Appendix Table A3.6 show that the first lag of PI
remains significantly positive; however, the second lag of FD and PI is
insignificant.
At least the robustness tests suggest that the inclusion of trade open-
ness in the models doesn’t affect the pattern of the findings in Tables 3.1
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and 3.2, and nor does the inclusion of the second lags of dependent and
independent variables in the models.
In summary, by using the SYS-GMM estimation method on averaged
data over 1970–1998 and controlling for the possibility of endogeneity
and omitted variable biases, this analysis finds that the positively sig-
nificant causation exists in both directions between private investment
and financial development for 43 developing countries. It also indicates
a high degree of persistence in the averaged data. The findings are robust
to various estimation methods and model specifications.
However, it is worth noting that the asymptotic properties of the SYS-
GMM estimator depend on having a large number of cross section units.
Concerns remain regarding the finite sample bias for this context. The
findings still await further confirmation from the analysis on pooled
annual data which will be undertaken in Section 3.4.
3.4 Analysis on annual data
Using averaged data has a number of advantages, as well documented
in the literature, but its limitations are also notable. Averaging data
over fixed intervals (typically over five or ten years) arbitrarily mod-
ifies the time series dimension so that information loss is inevitable.
Although averaging data has the potential for removing business cycle
fluctuations, it is not guaranteed that such fluctuations are eliminated
effectively given the varied length of business cycles across countries
and over time. Moreover, methods like GMM – imposing homogene-
ity over all slope coefficients – fail to capture potential cross sectional
heterogeneity in the parameters.
This section moves on to explore the link between private investment
and financial development by using pooled annual data. In principle,
annual data can be more informative than averaged data in examining
the relevant effect. By explicitly looking at the yearly time series vari-
ation, one can explore the existence of heterogeneity across countries
adequately and estimate the parameters of interest more precisely.
As widely pointed out, assuming cross section error independence fails
to reflect a reality in which financial market integration and business
cycle synchronization are key features of a global economy. The analysis
in this section attempts to study the causality between private invest-
ment and financial development in a world where the existence of global
shocks causes cross section dependence across countries.
The remainder of this section proceeds as follows. Subsection 3.4.1 sets
out the common factor approach of Bai and Ng (2004). Subsection 3.4.2
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contrasts the panel unit root test of Bai and Ng (2004) with the Maddala
and Wu (1999) Fisher test, which is associated with the assumption of
cross section independence. Subsection 3.4.3 conducts the panel coin-
tegration test of Pedroni (1999, 2004) on observed data and defactored
data. Subsection 3.4.4 adopts the Pesaran (2006) Common Correlated
Effect approach to estimate the models.
3.4.1 Methodology: Common factor approach
Assuming the interactions between financial development (FD) and
private investment over GDP (PI) are represented by the unrestricted







β1ijPI i,t−j + θ1it + λ
′







β2ijFDi,t−j + θ1it + λ
′
2if2t + v2it (3.10)
i = 1, 2, . . . , 43 and t = 2, . . . , 29
For the sake of simplicity, denoting by y the dependent variable (either
FD or PI) and by xs the explanatory variables other than the lagged







βijxi,t−j + θ1it + λ
′
ift + vit (3.11)
i = 1, 2, . . . , 43 and t = 2, . . . , 29
where ft is a (r×1) vector of unobserved common factors, and λi is a factor






i2ft2 · · · + λ
′
ir ftr (here r is the
number of common factors). The common factors could be a global trend
component, a global cyclical component, common technological shocks
or macroeconomic shocks that cause cross section dependence. vit are
errors assumed to be serially uncorrelated and independently distributed
across countries. We allow for richer dynamics in the representations to
control for business cycle influences, while the current value of x, xit , is
excluded to avoid a potential endogeneity problem.
The above representations with a factor structure are believed to be
very general. Bai (2009) points out that the interactive effects model
including the interaction between factors, ft , and factor loadings, λi, is
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more general than an additive effects model, the traditional one-way or
two-way fixed effects model.44
Since the common factors are unobservable, standard regression meth-
ods are not applicable for an equation like (3.11). Estimation of models
with a common factor structure is still at its early stage of development.
Pesaran (2006) estimates this type of model directly by proxying the
common factors with weighted cross section averages (Subsection 3.4.4
discusses this in detail). In spite of its convenience in not involving esti-
mation of common factors, the Pesaran (2006) approach is confined to
the single factor case. Among others, Bai and Ng (2004) and Moon and
Perron (2004) seek to estimate the common factors. Their approaches
have advantages in accommodating multiple common factors that may
coexist in the economy, effectively contributing to panel unit root test-
ing, panel cointegration testing and estimation of models in a more
general setting. Below is a brief description of common factor analysis
resulting from Bai and Ng (2004).
To overcome possible cross section dependence in panel unit root test-
ing, Bai and Ng (2004) propose a PANIC approach – Panel Analysis of
Non-stationarity in Idiosyncratic and Common Components. Essentially
they assume the DGP of a series zit (which could be yit or xit for this case)
has a common factor structure in the sense that the series is the sum of
an unobserved deterministic component (dit ), an unobserved common
component (λ
′
ift ) and an idiosyncratic component (eit ) as follows:
zit = dit + λ
′
ift + eit (3.12)
where ft is a vector of unobserved common factors and λi is the fac-
tor loading vector as defined before. The common and idiosyncratic
components could be stationary or non-stationary and are allowed
to be integrated of different orders. The common factor (ft ) and the
idiosyncratic component (eit ) can be expressed as:
fkt = αkfk,t−1 + υit (3.13)
eit = ρiei,t−1 + εit (3.14)
The factor k is stationary if αk < 1 while the idiosyncratic component
(eit ) is stationary if ρi < 1. When the idiosyncratic component (eit ) is
stationary, conventional wisdom suggests that the factors can be esti-
mated by using principal component (PC) analysis. As a crucial step Bai
and Ng (2004) propose applying a principal components analysis on the
differenced data (when a linear trend is not allowed) or differenced and
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demeaned data (when a linear trend is allowed) to estimate the factors
for the case where eit is integrated of order one.
To estimate the factors, the following two steps should be taken.
The first step is to estimate the number of common factors, and this
is discussed by Bai and Ng (2002) and Moon and Perron (2004). Bai
and Ng (2002) suggest using a principal component analysis on the
observed data to calculate the number of factors.45 For any arbitrary
k (k < min{N, T}), the estimates of λk and f k are derived by solving the

























where ft = (ft1, ft2, ft3, ...ftr )′ , λi = (λi1, λi2, λi3 . . . λir )′ , i = (λ1, λ2,
λ3 . . . λN )
′
and f is the (T × r) matrix of common components. Typically
when T < N, the normalization that f
k′ f k
T = Ik is used.46 The estimated
factor matrix, denoted by f̃ k, can be expressed as
√
T times the eigen-
vectors corresponding to the k largest eigenvalues of the T × T matrix
zz
′
. Given f̃ k, the estimated factor loading matrix, denoted by ̃k, can




Given f̃ k and ̃k, Bai and Ng (2002) propose to determine the number
of factors by minimizing one of the following criterion functions:
PC(k) = V(k, f̃ k) + kg(N, T) (3.16)
IC(k) = ln[V(k, f̃ k)] + kg(N, T) (3.17)







iεi) is a measure of fit, and g(N, T) is a
penalty function that depends on the size of panel. The criterion func-
tions capture a trade-off between measures of fit and a penalty function.
When the number of factors increases, the fit must improve, but the
penalty goes up. Bai and Ng (2002) provide three criterion functions for
PC(k) and IC(k), respectively. In general, IC(k) is easier to use since it
does not involve the estimation of a penalty function which requires
the choice of a bounded integer (kmax).
The integer minimizing a criterion function is the estimated number
of factors.
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The second step is to estimate the common and idiosyncratic compo-
nents once the true number of factors, denoted by r, has been worked
out. Let Zit be the differenced data (without a linear trend) or differ-
enced and demeaned data (with a linear trend) of observed data zit .47
The principal component estimator of the factor matrix f , denoted by
f̂ , is
√
T − 1 times the eigenvectors corresponding to the r largest eigen-
values of the (T − 1) × (T − 1) matrix ZZ′ . Given f̂ , the estimated factor




The approach above yields r estimated common factors f̂t and associ-
ated factor loadings λ̂i. The estimated idiosyncratic component takes the
form of
êit = Zit − λ̂
′
i f̂t (3.18)
To remove the effect of possible over-differencing, Bai and Ng (2004)
propose to re-cumulate the estimated common factors, f̂t , and estimated









t = 2, . . . T
The resulting idiosyncratic component, Êit , is in fact the defactored
data corresponding to the observed data zit .
3.4.2 Panel unit root tests
Over recent decades a number of panel unit root testing procedures have
been proposed in the literature to increase the power of univariate unit
root tests, such as Im et al. (2003), Levine et al. (2002) and Maddala and
Wu (1999). Associated with the unrealistic assumption of cross section
independence, these testing procedures are often classified as the first
generation of panel unit root tests. Since the influential work by Banerjee
et al. (2004), testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels under the
assumption of cross section dependence has attracted a great deal of
attention. The testing procedures proposed by Pesaran (2007), Moon and
Perron (2004) and Bai and Ng (2004) are among the second generation
of panel unit root tests.
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With the common factor structure presented earlier, Bai and Ng (2004)
note that the non-stationarity of series with a factor structure originates
from the non-stationarity of either the common component or idiosyn-
cratic component or both. Bai and Ng (2004) test for unit roots for the
common component and idiosyncratic component, Êit , separately. For
the idiosyncratic component, Bai and Ng (2004) propose testing the fol-
lowing ADF equation by using the (defactored) estimated idiosyncratic
component, Êit , with no deterministic term:
Êit = di0Êit + di1Êit−1 . . . + dipÊit−p + µit (3.21)
They propose to use the Fisher P-test as suggested by Maddala and Wu
(1999) on the above ADF equation.
For the non-stationarity of the common factors, Bai and Ng (2004)
distinguish two cases. When there is only one common factor, a standard
ADF test with an intercept is suggested:
F̂t = Dt + θ0F̂t−1 +
p∑
j=1
θjF̂t−j + υit (3.22)
When there is more than one common factor, Bai and Ng (2004) pro-
pose an interactive procedure, analogous to the Johansen trace test for
cointegration.
Appendix Figure AF3.1 displays the time series plots of FD and PI for
43 countries over 1970–98. The data for FD and PI are standardized to
control for common trends. More specifically, taking deviations from
year-specific means removes the common components, common tech-
nological shocks or macro shocks, which have common effects across
countries. The development process of FD was in general more grad-
ual and growing without bounds while the development process of PI
was more volatile and subject to bounds, in particular, PI experienced
increases in the 1970s, late 1980s and early 1990s, but fell in the early
1980s.
Appendix Table A3.7 reports the values of information criterion ICp1(k)
(Bai and Ng, 2002) for the series of FD and PI .48 When r = 1, the ICp1(k)
values for both FD and PI are minimized, clearly suggesting that there
is only one common factor for FD and PI , respectively. The time series
of the common factors for FD and PI are presented in Appendix Figure
AF3.2.
Table 3.3 contrasts the panel unit root test proposed by Maddala and
Wu (1999) and Bai and Ng (2004). The former is related to the assump-
tion of cross section independence while the latter is defined under the
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Table 3.3 Unit root tests in heterogeneous panels
Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher test





Bai and Ng (2004) test
FD PI
Without trend With trend Without trend With trend
Common −2.713 −3.099 −1.981 −2.202
Components
(ADF)
[0.07]∗ [0.11] [0.29] [0.49]
Idiosyncratic 214.555 199.876 79.206 55.067
Components
(P test)
[0.00]∗∗∗ [0.00]∗∗∗ [0.68] [1.00]
Unit Root no yes yes yes
Note: The upper panel presents the results of Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher test on the
observed data under the null hypothesis of a unit root. The lower panel reports the Bai and
Ng (2004) test, which decomposes the errors and conducts the unit root tests for the common
components (ADF test) and idiosyncratic components (Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher test)
separately. P-values are in brackets.
assumption of cross section dependence. The Maddala and Wu (1999)
Fisher test, which does not require a balanced panel, indicates the
series of FD and PI may be I(1) processes no matter whether a trend
is allowed.49 Controlling for the common factor, the Bai and Ng (2004)
approach suggests that the series for FD and PI are I(1) variables when
we allow for a trend.
Since PI is the ratio of nominal private investment to nominal GDP,
the evolution of PI is bounded between 0 and 1. The above finding on the
PI series being an I(1) process, even though it is constrained within the
interval between 0 and 1, is consistent with the finding in Section 3.3 on
the averaged PI series being highly persistent. However, given that the
PI series is bounded and the low power of these tests, more sophisticated
testing methods may be called for.
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3.4.3 Panel cointegration tests
When both FD and PI are integrated, cointegration between the two
variables is possible. This section uses panel cointegration techniques to
investigate the existence of a long-run relationship between them. Baner-
jee et al. (2004) point out that “cointegration across units and within
each unit may not be easily differentiatied due to the presence of cross
section cointegration”. The analysis of panel cointegration allowing for
cross section dependence is still in its infancy. Motivated by Gengenbach
et al. (2005), who suggest the use of defactored data, Êit , in panel coin-
tegration testing to control for cross section dependence, this section
contrasts the Pedroni (1999, 2004) residual-based panel cointegration
tests using observed data and defactored data.
The Pedroni (2004) test, widely used in empirical research in recent
years, assumes cross section independence of panel units but allows
for some heterogeneity in the cointegrating relationships. He proposes
two classes of statistics based on individual OLS residuals of the sin-
gle cointegration regression below to test the null hypothesis of no
cointegration:
yit = αi + x
′
i,t δit + uit (3.23)
One class is the “panel” statistics,50 which are constructed by taking
the ratio of the sum of the numerators and the sum of the denomi-
nators of individual unit root statistics across the within dimension of
the panel with a homogeneity restriction, and the other is the “group
mean” statistics,51 which are based on the averages of individual unit
root statistics along the between dimension of the panel allowing for
heterogeneity.
Pedroni (2004) shows that the ADF-based tests perform better when the
sample size is small. Table 3.4 reports the group and panel ADF statistics
of Pedroni (1999, 2004) using observed data and defactored data, both
with and without a deterministic trend. The result associated with using
observed data shows, when common factors are allowed, that the pres-
ence of cross section dependence might render the Pedroni test unable to
detect the cointegration relationship in question. However, when com-
mon factors are extracted, the null of no cointegration can always be
rejected clearly, no matter whether we allow for a trend.52 This table
indicates that a stationary long-run relationship exists between finan-
cial development and private investment, and highlights allowing for
cross section dependence as an important source of information for this
analysis.
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Table 3.4 Panel cointegration tests between FD and PI
Observed data Defactored data
Without trend With trend Without trend With trend
Panel ADF 1.749 1.039 −3.956 −6.311
Group ADF 2.661 1.360 −3.822 −5.855
Note: This table reports the Pedroni (1999, 2004) cointegration test. The number of lag trun-
cations used in the calculation of the Pedroni statistics is four. These are one-sided tests with
an critical value of −1.64. Under the null hypothesis of no cointegration, the test statistic is
asymptotically distributed as a standard normal.
Given the low power of these tests, this chapter still reports two esti-
mates of the long-run relationship between FD and PI. One should soon
realize that the long-run coefficients in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 are very
similar after normalizing the coefficients.
3.4.4 Estimation on annual data
Study of the estimation of large cross section and time series panel
datasets with a common factor structure has been fairly scarce. This
section undertakes the Pesaran (2006) common correlated effects
approach for the estimation of heterogeneous panels with common fac-
tors. Section 3.4.4.1 sets out the estimation methods associated with both
cross section error independence and cross section error dependence.
Section 3.4.4.2 presents the empirical evidence.
3.4.4.1 Estimation methods
Given that the series of FD and PI appear to be cointegated, there must be
a vector error correction representation, as shown by Engle and Granger
(1987), governing the co-movements of the series of FD and PI over

































+ θ1it + λ′ift + v1it (3.24)
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+ θ2it + λ′ift + v2it (3.25)


















In Equations (3.24) and (3.25), α1i and α2i are the coefficients for the
speeds of adjustment. −β1iα1i and −
β2i
α2i
are the long-run coefficients for PIit






β1im are the short-run coeffi-






β1im are, respectively, the short-run coefficients for
PIi,t−j and FDi,t−j in Equation (3.25).







In the absence of common factors, the within groups (WG) approach,
mean group (MG) approach of Pesaran and Smith (1995) and pooled
mean group (PMG) approach of Pesaran et al. (1999) are especially
suited to the analysis of panels with large time and large cross section
dimensions. The consistency of the WG estimator for the dynamic
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homogeneous model is approximately justified when T is large, as N->∞
(Nickell, 1981). In comparison to the WG method, which allows only
the intercept to vary across countries but imposes homogeneity on all
slope coefficients, the MG and PMG approaches allow for considerable
heterogeneity across countries. The MG approach applies an OLS regres-
sion for each country to obtain individual slope coefficients, and then
averages the country-specific coefficients to derive a long-run parame-
ter for the panel.53 For small samples, the MG estimator is likely to be
inefficient although it is still consistent.
Unlike the MG approach, which imposes no restriction on slope
coefficients, the PMG approach imposes cross section homogeneity
restrictions only on the long-run coefficient, but allows short-run coef-
ficients, the speeds of adjustment and the error variances to vary across
countries. The restriction of long-run homogeneity can be tested via
a Hausman test. Under the null hypothesis of long-run homogeneity,
the PMG estimators are consistent and more efficient than the MG esti-
mators. Moreover, Pesaran et al. (1999) show that the PMG estimators
are consistent and asymptotically normal irrespective of whether the
underlying regressors are I(1) or I(0).
The PMG approach requires that the coefficients for long-run effects

















When common factors are allowed, Pesaran (2006) suggests the use
of the (weighted) cross-sectional averages of the dependent variable
and individual specific regressors to proxy the common factors. More
specifically, he proposes augmenting the observed regressors with the
(weighted) cross-sectional averages of the dependent variable and the
individual specific regressors such that as the number of cross section
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units goes to infinity, the effects of unobserved common factors can be
eliminated.
Pesaran (2006) proposes two common correlated effect (CCE)
approaches for large heterogeneous panels whose errors contain unob-
served common factors. One is the common correlated effect pooled
(CCEP) estimator, a generalization of the within groups estimator that
allows for the possibility of cross section correlation, and the other is the
common correlated effects mean group (CCEMG) estimator, a general-
ization of the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995) which
is adapted for the possibility of cross section correlation. The CCEP esti-
mator is the within groups estimator with the (weighted) cross-sectional
averages of the dependent variable and the individual specific regres-
sors included in the model. The CCEMG approach uses OLS to estimate
an auxiliary regression for each country in which the (weighted) cross
sectional averages of the dependent variable and the individual specific
regressors are added, and then the coefficients and standard errors are
computed as usual.
The Pesaran (2006) approach exhibits considerable advantages. It does
not involve estimation of unobserved common factors and factor load-
ings. It allows unobserved common factors to be possibly correlated with
exogenous regressors and exert differential impacts on individual units.
It permits unit root processes amongst the observed and unobserved
common effects. The proposed estimator is still consistent, although it is
no longer efficient, when the idiosyncratic components are not serially
uncorrelated.
In this context, the cross section means of FDit , FDi,t−1, PIit and
PIi,t−1 are considered.54 The models are augmented with the interac-
tions between regional dummies and cross sectional means of these
variables, and time dummies. The CCEP and CCEMG estimators have
been shown to be asymptotically unbiased and consistent as N -> ∞
and T -> ∞, and to have generally satisfactory finite sample properties.
More importantly, the CCEP and CCEMG estimators hold for any num-
ber of unobserved common factors as long as the number is fixed, which
is especially attractive.
A common correlated effects pooled mean group (CCEPMG) estima-
tor is introduced in this study, which is a generalization of the pooled
mean group estimator of Pesaran et al. (1999) which also allows for the
possibility of cross section correlation. The restriction of long-run homo-
geneity can also be tested via a Hausman test. Under the null hypothesis
of long-run homogeneity, the CCEPMG estimators are expected to be
consistent and more efficient than the CCEMG estimators.
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3.4.4.2 Estimation results
Table 3.5 examines whether private investment causes financial develop-
ment for 43 developing countries over 1970–98, while Table 3.6 studies
causality in the reverse direction. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 contrast the CCEP,
CCEMG and CCEPMG estimates with their counterparts, the WG, MG
and PMG estimates.55 The first group of estimates is associated with the
assumption of errors being cross sectionally dependent, while the lat-
ter group assumes cross section error independence. An autoregressive
distributed lag ARDL(3, 3) system has been adopted for this analysis.56
We look first at the case of cross section error dependence. The coef-
ficients corresponding to the speeds of adjustment in the two tables
are significantly different from zero, suggesting that two-way Granger
causalities exist between them.
Imposing homogeneity on all slope coefficients except for the inter-
cept, the CCEP estimates in the two tables suggest that there are positive
long-run effects going in two directions. When heterogeneity is sought,
the CCEMG and CCEPMG are called for. The CCEMG estimates find
that the long-run effects are less precisely estimated for both directions.
This is of no surprise – the long-run effects become much harder to
capture when full heterogeneity is allowed. Nevertheless, it does imply
that heterogeneity is especially prominent in this context. Moving from
the CCEMG (no restriction, but potentially inefficient) to CCEPMG (a
common long-run effect required) changes the results significantly: in
particular, imposing long-run homogeneity reduces the standard errors
and the speeds of adjustment. The restriction cannot be rejected at a
conventional level by a Hausman test. The CCEPMG estimates provide
evidence in support of significant long-run effects in both directions.
The long-run coefficients in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are actually quite sim-
ilar. For example, the CCPMG and CCEMP estimates of the long-run
coefficients for FD in Table 3.6 are 0.008 and 0.028, respectively, while
their counterparts in Table 3.5 are 0.043 (1/23.055) and 0.040 (1/25.220).
This result suggests that it is very likely for a single long-run relationship
to exist in this context.
Comparing the above case with the case of cross section error inde-
pendence is worthwhile. As its counterpart associated with cross section
error dependence, the WG estimates (restrictions on all slope coeffi-
cients except for the intercept) show positive long-run effects in both
directions. Allowing for heterogeneity, but no error dependence, across
countries, the MG approach finds no evidence in support of significant
long-run effects in both directions. Supported by the Hausman tests in
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Tables 3.5 and 3.6, the PMG estimates indicate a significant long-run
effect going from private investment to financial development, but not
vice versa. This tends to underscore the importance of allowing for het-
erogeneity across countries in the sense that, compared to the PMG
approach, the WG approach – ignoring the divergent performance across
countries – is likely to produce misleading results. Moving from PMG
to CCEPMG clearly highlights the importance of controlling for error
dependence across countries.
After controlling for error dependence and heterogeneity across coun-
tries, the CCEPMG estimates clearly suggest positive long-run effects
going in both directions between private investment and financial devel-
opment. A note of caution may therefore be appropriate here: taking
careful consideration of the integrated properties of the data, the error
structure and the extent of heterogeneity are always worth keeping in
mind in the econometric analysis of panel data.
In the following a set of experiments are conducted to test whether the
above findings are robust to various model specifications. This research
considers including GDP per capita in logs and trade openness separately
as additional regressors.57 Results clearly indicate that the inclusion of
either GDP in log or trade openness does not alter the pattern of the
findings.
In sum, after allowing for global interdependence and heterogene-
ity across countries, this analysis on annual data clearly shows positive
long-run effects going in both directions between private investment and
financial development. It is very likely that a single long-run relationship
exists in this context. The findings in general suggest that surges of pri-
vate investment stimulate the deepening of financial markets, and, on
the other hand, financial development facilitates resource mobilization,
and increases the quantity of funds available for investment.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter aims to investigate the causality between aggregate private
investment and financial development in a globalized world. Using a
panel dataset with 43 developing countries over 1970–98, the analysis
is conducted in two steps. One is system GMM estimation on data for
five-year averages, indicating positive causal effects going in both direc-
tions and a high degree of persistence in the averaged data of private
investment and financial development. The other is a common factor
approach on annual data allowing for global interdependence and het-
erogeneity across countries. The analysis demonstrates that the series of
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both private investment and financial development are integrated, and
two-way positive causal effects exist in the cointegrated system. In gen-
eral, the chapter implies that, in a globalized world, private investment is
both an engine and a follower of financial development, and vice versa.
This analysis has produced significant insights into the interactions
between two important aspects of economic activities, aggregate pri-
vate investment and financial development, in developing countries.
The implications of the findings can be summarized in the following.
First, the finding in terms of a positive effect of private investment
on financial development has rich implications for the development of
financial markets. Since sound macroeconomic policies, and a favourable
economic and legal environment, undoubtedly facilitate private invest-
ment, any efforts by government to reduce macroeconomic policy
uncertainty, improve the regulatory framework and strengthen credi-
tor and investor rights will be conducive to the development of financial
markets. Moreover, the finding may shed light on a possible channel
through which other variables drive financial development, for example,
the effect of democracy and political stability on the speed of financial
development (Girma and Shortland, 2008) and Chapter 4.
Second, the finding on better financial development leading to a
private investment boom has clear implications for the conduct of
macroeconomic policies in developing countries. This chapter suggests
that as the financial system in a country becomes more sophisticated,
more funds are channelled for productive investment so that firms find
it easier to get access to them. This finding is in support of the finan-
cial development framework proposed by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw
(1973), who emphasize that financial liberalization and financial devel-
opment can foster economic growth by boosting investment and its
productivity, substantially influencing macroeconomic policies in devel-
oping countries since the 1970s. This research contributes to the existing
body of research on the links between financial development and eco-
nomic growth, by suggesting that the former may enhance the latter
through a private investment boom. This finding suggests that finan-
cial markets may well be the channel through which macroeconomic
volatility or downturn leads to declines in private investment, which
is consistent with what has happened during the 2007–2009 financial
crisis.
Third, this research stresses the importance of taking careful account
of error structure and heterogeneity in the econometric analysis of panel
data. By considering the effects of common trends in a global economy
and allowing for heterogeneity across countries, this analysis represents
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a significant improvement in comparison to existing research, which in
general assumes error independence across countries. The results gener-
ated from existing research may deserve careful examination since the
interactions and co-movements of economic factors, and the trends of
globalization, have been central features of the world economy in recent
decades.
Appendix tables
Table A3.1 The variables
Variable Description Source
FD Index for financial development in this
paper, mainly measuring the size of
financial intermediary development. It is
the first principal component of LLY,
PRIVO and BTOT.
LLY Liquid Liabilities, the ratio of liquid
liabilities of financial system (currency plus
demand and interestbearing liabilities of
banks and non-banks) to GDP.
Financial Development
and Structure Database
(FDS) in World Bank,
2008
PRIVO Private Credit, the ratio of credits issued to
private sector by banks and other financial
intermediaries to GDP.
FDS, 2008
BTOT Commercial-central Bank, the ratio of
commercial bank assets to the sum of
commercial bank and central bank assets.
FDS, 2008
PI The ratio of nominal private investment to
nominal GDP. It is replaced by PI/100.
Global Development
Network (GDN), 2002
LGDP Real GDP per capita (Chain) in log. Penn World Table 6.2
OPENC The sum of exports and imports over GDP
(at current prices). It is replaced by
log(1 + OPENC/100).
Penn World Table 6.2
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Table A3.2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
FD overall −0.52 0.91 −2.65 4.14 N = 1198
between 0.75 −2.13 1.66 n = 43
within 0.52 −2.36 2.34 T-bar = 27.86
PI overall 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.42 N = 1183
between 0.05 0.02 0.25 n = 43
within 0.04 0.00 0.42 T-bar = 27.51
LGDP overall 3.47 0.35 2.76 4.19 N = 1183
between 0.34 2.88 4.02 n = 43
within 0.09 3.09 3.82 T-bar = 29
OPENC overall 0.57 0.29 0.06 2.09 N = 1247
between 0.26 0.16 1.23 n = 43
within 0.14 0.04 1.43 T-bar = 29
Note: Appendix Table A3.1 describes all variables in detail.
Table A3.3 The list of countries in the full sample
East Asia & Pacific Sub Sahara Africa Latin America & Caribbean
PHL Philippines GAB Gabon HND Honduras
MYS Malaysia SEN Senegal TTO Trinidad and Tobago
PNG Papua New Guinea NGA Nigeria GTM Guatemala
THA Thailand NER Niger CRI Costa Rica
KOR Korea, Rep. MUS Mauritius HTI Haiti
KEN Kenya SLV El Salvador
South Asia TGO Togo BRB Barbados
IND India MDG Madagascar COL Colombia
NPL Nepal GHA Ghana PER Peru
PAK Pakistan GMB Gambia, The VEN Venezuela
RWA Rwanda ECU Ecuador
Middle East & North Africa CMR Cameroon MEX Mexico
DZA Algeria CIV Cote d’Ivoire ARG Argentina
MAR Morocco BDI Burundi URY Uruguay
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. ZAF South Africa CHL Chile
DOM Dominican Rep.
PRY Paraguay
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Table A3.4 Robustness test – GDP in log included (five-year-average data)
A. Does private investment cause financial development? 1970–98
Dependent
variable: FDit OLS WG SYS-GMM SYS-GMM-1 SYS-GMM-2
FDi,t=1 0.879 0.427 0.753 0.638 0.693
[15.21]∗∗∗ [5.46]∗∗∗ [6.38]∗∗∗ [6.14]∗∗∗ [3.78]∗∗∗
PIi,t=1 2.744 3.845 5.692 6.007 4.679
[4.17]∗∗∗ [4.25]∗∗∗ [6.70]∗∗∗ [4.65]∗∗∗ [3.13]∗∗∗
LGDPit 0.014 2.215 0.634 0.972 1.240
[0.12] [4.41]∗∗∗ [1.30] [1.73]∗ [2.11]∗∗
M1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.02
M2 (p-value) 0.99 0.80 0.46
Sargan (p-value) 0.51 0.35 0.30
Diff-Sargan (p-value) 0.98 1.00 0.71
Granger Causality
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LR effect point
estimate
22.61 6.71 23.04 16.58 18.26
(Standard error) [11.89]∗ [1.81]∗∗∗ [10.81]∗∗ [5.41]∗∗∗ [11.57]
Observations 212 212 212 212 212
B. Does financial development cause private investment? 1970–98
Dependent
variable: PIit OLS WG SYS-GMM SYS-GMM-1 SYS-GMM-2
PIi,t=1 0.698 0.186 0.512 0.498 0.352
[10.95]∗∗∗ [2.39]∗∗ [5.19]∗∗∗ [5.01]∗∗∗ [3.28]∗∗∗
FDi,t=1 0.007 0.004 0.004 −0.013 0.012
[1.74]∗ [0.55] [0.54] [1.36] [1.43]
LGDPit 0.016 0.081 0.092 0.095 0.103
[1.60] [1.88]∗ [3.34]∗∗∗ [1.19] [3.08]∗∗∗
M1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.01
M2 (p-value) 0.40 0.47 0.26
Sargan (p-value) 0.45 0.27 0.46
Diff-Sargan (p-value) 0.88 0.67 0.97
Granger Causality
(p-value)
0.08 0.58 0.59 0.18 0.16
LR effect point
estimate
0.02 0.00 0.01 −0.03 0.02
(Standard error) [0.01]∗ [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
Observations 198 198 198 198 198
Notes: Log GDP is included in the models to test the robustness of the findings of Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
See Table 3.1 for more notes.
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Table A3.5 Robustness test – OPENC included (five-year-average data)
A. Does private investment cause financial development? 1970–98
Dependent
variable: FDit OLS WG SYS-GMM SYS-GMM-1 SYS-GMM-2
FDi,t=1 0.863 0.565 0.734 0.764 0.478
[15.15]∗∗∗ [7.86]∗∗∗ [8.31]∗∗∗ [6.78]∗∗∗ [3.22]∗∗∗
PIi,t=1 2.699 4.206 4.759 7.494 2.713
[4.85]∗∗∗ [4.36]∗∗∗ [3.09]∗∗∗ [4.21]∗∗∗ [1.93]∗
OPENCit 0.124 0.746 0.603 −0.143 1.305
[0.80] [2.41]∗∗ [1.28] [0.23] [3.50]∗∗∗
M1 (p-value) 0.01 0.00 0.06
M2 (p-value) 0.92 0.90 0.90
Sargan (p-value) 0.32 0.25 0.36
Diff-Sargan (p-value) 0.25 0.09 0.30
Granger Causality
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
LR effect point
estimate
19.67 9.68 17.88 31.74 5.20
(Standard error) [7.87]∗∗ [2.59]∗∗∗ [8.47]∗∗ [14.33]∗∗ [3.73]
Observations 212 212 212 212 212
B. Does financial development cause private investment? 1970–98
Dependent
variable: PIit OLS WG SYS-GMM SYS-GMM-1 SYS-GMM-2
PIi,t=1 0.742 0.228 0.455 0.340 0.305
[13.87]∗∗∗ [2.82]∗∗∗ [3.61]∗∗∗ [2.24]∗∗ [2.38]∗∗
FDi,t=1 0.008 0.010 0.013 −0.010 0.019
[1.80]∗ [1.60] [1.75]∗ [0.80] [2.13]∗∗
OPENCit 0.002 0.004 0.018 0.071 0.029
[0.15] [0.14] [0.55] [1.00] [0.83]
M1 (p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.02
M2 (p-value) 0.33 0.39 0.21
Sargan (p-value) 0.24 0.36 0.15
Diff-Sargan (p-value) 0.10 0.13 0.03
Granger Causality
(p-value)
0.07 0.11 0.09 0.43 0.04
LR effect point
estimate
0.03 0.01 0.02 −0.01 0.03
(Standard error) [0.02]∗ [0.01] [0.01]∗ [0.02] [0.01]∗∗
Observations 198 198 198 198 198
Notes: Trade openness (OPENC) is included in the models to test the robustness of the findings of
Tables 3.1 and 3.2. See Table 3.1 for more notes.
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Table A3.6 Robustness test – two lags (five-year-average data)
A. Does private investment cause financial development? 1970–98
Dependent
variable: FDit OLS WG SYS-GMM SYS-GMM-1 SYS-GMM-2
FDi,t=1 1.076 0.492 0.683 0.564 0.383
[10.18]∗∗∗ [5.07]∗∗∗ [4.46]∗∗∗ [2.95]∗∗∗ [1.36]
FDi,t=2 −0.194 −0.179 −0.216 −0.174 −0.079
[1.67]∗ [1.94]∗ [1.54] [1.17] [0.67]
PIi,t=1 3.647 4.767 5.735 7.524 5.605
[3.75]∗∗∗ [4.20]∗∗∗ [2.85]∗∗∗ [2.87]∗∗∗ [2.88]∗∗∗
PIi,t=2 −1.118 3.385 3.305 3.983 2.812
[1.00] [2.88]∗∗∗ [1.88]∗ [2.55]∗∗ [1.76]∗
M1 (p-value) 0.02 0.09 0.37
M2 (p-value) 0.53 0.84 0.77
Sargan (p-value) 0.21 0.16 0.23
Diff-Sargan (p-value) 0.64 0.60 0.88
Granger Causality
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
LR effect point
estimate
21.5 11.87 16.96 18.89 12.09
(Standard error) [11.94]∗ [2.48]∗∗∗ [6.36]∗∗ [5.79]∗∗∗ [5.52]∗∗
Observations 169 169 169 169 169
B. Does financial development cause private investment? 1970–98
Dependent
variable: PIit OLS WG SYS-GMM SYS-GMM-1 SYS-GMM-2
PIi,t=1 0.692 0.087 0.506 0.565 0.402
[8.34]∗∗∗ [0.99] [4.24]∗∗∗ [3.88]∗∗∗ [2.82]∗∗∗
PIi,t=2 0.086 −0.081 −0.090 −0.038 −0.064
[0.99] [0.93] [0.84] [0.34] [0.64]
FDi,t=1 0.010 0.016 0.022 −0.003 0.027
[1.30] [2.09]∗∗ [1.96]∗ [0.25] [2.08]∗∗
FDi,t=2 −0.004 0.002 −0.005 −0.002 −0.004
[0.50] [0.28] [0.81] [0.25] [0.58]
M1 (p-value) 0.03 0.05 0.06
M2 (p-value) 0.14 0.16 0.08
Sargan (p-value) 0.61 0.47 0.45
Diff-Sargan (p-value) 0.54 0.27 0.25
Granger Causality
(p-value)
0.20 0.03 0.09 0.73 0.10
LR effect point
estimate
0.03 0.02 0.03 −0.01 0.03
(Standard error) [0.02] [0.01]∗∗ [0.01]∗∗ [0.03] [0.01]∗∗
Observations 155 155 155 155 155
Notes: AR(2) models are considered to test the robustness of the findings of Tables 3.1 and 3.2. See
Table 3.1 for more notes.
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Table A3.7 Determination of the numbers of com-
mon factors for FD and PI
FD PI
r = 1 2.654 3.339
r = 2 3.000 3.626
r = 3 3.202 3.823
r = 4 3.373 4.005
r = 5 3.539 4.183
r = 6 3.703 4.355
r = 7 3.866 4.522
r = 8 4.030 4.687
Note: This table reports the values of Information Criteria
(IC1) (Bai and Ng, 2002) for different numbers of factors
(r). The integer minimizing a criterion function, IC1 for
example, is the estimated number of factors.
Appendix figures












Figure AF3.1 Time series plots of FD and PI
Note: This graph depicts the time series plots of FD and PI over 1970–98.
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Figure AF3.2 Time series plots of common factors for FD and PI
Note: This graph depicts the time series plots of common factors for FD and PI,
identified by using the PANIC approach of Bai and Ng (2004), over 28 years (1971–
98). Here commfd denotes the common factor for the series of FD, while commpi
denotes the common factor for the series of PI.





Over the last few decades, there has been a substantial increase in finan-
cial development in many developing countries. The average ratio of
private credit to GDP increased from 23% in 1980 to 32% in 2000,
while the average ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP rose from 32% in
1980 to 42% in 2000 in the developing world. On the political front,
between 1980 and 2000 62 developing countries undertook significant
institutional reforms towards democracy.58 Do the above economic and
political events in the developing world interact in important ways?
Much work has been done to explore the relationship between insti-
tutional improvement, especially political liberalization, and economic
growth. The existing research in this field does not unanimously estab-
lish the consequences of political reform for economic development.
Instead, it is made up of one line of research supporting positive
consequences, another line stressing negative consequences and some
maintaining ambiguous views. How does democratic process to improve
institutional quality influence financial development, especially in coun-
tries with low GDP per capita, high ethnic and religious divisions or
specific legal origins?
The importance of institutional improvement for financial develop-
ment has been implicitly indicated by Clague et al. (1996) and Olson
(1993), who argue that, in comparison to autocracies, democracies better
facilitate property rights protection and contract enforcement, encour-
aging investment directly. In recent research on the political economy
of financial development, Pagano and Volpin (2001), Rajan and Zingales
(2003) and Beck et al. (2003) highlight the role of political intervention
and institutions in financial development. In examining what forces lead
101
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governments to undertake reforms to enhance financial development,
Chapter 5 finds that the extent of democracy is one of the significant
forces. However, there has been little research which directly studies
the impact of the democratic process for institutional improvement on
financial development.
This analysis mainly carries out a dynamic panel data study, focus-
ing on 90 developed and developing countries. It examines the impact
on financial development of the democratic process in a broader
sense, in terms of institutional improvement rather than political
transformation.59 The bias-corrected Least Square Dummy Variable
(LSDV) estimator proposed by Kiviet (1995) and recently developed by
Bruno (2005) is the central method of this study and is compared with
the system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and
Blundell and Bond (1998).
Before proceeding to the econometric analysis, this research provides
some preliminary evidence with a before-and-after event comparison to
study probably the most important institutional change, namely polit-
ical transformation from an autocratic regime to a democratic one. It
focuses on 33 countries which underwent a democratic transformation
during 1960–2000 subject to data availability for financial develop-
ment. This exercise examines the responses of the level and volatility
of financial development after a regime transition.
This chapter shows that improved institutional quality is associ-
ated with increases in financial development at least in the short run,
especially for lower–income, ethnically divided and French legal ori-
gin countries. The before-and-after event study also indicates that, in
general, democratic transitions are typically preceded by low financial
development, but followed by a short-run boost in, and greater volatil-
ity of, financial development. The findings of this research underline the
influence of institutional reform over the supply side of finance and shed
light on the strong and robust relationship between institutional quality
and economic performance.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents
a brief review of the literature on institutions, democratization and
finance. Section 4.3 describes the sample and measures that are used in
this study. The empirical results are presented in Section 4.5, following
a description of dynamic panel data methods in Section 4.4. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Institutions, democratization and finance
This section briefly outlines the theoretical background and motiva-
tion of this research. It discusses the role of institutions in financial
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development and the possible links between the democratic process and
finance.
Research on the effect of institutional reform on general economic
performance is associated with substantial controversies. Some argue
that the democratic process enhances fundamental civil liberties, stable
politics and an open society; promotes property rights protection and
contract enforcement; discourages corruption and lawlessness and fos-
ters economic growth (Olson, 1993; Clague et al., 1996; Minier, 1998
and Persson, 2005). On the contrary, under pressures from different
interest groups, democratic structures may suffer from inefficiency in
decision-making and difficulty in implementing viable policies for rapid
growth. “Premature” democracy in developing countries possibly low-
ers the economic growth rate, and even results in economic disorder,
political instability and ethnic conflict (Persson and Tabellini, 1992 and
Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000). Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) show that
“the overall effect of democracy on economic growth is moderately neg-
ative” – an increase in human capital accumulation is offset by a decrease
in physical capital accumulation in the process of democratization.
Research on the role of institutions in financial development has
been substantial, especially research on the effects of the legal and reg-
ulatory environment on the functioning of financial markets. A legal
and regulatory system involving protection of property rights, contract
enforcement and good accounting practices has been identified as essen-
tial for financial development. Most prominently, La Porta et al. (1997,
1998) have argued that the origins of the legal code substantially influ-
ence the treatment of creditors and shareholders, and the efficiency
of contract enforcement.60 Among others, Mayer and Sussman (2001)
emphasize that regulations concerning information disclosure, account-
ing standards, permissible banking practices, and deposit insurance do
appear to have material effects on financial development.
Another significant work in this context is Beck et al. (2003), which
extends the settler mortality hypothesis of Acemoglu et al. (2001) to
financial development. They argue that colonizers, often named as
extractive colonizers, associated with an inhospitable environment aim
to establish institutions that privilege the small elite group and poten-
tially ignore private property rights, while colonizers, often called settler
colonizers, in more favourable environments are more likely to create
institutions that support private property and balance the power of the
state. Accordingly, institutions in the extractive environment tend to
block financial development, while those in settler colonies are more
conducive to financial development.
The recently developed “new political economy” approach regards
“regulation and its enforcement as a result of the balance of power
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between social and economic constituencies” (Pagano and Volpin, 2001).
It centres on self-interested policy-makers who can intervene in financial
markets either through overall regulation or individual cases for purposes
such as career concerns and the promotion of group interests. Rajan and
Zingales (2003) emphasize the role which the interest groups, especially
the incumbent industrial firms and the domestic financial sector, can
play in the process of financial development.61
Arguably, countries controlled by elite groups are more inclined to
protect the interests of the elite from the bulk of society, restrict par-
ticipation in the political system, and so on. The more power held by
the elite groups and the more autocratic the system, the more obsta-
cles there are for financial development. This tends to suggest that
institutional reform intending to limit the influence of elite group over
policy-making, widen suffrage in the political system, respect basic polit-
ical rights and civil liberties, remove institutional obstacles and enhance
institutional efficiency is beneficial to financial development. Girma
and Shortland (2008) study the impact of democracy chrematistics and
regime change on financial development, showing that both democracy
and regime change promote financial development.62 Apart from Girma
and Shortland (2008), research directly exploring the impact of demo-
cratic process for institutional improvement on financial development
has been lacking.
This research might contribute to our understanding of the structural
determinants of financial development. Looking at this issue is also sig-
nificant for examining whether institutional innovation contributes to
an improved investment climate. This is because commonly used finan-
cial development indicators such as the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP
and the ratio of credit issued to the private sector to GDP are generally
forward-looking. Better financial development is then an early indication
of a better investment environment.
4.3 The measures and data
4.3.1 The sample
This research studies the impact of institutional improvement on finan-
cial development, controlling for GDP, trade openness, aggregate invest-
ment and the black market premium. The measures and data for financial
development and institutional improvement are explained in more
detail below. Information on the classifications of income levels, region
dummies, ethnic fractionalization and legal origins is obtained from the
HUANG: “CHAP04” — 2010/9/29 — 20:06 — PAGE 105 — #5
Political Institutions and Financial Development 105
World Bank Global Development Network Database (GDN) (2002). The
data for GDP, trade openness and aggregate investment are from the Penn
World Table 6.2. Data for the black market premium are from the GDN
(2002).
This study focuses on a panel of 90 non-transition economies over the
period 1960–99 with five observations per country. Averaging data over
non-overlapping, eight-year periods enables us to abstract from business
cycle influences and to examine both short-run and long-run effects. The
countries included for this analysis are those undertaking some political
reforms to improve institutional quality, but not necessarily experienc-
ing a democratic transition over 1960–99. The sample excludes the East
European countries,63 which became democracies and independent only
following the end of the Cold War. The selection of countries is based
on the Polity index, “polity2” of the PolityIV Database explained below.
We naturally use data up to the end of the twentieth century, which is
partly because of data availability for some important variables, like the
black market premium,64 and partly because annual data for 40 years are
sufficient for a dynamic panel data study.
4.3.2 The measure and data for financial development
The aggregate measure of financial development in this context is
denoted by FD. Since there is no single aggregate index in the literature,
we use principal components analysis to produce a new aggregate index.
Ideally, the principal component analysis should be based on indicators
from the banking sector, stock market and bond market so as to cap-
ture different aspects of financial development. However, data on stock
market and bond market development are rarely available for before
1975 or even later, so the analysis focuses on financial intermediary
development.
The measure is based on three widely used indicators of financial
intermediary development as follows:65
1. Liquid Liabilities (LLY), calculated as the liquid liabilities of banks
and non-bank financial intermediaries (currency plus demand and
interest-bearing liabilities) over GDP. It measures the size, relative to the
economy, of financial intermediaries including three types of financial
institutions: the central bank, deposit money banks and other financial
institutions.
2. Private Credit (PRIVO), defined as the credit issued to the pri-
vate sector by banks and other financial intermediaries divided by GDP,
excluding the credit issued to government, government agencies and
public enterprises, as well as the credit issued by the monetary authority
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and development banks. This captures general financial intermediary
activities provided to the private sector.
3. Commercial-Central Bank (BTOT), the ratio of commercial bank
assets over the sum of commercial bank and central bank assets. It prox-
ies the advantages of financial intermediaries in channelling savings
to investment, monitoring firms, exerting corporate governance and
undertaking risk management relative to the central bank.
Since these indicators are used to measure the size of the banking
system,66 FD mainly captures the size of bank-based intermediation. FD
is the first principal component of these three indicators above, and
accounts for 72% of their variation. The weights resulting from prin-
cipal component analysis over the period 1990–99 are 0.59 for Liquid
Liabilities, 0.63 for Private Credit and 0.50 for Commercial-Central Bank.
The data on these indicators are obtained from the World Bank’s
Financial Structure and Economic Development Database (2008).
4.3.3 The measure and data for institutional improvement
The research focuses on political institutions and studies their impact
on financial development. The institutional improvement index is the
Polity indicator “polity2” in the PolityIV Database (Marshall and Jag-
gers, 2009), denoted by POLITY2. It proxies the degree of democracy and
seeks to measure institutional quality based on the freedom of suffrage,
operational constraints and balances on executives and respect for other
basic political rights and civil liberties. It is called the “combined polity
score”,67 defined as the democracy score minus the autocracy score.68
To pick up any effect of institutional improvement on financial devel-
opment, this exercise tries to incorporate all democratic reform episodes
in the sense that any increase of the annual “polity2” score for a country
will be considered even if it remains an autocratic regime or a democratic
regime over the whole period.
To select democratic transition countries for the before-and-after event
study, we also take into account the freedom index from Freedom House
Country Survey (2008).
4.4 Methodology
To assess the relationship between institutional improvement and finan-
cial development, the following model is estimated:69
yit = αyi,t−1 + βxi,t−1 + z,i,t−1δ + ηi + φt + vit (4.1)
i = 1, 2, . . . 90 and t = 2 . . . 5
HUANG: “CHAP04” — 2010/9/29 — 20:06 — PAGE 107 — #7
Political Institutions and Financial Development 107
where yit is the dependent variable FD, xit is the explanatory variable
POLITY2, zit is a vector of controlling variables including the logarithm
of the real GDP per capita (LGDP), trade openness (OPENC), aggregate
investment (CI) and the black market premium (BMP). OPENC is the
logarithm of one plus the trade share, the sum of exports and imports
over GDP (at current prices), divided by 100. CI is the ratio of investment
to real GDP per capita (using domestic prices), divided by 100. BMP is
the logarithm of one plus the black market premium divided by 100. δ
is a parameter vector, e.g. (δ1, . . . δ4),. ηi is an unobserved time-invariant
country-specific effect and can be regarded as capturing the combined
effect of all omitted variables. φt is the time effect. vit is the transitory
disturbance term.
We assume that the transient errors vit are serially uncorrelated. In
system GMM estimation all x′s and z′s are assumed to be potentially
correlated with ηi and predetermined with respective to time-varying
errors.70 To avoid the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables,
lagged values of xi, t and zi, t are included in the regression equation,
which allows feedback from the past shocks onto xi, t−1 and zi, t−1
while the current and future realizations of yit do not affect them. The
assumption is inspired by Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005), who argue that
“democratisations tend to follow periods of low growth rather than
precede them”. In contrast to the GMM approach, the following bias-
corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimation assumes all
x′s and z′s to be strictly exogenous, which rules out the possibility of
feedbacks from the past, current and future shocks onto xi, t−1 and
zi, t−1.
When the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique is used to estimate
this model, the OLS estimate of α is inconsistent and likely to be biased
upwards since the lagged values of yit are positively correlated with the
omitted fixed effects.
A number of methods have been developed to deal with the presence
of fixed effects in the dynamic panel data model. By using a within group
operator, the LSDV method eliminates any omitted variables bias created
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i = 1, 2, . . . 90 and t = 2 . . . 5 (4.2)
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zit/5. Since the lagged value of y is correlated with
the new error term, as shown by Nickell (1981), the LSDV estimate of α
can be badly downwards biased for small T , even as N goes to infinity.
Another way commonly used to wipe out the individual effects is to
apply first-differencing to Equation (3.1). By estimating the following
first-difference equation, the first-difference 2SLS estimator of Anderson
and Hsiao (1980, 1981), first-differenced GMM estimator of Arellano and
Bond (1991) and the system GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998) are proposed among others:
yit = αyi,t−1 + xi,t−1β + z′i,t−1δ + φt − φt−1 + vit
i = 1, 2, . . . 90 and t = 3 . . . 5 (4.3)
Conventional wisdom suggests that the first-differenced GMM esti-
mator is consistent and asymptotically more efficient than the first-
differenced 2SLS estimator. However, it may suffer from finite sample
bias by employing weak instruments, as argued by Blundell and Bond
(1998), that is, that “when the autoregressive parameter α is close to
unity or the variance of the individual effects (ηi) increases relative to the
variance of the transient disturbances (vit ) in the standard AR(1) model,
the instruments available for the first-differenced equation are likely to
be weak”.
To handle the weak instrument problem, Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998) impose a mean stationarity assumption
on initial conditions,71 and combine the first-difference equations with
suitably lagged levels as instruments and levels equations with suit-
ably lagged first differences as instruments. More specifically, the system
GMM estimator, one of the main focuses of this analysis, uses all lagged
values of y, x and z as instruments for yi,t−1, xi,t−1 and zi,t−1 in
the first difference equation above,72 and the lagged first differences of
the series (yit , xit , zit ) dated t–1 as instruments for the untransformed
equations in levels.73 The system GMM estimator has been found to be
more efficient than the first-differenced GMM estimator in the presence
of persistent data and weak instruments for first differences.
The asymptotic properties of the system GMM estimator depend on
having a large number of cross section units, however. One of the main
problems in using this estimator is that it may have poor finite sample
properties in terms of bias and imprecision. Starting from Kiviet (1995),
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a bias correction of LSDV has recently been developed for use in short
dynamic panels. Kiviet (1995) derives an approach to approximating
the small sample bias of the LSDV estimator and suggests that the bias
approximation be evaluated at the estimates from some consistent esti-
mates rather than the unobserved true parameter values, which makes
bias correction operationally feasible. The Monte Carlo evidence from
Kiviet (1995), Judson and Owen (1999) and Bun and Kiviet (2003) sug-
gests that the bias-corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC) is more efficient
than LSDV, first-differenced 2SLS, first-differenced GMM and system
GMM in terms of bias and root mean square error (RMSE) for small or
moderately large samples. Bruno (2005) derives a bias approximation of
various orders in dynamic unbalanced panels with a strictly exogenous
selection rule.74
This analysis compares the OLS, LSDV, LSDVC and SYS-GMM, standing
for the system GMM estimator, for the whole sample and three sub-
samples. The LSDVC estimator is regarded as the preferred estimator,
especially for subsamples, even though the independent variables other
than the lagged dependent variable are assumed to be strictly exoge-
nous. The initial estimator for the LSDVC could be either first-differenced
GMM or the SYS-GMM estimator. However, the SYS-GMM is selected
since the Difference Sargan test of additional moments conditions could
not reject the null, and the SYS-GMM may be a more reliable estimator
than first-differenced GMM in this context.
4.5 Evidence
The econometric methods are applied to study the effect on financial
development of a broader issue, that is institutional improvement, based
on even a slight change of the Polity index, “polity2”. Before proceeding
to the econometric analysis, we look at some preliminary evidence on
the effect of the establishment of representative government on financial
development by applying a “before-and-after” approach to 33 countries
which underwent transformation from autocratic regimes to complete
or partial democracies at some point during 1960–2001.
4.5.1 Preliminary evidence
The sample selection for the “before-and-after” event study relies on both
the “polity2” index and “freedom” index from the Freedom House Coun-
try Survey (2008). Countries with either their “polity2” index increasing
from negative values to positive values or their “freedom” index jump-
ing from “Not Free” to “Partly Free” or “Free” for at least ten years are
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considered for this analysis. In general, the “polity2” and “freedom”
indices yield similar results on the timing of democratic transition for
most cases. However, the “polity2” index excludes countries with small
populations (less than half a million) and the “freedom” index is only
available starting from 1972–73.75 For completeness, the selection of
democratic transition countries combines both indices when both are
available and relies on either of them otherwise.
The “before-and-after” approach compares an individual country’s
financial development performance under autocratic and democratic
regimes.76 To ease interpretation, the FD measure has been rescaled77
in Table 4.1. The five- or ten-year average of FD preceding democratic
transition is compared with the mean of FD during the first five or ten
years under democracy for 33 countries.
The ten-year average of standardized FD for the sample countries
increases by 0.093 on average after the initiation of a democratic transi-
tion and more than half of the sample countries exhibit an improvement
in financial development.78 It is worth noting that the majority of coun-
tries which suffered from a dramatic drop in financial development
after democratization are Latin American countries. In contrast, most
African countries underwent a pick-up in financial development after
their democratic transformations. The divergent performance in coun-
tries’ financial development implies that, apart from democratization,
the level of financial development in each country may be affected by
numerous factors including macroeconomic risks and changes in the
general investment climate.79 On average, these results tend to suggest
that the establishment of representative government is often associated
with an increase in financial development, but the effect is only sizeable
for a subset of countries.
The upper chart of Figure 4.1 displays the cross-country median FD ten
years before and after transition for the whole sample. The lower chart
of Figure 4.1 plots the coefficients on the fixed-effect estimate of 20 time
dummies before and after democratisation to reflect the dynamic effect
of a sustained democratization.80 The two figures show that the sample
countries in general experience a drop in FD prior to democratization,
which is in accordance with the view that worsened economic conditions
are associated with a subsequent democratization. After democratization,
FD appears to move slightly upwards on average in one to five years,
followed by a surge in five to ten years.
Figure 4.2 describes the standard deviation of the FD growth rate
before and after a stable democratization for whole the sample and sub-
samples. Democratization has led to a substantial rise in the standard
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−0.2 Cross-country median financial developmentFD 





Fixed effect estimates of financial developmentFD 
Figure 4.1 Financial development ten years before and after democratization
Note: 33 democratization countries, 1960–99. Upper figure shows the cross-
country median financial development for these countries. Lower figure plots the
coefficients of fixed-effect estimate of 20 time dummies before and after democ-
ratization. The regression is estimated by OLS, in which the country effects, time
effects, controlling variables like LGDP, OPENC, BMP and CI are included.











Figure 4.2 Volatility of financial development ten years pre/post-
democratization
Note: 33 democratization countries, 1960–99. This figure shows the volatility
of financial development, standard deviation of FD growth rate, for the whole
sample and eight subsamples before and after democratization.
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deviation of the FD growth rate for the whole sample. Regional groups
like Latin American (LAC) and Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries expe-
rience a higher standard deviation of the FD growth rate, but Asian
countries (ASIA) do not.81 The standard deviations of the FD growth
rate in income groups, like low-income countries (INCLOW) and middle-
income countries (INCMID), and in legal origin groups, like British legal
origin countries (LEG_UK) and French legal origin countries (LEG_FR),
increases after their democratic transition. An increase in the standard
deviation of the FD growth rate may reflect the fact that the removal
of institutional obstacles after democratic transition could bring about
short-run investment booms, reflected in a more volatile FD growth rate.
4.5.2 Regression results
Section 4.5.1 does provide some interesting results on the impact of
democratic transition on financial development. However, this evi-
dence is preliminary, and not convincing. In what follows we present
the econometric evidence, for both the whole sample and three
subsamples.82
4.5.2.1 Whole sample results
Table 4.2 reports the results for the whole sample, including estimation
by OLS, LSDV, LSDVC and SYS-GMM. For each estimate, the first col-
umn is the baseline specification in which the income level and trade
openness are present, while the second column controls for the black
market premium and aggregate investment. The point estimate and the
approximate standard error of the long-run effect for each model are
reported. Given the estimated models, the OLS, LSDV, LSDVC and SYS-
GMM estimates require that the long-run effect must have same sign as
the short-run effect. For the SYS-GMM estimate, the table reports serial
correlation tests, a Sargan test and a Difference Sargan test. The serial cor-
relation tests are used to examine the null hypothesis of no first-order
serial correlation and no second-order serial correlation respectively in
residuals in first differences. Given the errors in levels are serially uncor-
related, we would expect to find significant first-order serial correlation,
but no significant second-order correlation in the first-differenced resid-
uals. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is used to examine
the overall validity of the instruments by comparing the sample moment
conditions with their population analogue. The Difference Sargan test,
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), is used to test the null hypothesis
that the lagged differences of the explanatory variables are uncorrelated
with the errors in the levels equations.
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It is worth noting that, first, the autoregressive parameter estimated by
LSDVC and SYS-GMM lies in the interval defined by the OLS levels and
LSDV estimates. Recall that, in AR(1) models, the OLS levels estimate of
the autoregessive parameter is biased upwards in the presence of fixed
effects and the LSDV estimate is biased downwards in a short panel. A
consistent estimate of the autoregressive parameter can be expected to lie
in between the OLS levels and LSDV estimates. It is a simple indication
of the presence of serious finite sample biases when particular estimates
fail to fall into this interval or are very close to the bounds.
Both OLS and LSDV estimates indicate a significant positive effect
of democratization on financial development although they are biased
in opposite directions. The LSDVC estimator suggests evidence at the
20% significance level. The SYS-GMM estimate provides strong evidence
that the improvement in institutional quality is associated with financial
development, and the diagnostic tests, including the first- and second-
order serial correlation tests, Sargan test and Difference Sargan test,
support this. In general, the coefficients on the GDP level, trade openness
and aggregate investment are positively signed, while the coefficient of
the black market premium is negatively signed. The long-run effects in
the cases of the OLS and LSDV estimates have been found to be positive
and stable. However, the long-run effects for LSDVC and SYS-GMM are
less precisely estimated.
In general, the table provides evidence, which is not due to unobserved
heterogeneity or endogeneity biases, that democratization is followed by
advances in financial development at least in the short run.
4.5.2.2 Subsamples
In principle, the system GMM and LSDVC estimates impose homogene-
ity on all slope coefficients. One concern over the above findings is
that these parameters may be heterogeneous across countries. A natu-
ral way to confront this problem is to investigate subsamples, which are
more homogeneous. We turn to three subsamples in this section: lower-
income countries, ethnically diverse countries and French legal origin
countries.83 Since the cross section dimensions of these samples are rel-
atively small, LSDVC is expected to be more appropriate than SYS-GMM
for them.
Table 4.3 presents the results for the lower-income countries, made up
of low-income and lower-middle-income countries, covering the major-
ity of the developing countries. We find strong evidence of a positive
effect of institutional improvement on financial development in the
short run for every estimator. The LSDVC should be the most reliable
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estimator, given the above discussion. Moreover, it also indicates that
the effect of improved institutional quality on financial development is
sustained into the long run. Trade openness enters the models at the
20% significance level.
Table 4.4 shows the results for ethnically diverse countries which have
a level of ethnic fractionalization greater than the sample median. We
find strong evidence of the positive effect of institutional improvement
on financial development in the short run. The autoregressive param-
eter estimates from LSDVC and SYS-GMM are very close. The LSDVC
estimates suggest a positive effect of political liberalization on financial
development at the 20% significance level with GDP and trade openness
entering significantly. The SYS-GMM estimates provide much stronger
evidence, in which GDP and trade openness are present at the 20% sig-
nificance level. The long-run effects and approximate standard errors
are in general less precisely estimated except for the case of the OLS and
LSDV estimates.
The results for countries with French legal origin are reported in Table
4.5. This selection is essentially inspired by the work of La Porta et al.
(1998), which regards legal origin as a main determinant of financial
development. The experiments for British, German (LEG-GE) and Scan-
dinavian (LEG-SC) legal origin groups produce no evidence in favour of
a causal link from institutional improvement to financial development.
First it is worth noting that the autoregressive parameter estimated
by SYS-GMM in the baseline model lies outside of the interval defined
by the OLS and LSDV estimates, further implying the LSDVC may be a
more reasonable estimator in this context. The LSDVC estimates typically
show evidence in support of a positive effect of institutional improve-
ment on financial development for French legal origin countries at the
15% significance level. The finding seems to be in line with La Porta
et al. (1998), which claims that the main characteristic for countries with
French legal origins is that private property rights are generally neglected,
while British legal origin countries care more about private property own-
ers. The finding supports a tentative hypothesis that democratization in
French legal origin countries tends to change the status of private prop-
erty owners in the national economy, and is thus conducive to financial
development.
In sum, the above studies on subsamples have produced a coherent
set of findings: improved institutional quality leads to greater financial
development, at least in the short run. In the group of lower-income
countries, a significant long-run effect is also observed. In general, we
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find the black market premium has a negative effect, while GDP, trade
openness and aggregate investment enter positively.
4.6 Conclusion
This research examines whether institutional improvement stimulates
financial development using a panel of 90 economies over the period
1960–99. By comparing newly developed panel data techniques, includ-
ing bias-corrected LSDV and system GMM estimators, this research shows
that improved institutional quality is associated with increases in finan-
cial development at least in the short run, and this is particularly true for
lower-income, ethnically divided and French legal origin countries. For
the lower-income countries, this effect is expected to persist over longer
horizons. The preliminary evidence from a “before-and-after” approach
indicates that, in general, democratic transitions are typically preceded
by low financial development, but followed by a short-run boost in, and
greater volatility of, this.
The findings of this research highlight the influence of institutional
innovation on the supply side of financial development. They shed light
on the strong and robust relationship between institutional quality and
economic performance, and present further grounds for institutional
reform.
The findings in the panel data study on the coexistence of the effect
of institutional innovation, GDP and trade openness on financial devel-
opment are very significant. First, the study enriches the evidence for
an openness-finance nexus. Huang and Temple (2005)’s cross section
and panel data study suggests that trade openness is very likely to
boost financial development, for which institutional improvement could
serve as one channel. The IMF (2003) indicates the possible existence
of such a channel by concluding that “greater openness to trade and
stronger competition are conducive to institutional improvement, and
thus to growth”. However, the findings of this research tend to sug-
gest that there are additional channels via which more open policies
exert a positive effect on financial development. The findings are also
consistent with Rajan and Zingales (2003)’s claim that trade openness
is helpful for changing incumbents’ willingness to promote financial
development.
Second, the study has implications for economic and political reform.
Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004) argue that “studying the effects of each
reform (economic and political reform) individually can be misleading”
and there are positive feedback effects and interaction effects between
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economic and political liberalization. The findings of this chapter seem
to be consistent with their findings on the interaction effects, in the sense
that institutional reform under an open economic environment exerts
an additional boost to investment and economic growth, and thus to
financial development.
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Appendix tables
Table A4.1 The variables
Variable Description Source
FD Index for financial development in this paper,
mainly measuring the size of financial
intermediary development. It is the first
principal component of LLY , PRIVO and BTOT .
LLY Liquid Liabilities, the ratio of liquid liabilities
of financial system (currency plus demand and




(FDS) in World Bank,
2008
PRIVO Private Credit, the ratio of credits issued to
private sector by banks and other financial
intermediaries to GDP.
FDS, 2008
BTOT Commercial-Central Bank, the ratio of
commercial bank assets to the sum of
commercial bank and central bank assets.
FDS, 2008
POLITY2 The index for the degree of democracy. It is the




LGDP Real GDP per capita (Chain) in log. Penn World Table 6.2
OPENC The sum of exports and imports over GDP (at
current prices). The regression uses
log(1+OPENC/100).
Penn World Table 6.2
CI The sum of investment over real GDP per
capita (using domestic prices). The regression
uses CI/100.
Penn World Table 6.2




INCLOW Dummy for low-income group GDN, 2002




ETHFRAC Dummy for ethnic fractionalization GDN, 2002
LEG_UK Dummy for British legal origin GDN, 2002
LEG_FR Dummy for French legal origin GDN, 2002
LEG_GE Dummy for German legal origin GDN, 2002
LEG_SC Dummy for Scandivanian legal origin GDN, 2002
ASIA Dummy for Asian countries GDN, 2002
LAC Dummy for Latin American countries GDN, 2002
SSA Dummy for Sub-Sarahan African countries GDN, 2002
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Table A4.2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
FD overall −0.61 1.17 −2.91 1.85 N = 341
between 1.09 −2.77 2.53 n = 90
within 0.56 −2.45 4.48 T-bar = 3.79
POLITY2 overall −1.83 6.39 −10.00 10.00 N=438
between 5.37 −9.78 9.83 n=90
within 3.56 −12.70 10.92 T-bar = 4.87
LGDP overall 7.73 0.84 5.89 10.06 N = 399
between 0.86 6.28 10.06 n = 86
within 0.26 6.70 8.73 T-bar = 4.64
OPENC overall 0.43 0.19 0.07 1.18 N = 399
between 0.19 0.13 1.08 n = 86
within 0.08 0.16 0.78 T-bar = 4.64
CI overall 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.39 N = 399
between 0.07 0.02 0.31 n = 86
within 0.04 0.00 0.35 T-bar = 4.64
BMP overall 0.33 0.66 −0.04 7.64 N = 402
between 0.47 0.00 3.17 n = 88
within 0.53 −1.65 5.88 T-bar = 4.57
Note: Appendix Table A4.1 describes all variables in detail.





Financial liberalization has been one of the key trends characterizing the
post-Bretton Woods era, with decreasing capital controls and an increas-
ing participation of developing countries in international financial mar-
kets in recent decades. More broadly, domestic financial development,
measured in terms of liquid liabilities or stock market capitalization,
has risen dramatically over the same period. By using Bayesian Model
Averaging (BMA) and General-to-specific (Gets) approaches, Chapter 2
examines the long-run determinants of financial development. However,
what are the factors directly stimulating governments to liberalize the
financial sector, aimed at enhancing financial development? Building on
the framework of Abiad and Mody (2005) (AM hereafter), this chapter
attempts to answer this question and to provide a more comprehensive
view of the political economy of financial reform.
Although financial liberalization has been criticized as increasing the
likelihood of financial crises and financial fragility, it is widely regarded
as promoting the flow of financial resources, thereby reducing capital
costs, stimulating investment and fostering financial development and
economic growth (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache, 1998; Summers, 2000). In practice, governments in recent
decades have been committed to reducing direct intervention in the
financial system by easing or removing controls over interest rates, credit
allocation and financial transactions domestically and internationally,
opening up the banking system for foreign entry, and privatizing com-
mercial banks or non-bank financial intermediaries. What are the main
factors inducing governments to take these steps?
125
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AM introduce an analytical framework to examine the factors that
induce governments to undertake financial reforms. Using an ordered
logit technique to estimate their specifications, AM argue that policy
change in a country is positively related to its level of liberalization and
any liberalization gap from the regional leader. The pace of reform is
found to be affected by shocks or discrete changes such as a balance-of-
payments crisis, a banking crisis, a new government’s first year in office,
participation in an IMF programme and a decline in US interest rates.
However, they find that ideology and political and economic structures
have “limited influence” on the likelihood of reform.
The AM analytical framework is attractive in many respects, but some
aspects of their empirical analysis merit further attention. First, the
ordered logit technique they apply may not be appropriate for this
context, although the discrete and ordinal nature of the financial liber-
alization level, FLi,t , and policy change, FLi,t , may render the ordered
logit method a natural choice at first glance. In the AM analysis, the
dependent variable is not the level of financial liberalization, but the change
in the level of liberalization. AM treat a movement from a score of 1 to
3 of the underlying index the same as they do a movement from 16 to
18, among many other possibilities for a specific change (say +2). How-
ever, the lack of cardinality in the scale of their original measure implies
that movements along the scale for a specific change are not equiva-
lent. Given this particular nature of the dependent variable, resorting
to the ordered logit technique may not lead to the expected gains.84
Second, as in most cross-country research, AM do not take into account
the effects of common trends and the possibility of error dependence
across countries and over time. The importance of error dependence
seems especially relevant when the effects of domestic learning and
regional diffusion are investigated, and is confirmed by the results of
this analysis, including a formal test of dependence following Pesaran
(2004).
In this analysis, four innovations are introduced. The first is that,
rather than their ordered logit technique, this analysis centres on the
Pesaran (2006) common correlated effect pooled (CCEP) approach that
allows for the possibility of error dependence across countries. Second,
to adjust for serial correlation in individual errors, the panel-robust stan-
dard errors after Arellano (1987) are computed for the CCEP estimates.85
Third, it adds the extent of democracy into the AM framework, by intro-
ducing the Polity indicator, “polity2”, in the PolityIV Database (Marshall
and Jaggers, 2008), seeking to measure institutional quality. The level of
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democracy is a potentially important variable which reflects the polit-
ical environment in which new policies are approved or rejected, and
policy changes take place. Fourth, in addition to focusing on the orig-
inal dataset used by AM, it takes up a further investigation based on a
larger set of countries, in which the Abiad and Mody financial liberaliza-
tion index is replaced by the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness
(2006).
This chapter produces the following findings. In general it confirms the
negative effects of banking crises and high inflation on policy change,
as observed by AM. It is also consistent with AM in suggesting that the
effects of new governments in their first year and IMF programmes are
strong when financial sectors are highly repressed, and become weaker as
the level of financial liberalization goes up. However, this chapter points
to the following three distinct conclusions. First, it shows that some
of their findings on the effects of crises and shocks are fragile. Second,
it is at odds with AM on the effects of domestic learning and regional
diffusion. It suggests that policy change in a country is negatively rather
than positively related to its liberalization level, and the liberalization
gap from the regional leader appears less relevant than in AM. Third, this
analysis observes a significant effect of the extent of democracy, the new
variable added to the Abiad and Mody framework, on policy change. The
findings on the negative effects of domestic learning and irrelevance of
regional diffusion are supported by a larger sample of countries drawing
on the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness.
Section 5.2 provides a brief discussion of the model specifications and
econometric methods. Section 5.3 presents the empirical results, based
on the original dataset with the AM measure, and a larger set of coun-
tries with the Chinn-Ito measure, separately. Section 5.4 discusses the
implications of the findings. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Methodology
This section starts by briefly describing the models used in AM to
study how financial reform is shaped, followed by a discussion of the
econometric methods that will be applied in this chapter.
5.2.1 Model specifications
Below is the general model structure that captures the effects of domestic
learning, regional diffusion, discrete changes and ideology and structure
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on policy changes.
FLit = α(FL∗it − FLi,t−1)





The dependent variable, FLit , is used to measure policy change, the
difference between the level of financial liberalization in the current
period, FLit , and the past level of financial liberalization, FLi,t−1. FL86it
ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 and 1 corresponding to complete finan-
cial repression and complete financial liberalization, respectively. FL∗it
is the desired level of financial liberalization. The adjustment factor, α,
measures the degree of status quo bias. A lower value of α is associated
with more resistance to reform and a greater bias towards the status
quo. The first term on the RHS is therefore used to examine domes-
tic adjustment. The second term captures regional diffusion in which
REG_FLi,t−1 is the maximum level of financial liberalization achieved
in the region. SHOCKSit denotes discrete changes including four types
of crises – balance-of-payments crises (BOPit ), banking crises (BANKit ),
recessions (RECESSIONit ) and high inflation periods (HINFLit ) – and three
types of internal or external influences like the incumbent’s first year
in office (FIRSTYEARit ), the influence of international financial institu-
tions reflected by a dummy for an IMF programme of lending (IMFit )
and the influence of global factors proxied by the US Treasury Bill rate
(USINTit ). IDEOLOGYit reflects political orientation including a dummy
for left-wing government (LEFTit ) and a dummy for right-wing gov-
ernment (RIGHTit ). STRUCTUREit represents structural variables (either
economic or political), for example the trade openness measure (OPENit )
used in AM.
Overall, the Abiad and Mody framework is appealing, covering almost
all possible aspects. However, a political structural variable, the extent
of democracy (POLITY2it ), may be relevant to the analysis and is added
to their framework. This is the Polity indicator “polity2” in the PolityIV
Database (Marshall and Jaggers 2008) and seeks to measure institutional
quality based on the freedom of suffrage, operational constraints on exec-
utives and respect for other basic political rights and civil liberties. It
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is called the “combined polity score”, defined as the democracy score
minus the autocracy score.87
5.2.1.1 Benchmark specification
The benchmark specification assumes that the desired level of financial
liberalization, FL∗it , is the perfect level of financial liberalization and
the adjustment factor, α, is positively related to the level of financial
liberalization to allow for the likelihood of domestic learning. Putting
FL∗ = 1 and α = θ1FLi,t−1(θ1 > 0) into Equation (5.1) above and
reparameterizing, we have
FLit = θ1FLi,t−1(1 − FLi,t−1)





This equation is Equation (4) in AM.
5.2.1.2 Alternative specifications
Relaxing two assumptions used in the benchmark specification, three
alternative specifications are considered:
First, rather than assuming the desired level of financial liberalization,
FL∗it , to be full liberalization, it is natural to adopt country-specific mea-
sures of the desired extent of liberalization. When plugging FL∗ = c
(0 < c < 1) and α = θ1FLi,t−1 into Equation (5.1) above, redefining the
coefficients yields the following equation as in Equation (5) of AM88:
FLit = θ1FLi,t−1 + θ2FL2i,t−1
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Second, the desired level of financial liberalization, FL∗it , might be
reasonably regarded to be increasing with the level of income. When
FL∗ = a + bYit and α = θ1FLi,t−1 are considered, Equation (5.1) above
can be rearranged and reparameterized as Equation (6) in AM:89
FLit = θ1FLi,t−1 + θ2FL2i,t−1
+ θ3(FLi,t−1.Yit )





Finally, when the possibility that shocks, ideology and structure vari-
ables may exert effects on the status quo bias is taken into account, the
previous assumption α = θ1FLi,t−1 is replaced by the following equation:
α = γ1FLi,t−1




Putting this expression as well as FL∗ = c into Equation (5.1) and
redefining the coefficients yields the third specification, Equation (8) in
AM, below:
FLit = θ1FLi,t−1 + θ2FL2i,t−1
+ θ3(REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1)
+ θ4(REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1).FLi,t−1
+ θ ′5SHOCKSit + θ
′
6SHOCKSit .FLi,t−1
+ θ ′7IDEOLOGYit + θ
′
8IDEOLOGYit .FLi,t−1
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5.2.2 Econometric methods
AM use an ordered logit technique to estimate the benchmark specifi-
cation and three alternative specifications with the results presented in
Tables 7, 8 and 9 of their paper. A minor problem has been detected in
their empirical results in which Singapore is misclassified as an African
country while South Africa is misclassified as an East Asian country. The
corrected results are presented in Appendix Table A5.4. In general, the
pattern of Appendix Table A5.4 (part A) is similar to that of their Table 7.
Appendix Table A5.4 (part B) presents stronger evidence for IMFit and
REG_FLi,t−1−FLi,t−1.90 It is worth noting that Appendix Table A5.4 (part
C) shows that FLi,t−1, OPENit and OPENit× FLi,t−1 appear to be insignif-
icant when country fixed effects are included, different from Table 9 of
AM, which shows these variables to be significant when country fixed
effects are included.
More importantly, the analyses conducted by AM may be questioned
in the following two aspects.
The first is that the ordered logit technique they apply may not be
natural for this context, although the discrete and ordinal nature of the
financial liberalization level, FLi,t , and policy change, FLi,t , may render
the ordered logit method an appropriate choice at first glance. Since
the dependent variable is not the level of financial liberalization, but policy
change, financial liberalization moving from a score of 1 to 3 in terms of
their original measure91 is treated the same as moving from 16 to 18, for
example. However, given the ordinal feature of their original measure,
in reality policy change reflected by moving from a score of 1 to 3, which
could be at rather low levels, doesn’t necessarily lead to the same extent of
financial liberalization as moving from 16 to 18, which could be at much
higher levels of financial liberalization. Given this particular nature of
the dependent variable, resorting to the ordered logit technique may not
lead to the expected gains.
Second, like in most cross-country research, AM do not take into
account the effects of common trends and the possibility of error depen-
dence across countries and over time. This seems especially relevant
when the effects of domestic learning and regional diffusion are inves-
tigated. The assumption on the error term they use implies that the
disturbances are uncorrelated between groups and over time. However,
if the error term contains one or more unobserved factors which have
different effects on every unit, as noted by Phillips and Sul (2003) among
others, “the consequences of ignoring cross section dependence can be
serious”. On the other hand, the consequences of ignoring serial corre-
lation and heteroscedasticity can also be serious, since this may lead to
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a downwards bias in standard errors, and therefore higher significance
levels attached to the coefficients. In examining the origins of financial
openness, Quinn and Inclán (1997) argue that it is critical to consider
a common trend, such as changes in consumer tastes and technology,
that may exert substantial effects on government liberalization policies
as “fundamental but unobservable forces”.
The particular nature of the dependent variable and the possibility
of error dependence suggest that another estimation approach would
be worthwhile. The wide range of scores on the original financial lib-
eralization index from 1 to 18 and the policy change, FLi,t , from -1
to 1 (after transformation) makes a simpler linear regression method a
possible choice for this context. This chapter’s approach centres on the
Pesaran (2006) common correlated effect pooled (CCEP) estimator, a gen-
eralization of the fixed effects estimator which allows for the possibility
of cross-section correlation.92 To adjust for serial correlation in individ-
ual errors,93 the panel-robust standard errors from Arellano (1987) are
computed for the CCEP estimates, allowing the errors not only to be
serially correlated for a given country, but also to have variances and
covariances that vary across countries.
Pesaran (2006) proposes two common correlated effect (CCE)
approaches for large heterogeneous panels whose error contains unob-
served common factors. More specifically, this approach augments the
one-way fixed effects model with the (weighted) cross-sectional means of
the dependent variable and the individual specific regressors, analogous
to a two-way fixed effects model. Including the (weighted) cross-sectional
averages of the dependent variable and individual specific regressors is
suggested by Pesaran (2006, 2007) as an effective way to filter out the
impacts of common factors, which could be common technological or
macroeconomic shocks, causing between group error dependence.
The Pesaran (2006, 2007) approach exhibits considerable advantages.
It allows unobserved common factors to be possibly correlated with
exogenous regressors and exert differential impacts on individual units.
It permits unit root processes amongst the observed and unobserved
common effects. The proposed estimator is still consistent, although it is
no longer efficient, when the idiosyncratic components are not serially
uncorrelated.
In this context, the cross sectional means of FLit , FLi,t−1, GDPi,t−1
and OPENit are considered since these variables may be especially likely
to reflect common effects. To allow the effects to be heterogeneous
across regions, the models are augmented with the interactions between
regional dummies and cross sectional means of the above variables, and
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time dummies. The CCEP estimator has been shown to be asymptoti-
cally unbiased and consistent as N− > ∞ for both T fixed or T − > ∞,
and to have generally satisfactory finite sample properties.
Appendix Table A5.3 presents the time series properties for three con-
tinuous variables, the financial liberalization index (FLi,t ), GDP per
capita in PPP terms (GDPi,t ) and trade openness (OPENi,t ). It contrasts a
panel unit root test proposed by Pesaran (2007) in the presence of cross
section dependence with the Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher test, which
is associated with the assumption of cross section independence of the
error term and does not require a balanced panel. The Pesaran (2007)
approach augments the standard ADF regression with cross section aver-
ages of lagged levels and first differences of individual series, to control
for cross section dependence. The Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher test is
then applied to this more general setting. With cross sectionally inde-
pendent errors, the Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher test cannot reject the
null of non-stationarity for FLi,t , GDPi,t and OPENi,t when we do not
allow for a trend. With a trend, the series of GDPi,t and OPENi,t are close
to being found as stationary. When we allow for a trend, Pesaran’s test
shows that we can almost reject the null of non-stationarity for FLi,t ,
GDPi,t and OPENi,t at the 10% significance level94, suggesting that FLi,t ,
GDPi,t and OPENi,t may not be I(1) variables. However, this result should
be interpreted with caution since there are reservations as to the power
and reliability of these tests.
This analysis also employs a normal within groups (WG) approach
to estimating the one-way fixed effects models (country fixed effects
included), as estimated by AM, with non-robust standard errors. How
important controlling for error dependence across countries and over
time is for this context can be examined by comparing the WG estimates
and CCEP estimates. The consistency of the one-way WG estimator for
the dynamic homogeneous model is justified by the length of the time
series,95 but this estimator is biased in small samples because of the
lagged dependent variable bias. The country fixed effects can be elimi-
nated by an idempotent (covariance) transformation matrix as in within
groups estimation.
5.3 Empirical evidence
By applying a within groups approach to the AM framework with the
addition of the extent of democracy, this section presents empirical evi-
dence in two steps on what shapes financial reform, an analysis on the
original dataset with the AM measure in Section 5.3.1 and an analysis
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on a larger dataset with the Chinn-Ito (2006) measure in Section 5.3.2.
In each step, the normal one-way fixed effects WG estimates with non-
robust standard errors are contrasted with Pesaran (2006) CCEP estimates
with panel-robust standard errors, with the former assuming that the
errors are serially uncorrelated and independent across countries, while
the latter approach allows for error dependence both across countries
and over time.
5.3.1 Analysis on the original dataset
This section concerns the analyses on the benchmark specification
(Equation 5.2) and three alternative specifications (Equations 5.3, 5.4
and 5.5) using AM’s original dataset. The results are presented in Tables
5.1A/B, 5.2 and 5.3 corresponding to Tables 7, 8 and 9 in AM, respectively.
Table 5.1 (part A) and 5.1 (part B) reports the WG estimates and
CCEP estimates of the benchmark specification (Equation 5.2). Table
5.1A strictly follows the model structure of AM96 while Table 5.1 (part
B) reports FLi,t−1 and FL2i,t−1 separately, presenting a direct link between
policy change, FLit , and the level of liberalization, FLi,t−1. In compar-
ison to the ordered logit estimates in columns 4–6 (with country fixed
effects) of Appendix Table A5.4A, the WG estimates in Table 5.1A (coun-
try effects are included by definition) not only confirm their findings, but
also show that FIRSTYEARit and OPENit have positive effects on policy
change.
To present a direct link between policy change, FLit , and the level
of liberalization, FLi,t−1, Table 5.1 (part B) reports FLi,t−1 and FL2i,t−1
separately. The within R2 associated with the CCEP estimates is much
larger then those for the WG estimates, hinting at the importance of
error dependence. With satisfactory finite sample properties, the CCEP
estimates in Table 5.1 show that policy change is negatively rather
than positively associated with the lagged level of financial liberaliza-
tion, FLi,t−1, and the regional liberalization gap, REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1.
The CCEP estimates confirm the AM finding on a negative effect of
BANKit , and positive effects of BOPit and FIRSTYEARit on policy change.
It also provides strong evidence for a negative effect of POLITY2it ,
indicating that the extent of democracy tends to hinder the pace of
reform.
Table 5.2 presents the within groups estimates, WG and CCEP, for
the alternative specifications (Equations 5 and 6 in AM). The CCEP esti-
mates confirm the previous observations of Table 5.1 in terms of the
negative effects of the level of liberalization, regional liberalization gap,
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banking crises and the extent of democracy, and the positive effects of a
balance-of-payments crisis and a new government’s first year in office. A
positive effect of USINTit is also observed.
Next we proceed to Table 5.3, which presents the within groups esti-
mates of the most general specification (Equation 8 in AM). Note that the
corrected Table 9 in AM shows that FLi,t−1, OPENit and OPENit× FLi,t−1
are insignificant in the presence of country fixed effects. Similarly, the
Table 5.1 Within estimates: Benchmark specification (Equation 4)
A. FLi,t−1 × (1 − FLi,t−1) reported
Estimators WG WG WG CCEP CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 0.083 0.098 0.083 0.046 0.070 0.075
×(1 − FLi,t−1) [0.038]** [0.038]*** [0.039]** [0.060] [0.054] [0.056]
REG_FLi,t−1 0.076 0.070 0.083 0.109 0.111 0.121
−FLi,t−1 [0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.027]***
BOPit 0.017 0.013 0.019 0.019
[0.006]*** [0.006]** [0.006]*** [0.006]***
BANKit −0.024 −0.022 −0.021 −0.020
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.010]** [0.009]**
RECESSIONit −0.010 −0.009 −0.006 −0.007
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
HINFLit −0.003 −0.002 −0.009 −0.012















Observations 805 805 805 805 805 805
Number of
countries
35 35 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.15 0.17
CSD test
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01
continued
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Table 5.1 Continued
B. FLi,t−1 and (FLi,t−1)2 reported separately
Estimators WG WG WG CCEP CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 0.081 0.096 0.074 −0.208 −0.178 −0.202
[0.038]** [0.038]** [0.040]* [0.058]*** [0.061]*** [0.071]***
(FLi,t−1)2 −0.104 −0.113 −0.113 −0.154 −0.175 −0.174
[0.043]** [0.043]*** [0.043]*** [0.066]** [0.065]** [0.064]***
REG_FLi,t−1 0.059 0.058 0.058 −0.144 −0.133 −0.148
−FLi,t−1 [0.022]*** [0.022]*** [0.023]** [0.042]*** [0.047]*** [0.053]***
BOPit 0.016 0.011 0.014 0.014
[0.006]*** [0.006]* [0.006]** [0.005]**
BANKit −0.024 −0.020 −0.019 −0.018
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.010]* [0.009]*
RECESSIONit −0.010 −0.009 −0.002 −0.004
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
HINFLit −0.003 −0.002 −0.014 −0.012















Observations 805 805 805 805 805 805
Number of
countries
35 35 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.22 0.24
CSD test
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01
Notes: 35 countries (original dataset), 1973–96. Dependent variable is FLit . Using normal
one-way within it groups estimator (WG) and Pesaran (2006)’s CCEP estimator, Table 5.1 A/B
presents new results corresponding to models in Table 7 in Abiad and Mody (2005) with the
addition of POLITY2it . Table 5.1A reports results for FLi,t−1 × (1 − FLi,t−1), while Table 5.1B
reports results for FLi,t−1 and FLi,t−12 separately. The within R-squared is reported. Non-
robust standard errors are reported for WG estimates, while panelrobust standard errors are
reported for CCEP estimates. CSD tests the null hypothesis of cross section independence in
the panel data models using the test following Pesaran (2004).
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 5.2 Within estimates: Alternative specification (Equations 5 and 6)
Estimators WG WG CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 0.074 0.092 −0.202 −0.175
[0.040]* [0.040]** [0.071]*** [0.078]**
(FLi,t−1)2 −0.113 −0.201 −0.174 −0.105
[0.043]*** [0.053]*** [0.064]*** [0.066]
FLi,t−1 × Yi,t−1 0.007 −0.009
[0.002]*** [0.004]**
REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.058 0.063 −0.148 −0.094
[0.023]** [0.023]*** [0.053]*** [0.079]
BOPit 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.016
[0.006]* [0.006]* [0.005]** [0.005]***
BANKit −0.020 −0.023 −0.018 −0.016
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.009]* [0.009]*
RECESSIONit −0.009 −0.010 −0.004 −0.004
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
HINFLit −0.002 −0.004 −0.012 −0.015
[0.011] [0.011] [0.018] [0.018]
FIRSTYEARit 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
[0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]*
IMFit 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.009
[0.007]* [0.007]* [0.008] [0.008]
USINTit −0.003 −0.003 0.003 0.006
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.004] [0.003]**
LEFTit 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.011
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
RIGHTit 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.006
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009]
OPENit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000]* [0.000]** [0.000] [0.000]
POLITY2it −0.011 −0.010 −0.038 −0.039
[0.014] [0.014] [0.022]* [0.018]**
Observations 805 805 805 805
Number of countries 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.24 0.25
CSD test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Notes: This table, based on the original dataset, presents new results corresponding to models
in Table 8 in AM except for the addition of POLITY2it . See Table 5.1 for further notes.
CCEP estimates of Table 5.3 find less evidence for FLi,t−1, OPENit and
OPENit× FLi,t−1. It confirms the negative effect of REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1
on policy reform.97 A positive effect of FIRSTYEARit and a negative effect
of its interaction term with FLi,t−1 are observed, highlighting that new
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REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.025 −0.147
[0.023] [0.055]**







































HUANG: “CHAP05” — 2010/9/29 — 20:06 — PAGE 139 — #15
Financial Reforms for Financial Development 139
Table 5.3 Continued
Estimators WG CCEP




POLITY2it × FLi,t−1 0.002 0.001
[0.002] [0.003]
Observations 805 805
Number of countries 35 35
R-squared 0.14 0.27
CSD test (p-value) 0.00 0.01
Notes: This table, based on the original dataset, presents new results corresponding
to models in Table 9 in AM except for the addition of POLITY2it . See Table 5.1 for
further notes.
governments in their first year are likely to trigger reform, especially
when the extent of financial liberalization is still at an early stage. The
effect of the interaction between LEFTit and FLi,t−1 is also shown to be
positive.
The discrepancy between the WG estimates and CCEP estimates in
the above study has pointed to the fundamental significance of relaxing
assumptions on the error term. One may wonder which is more impor-
tant, controlling for serial correlation in the errors or adjusting for cross
section error dependence? To what extent does each relaxation make the
results different from those associated with error independence? Answers
may be found from Table 5.4, which reports the WG estimates with
panel-robust standard errors, controlling for serial correlation of errors
only, and the CCEP estimates with non-robust standard errors, con-
trolling for cross section error dependence only. As it stands, both are
important. Nevertheless, the quantitatively larger effects (coefficients)
and much larger R2 associated with the CCEP estimates than with the
WG estimates may reflect that controlling for cross-country correlation
is an especially crucial step for this context. One may notice from Table
5.4 that, suggested by either the WG estimates or CCEP estimates, the
ideology and economic and political structure in general appear to have a
substantial influence on policy change, especially for LEFTit and OPENit .
This has raised a methodological concern that insufficient consideration
of error dependence could lead to misleading findings.
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Table 5.4 Error dependence across countries and over time considered
separately
A. Within estimates corresponding to Table 5.1B
Estimators WG WG WG CCEP CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 0.081 0.096 0.074 −0.208 −0.178 −0.202
[0.049] [0.045]** [0.053] [0.056]*** [0.057]*** [0.059]***
(FLi,t−1) −0.104 −0.113 −0.113 −0.154 −0.175 −0.174
[0.046]** [0.045]** [0.051]** [0.049]*** [0.050]*** [0.050]***
REG_FLi,t−1 0.059 0.058 0.058 −0.144 −0.133 −0.148
−FLi,t−1 [0.025]** [0.027]** [0.027]** [0.037]*** [0.037]*** [0.040]***
BOPit 0.016 0.011 0.014 0.014
[0.006]** [0.006]* [0.006]** [0.006]**
BANKit −0.024 −0.020 −0.019 −0.018
[0.009]** [0.009]** [0.007]*** [0.007]**
RECESSIONit −0.010 −0.009 −0.002 −0.004
[0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
HINFLit −0.003 −0.002 −0.014 −0.012















Observations 805 805 805 805 805 805
Number of
countries
35 35 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.22 0.24
CSD test
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01
Notes: Panelrobust standard errors are reported for WG estimates, whilst non-robust standard
errors are reported for CCEP estimates. See Table 5.1 for further notes.
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Table 5.4 Continued
B. Within estimates corresponding to Table 5.2
Estimators WG WG CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 0.074 0.092 −0.202 −0.175
[0.053] [0.053]* [0.059]*** [0.062]***
(FLi,t−1)2 −0.113 −0.201 −0.174 −0.105
[0.051]** [0.068]*** [0.050]*** [0.055]*
FLi,t−1 × Yi,t−1 0.007 −0.009
[0.003]** [0.003]***
REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.058 0.063 −0.148 −0.094
[0.027]** [0.025]** [0.040]*** [0.047]**
BOPit 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.016
[0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]** [0.006]**
BANKit −0.020 −0.023 −0.018 −0.016
[0.009]** [0.009]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
RECESSIONit −0.009 −0.010 −0.004 −0.004
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
HINFLit −0.002 −0.004 −0.012 −0.015
[0.020] [0.020] [0.011] [0.011]
FIRSTYEARit 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
[0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]*
IMFit 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.009
[0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
USINTit −0.003 −0.003 0.003 0.006
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.003] [0.003]*
LEFTit 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.011
[0.008] [0.007] [0.011] [0.011]
RIGHTit 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.006
[0.008] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010]
OPENit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000]* [0.000]** [0.000] [0.000]
POLITY2it −0.011 −0.010 −0.038 −0.039
[0.013] [0.013] [0.015]*** [0.015]***
Observations 805 805 805 805
Number of countries 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.24 0.25
CSD test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Note: Panelrobust standard errors are reported for WG estimates, whilst non-robust standard
errors are reported for CCEP estimates. See Table 5.1 for further notes.
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Table 5.4 Continued






REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.025 −0.147
[0.029] [0.040]***


































RIGHTit × FLi,t−1 0.020 0.025
[0.034] [0.032]
continued
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POLITY2it × FLi,t−1 0.002 0.001
[0.002] [0.002]
Observations 805 805
Number of countries 35 35
R-squared 0.14 0.27
CSD test (p-value) 0.00 0.01
Notes: Panelrobust standard errors are reported for WG estimates, whilst
non-robust standard errors are reported for CCEP estimates. See Table 5.1
for further notes.
In sum, the above analyses based on the augmented specifications
in which POLITY2it is included, allowing for the possibility of error
dependence across countries and over time, produce interesting find-
ings. On the one hand, this chapter confirms the significant effects of
crises and shocks on policy reform identified by AM. More specifically, it
confirms negative effects of banking crises and high inflation, and does
agree with AM that a new government in its first year and an IMF pro-
gramme have a strong effect when financial sectors are highly repressed
and a weaker effect thereafter. On the other hand, it differs from AM in
the following three aspects. First, it shows that the significant effects
of balance-of-payments crises and US interest rates found by AM are
fragile. The second aspect is that it yields opposite findings to AM on the
effects of domestic learning. It shows that the extent of policy reform
is negatively rather than positively affected by the existing liberaliza-
tion level, while the regional liberalization gap does not appear relevant.
Third, it addresses the importance of the extent of democracy for the
process of financial reform and identifies a negative effect of the extent
of democracy on policy change.
5.3.2 Analysis on a larger dataset
This section makes an effort to explore if the findings are robust to a
larger set of countries. It makes use of the Chinn-Ito index of financial
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openness (2006) which is available for 108 countries over 1970–2000. But
the Chinn-Ito index measures only a country’s degree of capital account
openness, one aspect of six policy dimensions on which the creation of
the AM is based. Moreover, the country coverage in this analysis is con-
fined to the data availability of crisis variables taken from Bordo et al.
(2000) which contains only 55 countries. Since most of the added coun-
tries are OECD countries (listed in the Appendix Table A5.2), the effects of
factors like balance-of-payment crises, banking crises, IMF programmes
and the extent of democracy are expected to be weaker.98 A variable
description is presented in Appendix Table A5.1.
Tables 5.5A, 5.5B and 5.5C report the within groups estimates corre-
sponding to Tables 5.1B, 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. As expected, these
tables show weaker evidence for the effects of shocks, crises, ideology
and economic and political structures on policy reform, except for US
interest rates and high inflation. But, since the above analysis in general
obtains findings consistent with AM on the effects of crises and shocks,
more emphasis is placed on the robustness of the new findings regarding
the negative effects of domestic learning and regional diffusion.
With a larger sample size, both the WG and CCEP estimates in these
tables clearly indicate that policy reform is negatively linked to the level
of liberalization, FLi,t−1, at the 1% significance level. The tables fur-
ther confirm that the effect of REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 on policy change is
ambiguous. Removing the variable IMFi,t doesn’t alter the pattern of the
results, as reported in Appendix Table A5.5 (A, B, C).
Hence, the findings summarized earlier on the negative effects of
domestic learning and irrelevance of regional diffusion are largely sup-
ported by a larger sample of countries based on the Chinn-Ito index of
capital account openness.
5.4 Discussions
The above findings have several implications. The negative link between
policy change and the liberalization level suggests a convergence in the
extent of financial liberalization in the sense that countries with highly
repressed financial sectors have more potential to embark on reform,
while countries with a highly liberalized financial sector have greater
status quo bias – the reform likelihood is “saturated” (AM). Vivid exam-
ples can easily be picked up from the financial liberalization process in
East Asia in recent decades. Since the 1970s, countries or areas with levels
of liberalization much lower than those of the main developed countries
(the US or UK for example) like the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Hong
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Table 5.5 Augmented dataset with Chinn-Ito measure (2006)
A. Within estimates corresponding to Table 5.1B
Estimators WG WG WG CCEP CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 −0.168 −0.170 −0.185 −0.204 −0.214 −0.301
[0.044]*** [0.044]*** [0.048]*** [0.069]*** [0.068]*** [0.086]***
(FLi,t−1)2 0.052 0.053 0.070 0.087 0.092 0.164
[0.037] [0.037] [0.039]* [0.049]* [0.049]* [0.058]***
REG_FLi,t−1 −0.016 −0.018 0.007 0.048 0.044 0.063
−FLi,t−1 [0.027] [0.027] [0.030] [0.036] [0.037] [0.046]
BOPit 0.002 0.003 −0.005 −0.006
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]
BANKit −0.010 −0.012 −0.008 −0.010
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011]
RECESSIONit −0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
HINFLit −0.018 −0.015 −0.009 −0.007















Observations 1263 1262 1150 1263 1262 1150
Number of
countries
55 55 53 55 55 53
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.22 0.22 0.26
Notes: 55 countries, 1973–97. Dependent variable is FLi,t . Using normal one-way within
groups estimator (WG) and Pesaran (2006)’s CCEP estimator, this table, based on a larger
dataset associated with the Chinn-Ito measure (2006), presents new results corresponding to
Table 5.1B. The within groups R-squared is reported. Variable descriptions are presented in the
Appendix Table A5.1. Countries included are listed in the Appendix Table A5.2. Non-robust
standard errors are reported for WG estimates, while panelrobust standard errors are reported
for CCEP estimates.
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 5.5 Continued
B. Within estimates corresponding to Table 5.2
Estimators WG WG CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 −0.185 −0.180 −0.301 −0.375
[0.048]*** [0.048]*** [0.086]*** [0.122]***
(FLi,t−1)2 0.070 0.028 0.164 0.138
[0.039]* [0.046] [0.058]*** [0.071]*
FLi,t−1 × Yi,t−1 0.003 0.002
[0.002]* [0.004]
REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.007 0.013 0.063 0.038
[0.030] [0.030] [0.046] [0.058]
BOPit 0.003 0.002 −0.006 −0.012
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010]
BANKit −0.012 −0.011 −0.010 −0.002
[0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.013]
RECESSIONit 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002
[0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.010]
HINFLit −0.015 −0.018 −0.007 0.006
[0.013] [0.013] [0.018] [0.017]
FIRSTYEARit 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
[0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006]
IMFit 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.010
[0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
USINTit −0.005 −0.005 −0.002 −0.002
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002] [0.002]
LEFTit −0.002 −0.004 −0.010 −0.013
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011]
RIGHTit 0.000 −0.002 −0.003 −0.008
[0.010] [0.010] [0.012] [0.017]
OPENit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
POLITY2it −0.003 −0.003 0.004 0.007
[0.018] [0.018] [0.027] [0.033]
Observations 1150 1150 1150 1150
Number of countries 53 53 53 53
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.26 0.33
Note: See Table 5.5A for further notes.
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Table 5.5 Continued






REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 −0.006 −0.009
[0.031] [0.057]


































RIGHTit × FLi,t−1 −0.011 0.022
[0.031] [0.048]
continued
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POLITY2it × FLi,t−1 0.001 0.000
[0.002] [0.007]
Observations 1150 1150
Number of countries 53 53
R-squared 0.10 0.35
Note: See Table 5.5A for further notes.
Kong, Thailand and China have actively and progressively liberalized
their financial systems.
This research finds that the significant effect of a regional liberalization
gap on policy changes is hard to identify, although two opposite views
have been proposed in the literature. AM suggest that countries with a
level of liberalization far from that of the regional leader are found to be
more likely to undertake reform, perhaps due to competitive pressure.
The larger the gap in terms of liberalization levels within a region, the
fiercer the competition amongst these countries for international capital
and technologies. In contrast, Axelrod (1997) documents that the more
similar a country is to its neighbouring nations in terms of economic,
social and political developments, the more likely it is that it “adopts
one of the neighbour’s traits” while Simmons and Elkins (2004) predict
that “governments’ liberalization policies will be influenced by the poli-
cies of their most important foreign economic competitors”. This line of
research in general predicts that a greater gap from the regional leader
tends to be associated with less incentive to compete and less chance to
catch up with the regional leader in the short run, therefore a status quo
bias is maintained.
In accordance with AM, the pattern suggested by their Table 3 that the
coefficient on REG_FLi,t−1 −FLi,t−1 is positive and the coefficient on the
interaction term is negative although insignificant, seems to be in line
with the convergence story identified earlier in the sense that countries
with lower levels of liberalization relative to that of the regional leader
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are more inclined to initiate reform, while the reform momentum fades
as the liberalization gap from the regional leader shrinks. It implies that
a greater gap from the regional leader tends to be associated with more
incentives to engage in reform.
The finding concerning the negative effect of the extent of democracy
on policy change is consistent with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), who
argue that there is uncertainty with respect to the distribution of bene-
fits and costs from reform. They contrast democratic societies in which
the majority would vote against the reform due to the presence of this
uncertainty, just for safety, with authoritarian societies like Taiwan and
the Republic of Korea (early 1960s), Chile (1970s) and Turkey (1980s),
where “reform was imposed by the authoritarian regimes and against the
wishes of business.” The status quo appears to be more easily dislodged
in autocratic societies than in democratic societies.
Chapter 4 shows that democratization is typically followed by finan-
cial development at least in the short run, which is in line with the
argument of Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) in terms of a short-run boost
in economic growth and a decline in growth volatility after democrati-
zation. Together with the findings of Chapter 4, a clear picture seems
to appear to us: a short-run increase in financial development emerges
after democratization; however, once democracy has been established
and enhanced, the extent of democracy may exert negative effects on
the extent to which governments undertake financial reform.
This finding tends to suggest that ideology and political structure can
have a substantial influence on policy change, contrary to some extent to
the findings of AM, who claim that ideology and economic and political
structure have a limited influence on policy change.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies the forces that lead governments to undertake
reforms to enhance financial development, based on AM. Given the par-
ticular nature of the dependent variable, it suggests replacing the ordered
logit technique used by AM with a within groups approach, allowing for
the possibility of error dependence across countries and over time, which
seems of especial importance when the effects of domestic learning and
regional diffusion in the process of financial liberalization are studied.
Based on these innovations, the analysis shows that some of the AM
findings are not robust to error dependence and the estimation method.
It has produced the following significant findings, shedding new light
on the political economy of financial reform.
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This chapter finds that policy change in a country is negatively rather
than positively associated with the initial extent of liberalization level,
and the distance behind the regional leader. This indicates convergence
in the extent of financial liberalization, in the sense that countries with
highly repressed financial sectors have more potential to embark on
reform, whilst countries with a highly liberalized financial sector have
greater status quo bias.
This analysis suggests that some of AM findings on the effects of shocks
and crises are robust whilst others are fragile. More specifically, it con-
firms the negative effects of banking crises and high inflation. It also
agrees with AM that new governments in their first year and IMF pro-
grammes have a strong effect when financial sectors are highly repressed,
and a weaker effect thereafter. But it finds no evidence in support of
the effects of balance-of-payments crises and US interest rates on policy
change.
Furthermore, it shows that economic and political structure and ide-
ology can have a substantial influence on policy change, and the extent
of democracy, the added variable, has a significantly negative effect on
policy reform.
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Appendix tables
Table A5.1 The variables (mainly used with the larger dataset)
Variable Description Source
FL It is the financial liberalization index,
produced by rescaling the Chinn-Ito
index to interval [0, 1]. The Chinn-Ito
index, the KAOPEN index, measures a
country’s degree of capital account
openness, taking on higher values the




Y GDP per capita in PPP terms. Penn World
Table 6.2
BOP As in Abiad and Mody (2005) (originally
taken from Bordo et al. (2000)), it is the
balance-of-payments crisis variable
identified by “a forced change in parity,
abandonment of a pegged exchange rate,
or an international rescue,” or if an index
of exchange market pressure (a weighted
average of exchange rate, reserve and
interest rate changes) exceeds a critical
threshold of one and a half standard
deviations above its mean. It is set equal
to 1 if a balance of payments crisis has
occurred within the past two years, and 0
otherwise.
Bordo et al. (2000)
BANK As in Abiad and Mody (2005) (originally
taken from Bordo et al. (2000)), it is the
bankig crisis identified by periods of
“financial distress resulting in the erosion
of most or all of aggregate banking
system capital”. It is set equal to 1 if a
banking crisis has occurred within the
past two years, and 0 otherwise.
Bordo et al. (2000)
RECESSION As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it is the
recession dummy variable, set equal to 1
where the annual real GDP growth rate is
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Table A5.1 Continued
Variable Description Source
HINFL As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it is the
high inflation dummy variable, set equal
to 1 where the annual inflation exceeds





FIRSTYEAR Based on the YRSOFFC variable (how
many years the chief executive has been
in office), it is the first year in office





IMF As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it is the
IMF programme dummy variable
constructed using the programme dates






USINT As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it is the US





LEFT As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it denotes a
left-wing government where its







RIGHT As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it denotes
the right-wing government where its






OPEN The sum of exports and imports over




DEMO Index of democracy. It is called combined
the polity score, and is the democracy
score minus the autocracy score, averaged
over 1973–97. It is also used with the
original dataset. The index has been
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Table A5.2 The list of countries in the augmented dataset
East Asia South Asia OECD countries
CHN China BGD Bangladesh* AUS Australia*
HKG Hong Kong IND India* AUT Austria
IDN Indonesia* LKA Sri Lanka* BEL Belgium
KOR Korea, Rep.* NPL Nepal* CAN Canada*
MYS Malaysia* PAK Pakistan* CHE Switzerland
PHL Philippines* DEU Germany*
SGP Singapore* DNK Denmark
THA Thailand* ESP Spain
TWN Taiwan* FIN Finland
FRA France*
Latin America Middle East GBR United Kingdom*
& Caribbean & Africa GRC Greece
ARG Argentina* EGY Egypt* IRL Ireland
BRA Brazil* GHA Ghana* ISL Iceland
CHL Chile* ISR Israel* ITA Italy*
COL Colombia* MAR Morocco* JPN Japan*
CRI Costa Rica NGA Nigeria NLD Netherlands
ECU Ecuador ZAF South Africa* NOR Norway
JAM Jamaica ZWE Zimbabwe* NZL New Zealand*
MEX Mexico* PRT Portugal
PER Peru* SWE Sweden
PRY Paraguay TUR Turkey*
URY Uruguay USA USA*
VEN Venezuela*
Note: Countries with ∗ are in the original dataset of Abiad and Mody (2005).
Table A5.3 Unit root test in heterogeneous panels
Variables FL GDP OPEN
Trend Yes No Yes No Yes No
Maddala and 43.82 25.39 77.84 52.81 75.23 64.11




74.85 50.23 67.65 54.98 63.01 62.31
Notes: Maddala and Wu (1999)’s Fisher test is for the case of cross sectionally independent
error. Under the null of a unit root, the test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a standard
normal. Pesaran (2007)’s test is the Maddala and Wu (1999)’s Fisher test applied to the cross
sectionally augmented Dickey-Fuller regression. The 10% critical values provided by H.M.
Pesaran for the pair of N = 30 and T = 30 is 82.89 with a trend and 82.18 without a trend.
HUANG: “CHAP05” — 2010/9/29 — 20:06 — PAGE 154 — #30
154 Determinants of Financial Development
Table A5.4 Corrected version of Tables 7, 8 and 9 in Abiad and Mody (2005)
A. Corrected version of Table 7 in Abiad and Mody (2005)
Country
dummy
included No No No Yes Yes Yes
FLi,t−1 3.933 4.562 4.106 6.794 7.284 6.574
×(1 −
FLi,t−1)
[4.39]*** [4.94]*** [4.48]*** [4.44]*** [4.83]*** [4.07]***
REG_FLi,t−1 1.032 1.050 1.195 2.285 2.089 2.529
−FLi,t−1 [4.18]*** [3.76]*** [3.93]*** [3.23]*** [2.71]*** [3.21]***
BOPit 0.521 0.430 0.550 0.475
[2.60]*** [2.21]** [2.19]** [1.94]*
BANKit −1.020 −0.983 −0.995 −0.935
[2.74]*** [2.67]*** [2.68]*** [2.57]**
RECESSIONit −0.018 0.002 −0.055 −0.026
[0.05] [0.00] [0.15] [0.07]
HINFLit −0.136 −0.238 −0.317 −0.302













Observations 805 805 805 805 805 805
Number of
countries
35 35 35 35 35 35
Notes: This is a corrected version of Table 7 in Abiad and Mody (2005), which treated Singapore
as an African country and South Africa as an East Asian country. Except for the difference in
magnitude, this table shows a similar pattern to Table 7 in Abiad and Mody (2005). Robust
t-statistics in brackets.
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table A5.4 Continued
B. Corrected version of Table 8 in Abiad and Mody (2005)
Country dummy
included No No Yes Yes
FLi,t−1 4.110 4.307 6.546 7.189
[4.49]*** [4.69]*** [4.02]*** [4.34]***
(FLi,t−1)2 −4.052 −5.720 −6.638 −9.893
[3.94]*** [4.19]*** [3.35]*** [3.90]***
FLi,t−1 × Yi,t−1 0.095 0.247
[2.34]** [2.55]**
REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 1.231 0.965 2.465 2.714
[2.72]*** [1.88]* [2.09]** [2.45]**
BOPit 0.429 0.476 0.473 0.457
[2.19]** [2.40]** [2.02]** [1.95]*
BANKit −0.985 −0.976 −0.932 −1.007
[2.70]*** [2.70]*** [2.70]*** [2.92]***
RECESSIONit −0.002 −0.005 −0.027 0.001
[0.00] [0.01] [0.07] [0.00]
HINFLit −0.235 −0.206 −0.303 −0.398
[0.63] [0.53] [0.48] [0.64]
FIRSTYEARit 0.178 0.141 0.233 0.245
[0.78] [0.62] [0.86] [0.91]
IMFit 0.332 0.414 0.255 0.288
[1.74]* [2.12]** [0.96] [1.06]
USINTit −0.070 −0.074 −0.090 −0.086
[1.80]* [1.87]* [2.07]** [1.99]**
LEFTit 0.280 0.190 −0.029 −0.098
[1.15] [0.82] [0.08] [0.28]
RIGHTit 0.146 0.153 −0.125 −0.072
[0.77] [0.84] [0.38] [0.21]
OPENit −0.001 0.000 0.009 0.013
[1.00] [0.04] [1.14] [1.40]
Observations 805 805 805 805
Number of countries 35 35 35 35
Notes: This table corresponds to the Table 8 in Abiad and Mody (2005), which treated Sin-
gapore as an African country and South Africa as an East Asian country, and consequently
indicates that IMF in column 1 and REG_FL-FL in columns 2 and 3 are insignificant. Robust
t-statistics in brackets.
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
HUANG: “CHAP05” — 2010/9/29 — 20:06 — PAGE 156 — #32
156 Determinants of Financial Development
Table A5.4 Continued
C. Corrected version of Table 9 in Abiad and Mody (2005)





REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.508 1.459
[0.81] [1.21]


































RIGHT × FLi,t−1 0.087 −0.221
[0.09] [0.19]
continued
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Table A5.4 Continued
Country dummy included No Yes
OPENit 3.719 3.475
[2.16]** [1.61]
OPENit × FLi,t−1 −3.827 −1.82
[2.19]** [0.70]
Observations 805 805
Number of countries 35 35
Notes: This table corresponds to the Table 9 in Abiad and Mody (2005),
which treated Singapore as an African country and South Africa as an
East Asian country, and consequently indicates that (REG_FL−FL)×FL
is significant but OPEN and OPEN × FL are insignificant in column 1,
and FL, OPEN and OPEN × FL are significant in column 2. Robust
t-statistics in brackets.
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Table A5.5 Augmented dataset with Chinn-Ito measure (2006): IMF dropped
A. Within estimates corresponding to Table 5.1B
Estimators WG WG WG CCEP CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 −0.168 −0.170 −0.174 −0.204 −0.214 −0.261
[0.044]*** [0.044]*** [0.045]*** [0.069]*** [0.068]*** [0.084]***
(FLi,t−1)2 0.052 0.053 0.056 0.087 0.092 0.119
[0.037] [0.037] [0.038] [0.049]* [0.049]* [0.059]**
REG_FLi,t−1 −0.016 −0.018 0.002 0.048 0.044 0.044
−FLi,t−1 [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.036] [0.037] [0.036]
BOPit 0.002 0.001 −0.005 −0.006
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]
BANKit −0.010 −0.010 −0.008 −0.009
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011]
RECESSIONit −0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
HINFLit −0.018 −0.017 −0.009 −0.009
[0.012] [0.013] [0.017] [0.017]
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Table A5.5 Continued





Observations 1263 1262 1213 1263 1262 1213
Number of
countries
55 55 53 55 55 53
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.22 0.22 0.25
Note: See Table 5.5A for notes.
B. Within estimates corresponding to Table 5.2
Estimators WG WG CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 −0.174 −0.169 −0.261 −0.343
[0.045]*** [0.045]*** [0.084]*** [0.118]***
(FLi,t−1)2 0.056 0.006 0.119 0.079
[0.038] [0.044] [0.059]** [0.081]
FLi,t−1 × Yi,t−1 0.004 0.004
[0.002]** [0.004]
REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.002 0.007 0.044 0.012
[0.028] [0.028] [0.036] [0.048]
BOPit 0.001 0.001 −0.006 −0.011
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
BANKit −0.010 −0.010 −0.009 0.000
[0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.013]
RECESSIONit 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002
[0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009]
HINFLit −0.017 −0.020 −0.009 0.000
[0.013] [0.013] [0.017] [0.016]
FIRSTYEARit 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
USINTit −0.005 −0.004 −0.002 −0.001
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002] [0.002]
LEFTit −0.004 −0.006 −0.008 −0.012
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
RIGHTit 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.004
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.015]
OPENit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000]* [0.000]* [0.000] [0.000]
continued
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Table A5.5 Continued
Estimators WG WG CCEP CCEP
POLITY2it −0.002 −0.002 0.012 0.019
[0.016] [0.016] [0.022] [0.028]
Observations 1213 1213 1213 1213
Number of countries 53 53 53 53
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.25 0.31
Note: See Table 5.5A for notes.
Table A5.5 Continued






REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 −0.024 −0.040
[0.029] [0.053]




















FIRSTYEARit × FLi,t−1 0.010 0.010
[0.020] [0.018]
continued
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LEFTit × FLi,t−1 −0.017 −0.034
[0.015] [0.025]












POLITY2it × FLi,t−1 0.002 0.002
[0.002] [0.005]
Observations 1213 1213
Number of countries 53 53
R-squared 0.09 0.33
Note: See Table 5.5A for notes.





Global warming has emerged as one of the most critical issues of our age,
and a key issue in the global economic and environmental debates. In
recent years, the global carbon market has become a newly developed
area for research and practice. It essentially consists of allowance-based
markets and project-based markets which use market-based mechanisms
to allocate and trade carbon credits that represent CO2 emission reduc-
tions in order for the participants to meet their compliance requirements
at the lowest possible cost. In allowance-based markets, the buyers
purchase emission allowances created and allocated (or auctioned) by
regulators under cap-and-trade regimes like Assigned Amount Units
(AAUs) under the Kyoto Protocol, or EU Allowances (EUAs) under the
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Within project-based markets,
the buyers purchase emission credits from investing into a project that
can demonstrate a reduction of CO2 emissions in comparison to the
level of emissions in the absence of the project investment. The most
notable examples of such activities are the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI) schemes under the Kyoto
Protocol.
As part of the emerging global carbon market, CDM is the only Kyoto
mechanism which involves developing countries in the climate change
negotiations. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM is designed to realize
the benefits in terms of capital flow, technological transfer, sustainable
development and cost-effective emission abatement. However, the geo-
graphic distribution of CDM projects by host country and region has
been found to be highly uneven. This chapter addresses the issue of
whether the geographic endowments in the host countries matter for
161
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CDM development using recently developed spatial econometric tech-
niques, with an aim of encouraging further research into economic,
institutional and policy determinants of CDM development.
In response to climate change, the global community adopted the
Kyoto Protocol in 1997. It came into force in February 2005 and calls
for legally binding limits on the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by
developed countries (or Annex I countries) by at least 5% in compari-
son to the 1990 levels over the first commitment period (i.e. 2008–12).
Although each Annex I country is assigned an amount of CO2 equiva-
lents (expressed in Assigned Amount Units, AAUs) to be used over the
period 2008–12, some Annex I countries still face a projected shortfall
in GHG emission reductions. To meet their commitments, these coun-
tries usually seek emission reduction credits through the three “flexibility
mechanisms” defined under the Kyoto Protocol: International Emission
Trading (IET), Joint Implementation (JI) and the CDM.
The CDM is defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, and is the
only such mechanism that involves developing countries. By joining in
the CDM, on the one hand, developing countries can get access to sig-
nificant foreign capital flows and technology transfer to achieve more
sustainable, less GHG-intensive pathways of development. On the other
hand, the Annex I countries can purchase and utilize the emission reduc-
tion credits, called Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), generated from
CDM projects towards meeting their quantified emission targets under
the Protocol.
The geographic distribution of CDM projects by host country and
region has been observed as being lopsided, in terms of both the number
of projects and the volume of credits. More specifically, two regions, Asia
and the Pacific, and Latin America, together dominate the distribution
of CDM projects and CER flows, such that by the end of September 2008
China, India, Brazil and Mexico accounted for 45%, 23%, 5% and 1%
of CDM projects, respectively.99 Developing countries with large popu-
lations and economies are expected to account for a large number of
CDM projects and CER flows. However, do countries with particular
geographic characteristics like higher absolute latitudes, higher eleva-
tions and richer resource endowments have more CDM projects and CER
flows?
Economists have long noted the crucial role of geography in economic
development: transport costs, human health, agricultural productivity
and ownership of natural resources. The climate theory of underdevel-
opment has been widely recognized in the sense that certain geographic
endowments have an adverse impact on economic development. For
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example, some geographic endowments (like mineral resource endow-
ments) may influence the inputs into the production function, while
others (like tropical location) may make the production technologies
much harder to employ and affect technological development in the
very long term (Sachs, 2003; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Diamond, 1997;
Gallup et al. 1999).
While there is considerable research examining the sustainable devel-
opment impacts of CDM development, much less work has aimed to
explore the fundamental determinants of CDM development across
countries. This chapter evaluates whether cross-sectional differences in
CDM development can be explained by cross-sectional differences in
geographic characteristics and resource endowments, once controlling
for other potential factors.
The cross-country experience of CDM project selection and foreign
direct investment indicates the existence of neighbourhood effects or
spillovers among countries.100 The neighbourhood effects of CDM
projects, together with “a new and deeper version of globalization” since
1970 (Crafts, 2000) which causes a closer interdependence across coun-
tries, suggest that spatial correlation is an important phenomenon to
be considered in this application. By employing the spatial econometric
method recently developed by Kelejian and Prucha (2010), this chapter
conducts a cross-country study on 48 developing countries over the
period from December 2003 up to September 2008.
This research has led to two significant findings. First, it provides evi-
dence that positive spatial dependence among observations exists in this
context. More specifically, the CDM credit flows in a country increase by
about 0.34 to 0.48 units if those in its neighbouring countries increase
by one unit; and countries with larger CDM credit flows tend to be geo-
graphically clustered with other large CDM host countries. Second, by
allowing for spatial dependence and accounting for the size of the econ-
omy (initial population and initial GDP per capita), this research finds
that absolute latitude and elevation have positive impacts on CDM credit
flows, suggesting that countries further from the equator and having
higher elevations tend to initiate more CDM projects and issue more
CDM credit flows. Larger service exporting countries seem to have more
advantages in getting access to CDM projects, while on the contrary,
larger natural resource exporting countries have smaller CDM credit
flows, indicating that natural resource abundance may not necessarily
be attractive to CDM projects.
This finding sheds light on the geographic determinants of uneven
CDM project development across countries. It has rich implications
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for developing countries in terms of international cooperation and
national capacity building in order to access effectively the CDM for
their national sustainable development objectives. This research also sug-
gests that the geographic considerations should be introduced into the
econometric and theoretical cross-country studies of climate change and
mitigation.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 describes
the data and shows some stylized facts. The empirical results are pre-
sented in Section 6.4, following a description of econometric methods
in section 6.3. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Data and stylized facts
This section outlines the measures and data for CDM, key geographic
variables and the control variables.
The dependent variable is the Clean Development Mechanism credit
flows, simply denoted by CDM . The indicator for CDM is the average of
the Certified Emission Reductions (2012 kCERs) generated by the CDM
projects in the pipeline over the period from December 2003 to Septem-
ber 2008.101 One country has one observation. To diminish the impacts
of outliers and measurement errors, it is taken in logs. The CDM projects
in the pipeline include not only those called “confirmed projects” which
have been at the registration stage, having either registered or requested
registration, but also those called “probable projects” which are at the
validation stage, waiting to be registered and implemented over the next
three years. One CER equals to one metric tonne of CO2e.102 Data on
CER flows are from the UNEP Risoe Centre (2008).
To examine the impacts of particular geographic characteristics on
CDM project development, three geographic variables – absolute lat-
itude, elevation and land area – are considered. Absolute latitude
(LATITUDE) equals the absolute distance from the equator of a coun-
try. The closer the countries are to the equator, the more tropical climate
they have. Elevation (ELEV) is the mean elevation (metres above sea
level) calculated in geographic projection, and used in logs. The land
area (AREA) in square kilometres for each country is in logs. Data
on latitude, elevation and land area are taken from the physical fac-
tors dataset of Center for International Development (CID) at Harvard
University.103
To assess the role of natural resource endowments, this research uses
two groups of variables. One group of variables consists of dummies
for the manufactured goods exporting countries (EXPMANU ), service
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exporting countries (EXPSERV) and non-fuel primary goods exporting
countries (EXPPRIM) from the Global Development Network of the
World Bank (GDN). The other group of variables, taken from Isham
et al. (2005), includes dummies for the exporters of point source natural
resources (e.g. oil, diamonds, plantation crops) (RESPOINT), “diffuse”
natural resources (e.g. wheat, rice, animals) (RESDIFF) and coffee/cocoa
natural resources (RESCOFF).
Control variables included in this analysis are the initial GDP per
capita (GDP03), the initial population (POP03), an ethnic fractionaliza-
tion index (ETHNIC), a religious fractionalization index (RELIGION) and
legal origin dummies, COMLEG and CIVLEG.
The inclusion of the initial GDP per capita and population is to con-
trol for the size of the economy where GDP03 is the real GDP per capita
in 2003 in constant 2000 US$ (chain series), and POP03 is the popula-
tion in 2003. Both GDP03 and POP03 are used in logs and taken from
the Penn World Table 6.2 in Heston et al. (2006). The variables ETHNIC
and RELIGION characterize social divisions and cultural differences. The
data on ETHNIC and RELIGION are taken from Alesina et al. (2003).104
COMLEG is the Common Law legal origin dummy for countries with
British legal origin, while CIVLEG is the Civil Law legal origin dummy
for countries with French, German or Scandinavian legal origins. Data
on CIVLEG and COMLEG are from the GDN.105
The sample includes 48 CDM host countries from Asia and the Pacific,
Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa and Europe and Central Asia as listed in the Appendix
Table A6.1. Countries with fewer than three monthly non-zero observa-
tions (up to September 2008) in terms of credit flows (2012 kCERs) have
been removed.
Figure 6.1 presents the scatter plots between CDM credit flows and
absolute latitude and elevation, respectively. Despite the existence of
outliers such as China and Paraguay, the positive associations between
absolute latitude and CDM credit flows, and between elevation and CDM
credit flows, can be observed. Countries with higher absolute latitudes
and higher elevations are more likely to have more CDM projects as well
as CER credit flows.
Figure 6.2 demonstrates, in the upper chart, that CDM credit flows
in coffee exporters, diffuse exporters and point source exporters are
in general smaller than those in the non-exporters of the relevant
resources. The lower chart shows that manufactured goods exporters, ser-
vice exporters and non-fuel primary goods exporters tend to have fewer
CDM credit flows in comparison to their counterparts.
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Figure 6.1 Scatter plots of CDM and geography
Note: Variables and data sources are described in the text. These figures show
scatter plots of absolute latitude and elevation against CDM credit flows (CERs).
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Figure 6.2 CDM and resource endowments
Note: Variables and data sources are described in the text. These figures show the
comparisons of CDM credit flows (CERs) for different dummies of exporters.
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6.3 Econometric method: Spatial econometric approach
To study the impacts of geography on CDM project development, this
research conducts a cross-sectional study allowing for spatial correlation
on 48 countries over the period from December 2003 to September 2008.
It starts from an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation on a basic model:
Yn = X′nβ + εn
n = 1, 2, . . . 48 (6.1)
where Yn is an n × 1 (n is the number of cross section units) vector of
observations on dependent variable CDM .
Xn is an n × k matrix of observations on k exogenous explanatory
variables which consist of geographic variables (LATITUDE, ELEV , AREA,
EXPSERV , EXPPRIM , RESPOINT , RESDIFF and RESCOFF) and the control
variables including GDP03, POP03, ETHNIC, RELIGION and legal origin
dummies (CIVLEG, COMLEG).
β is a k × 1 parameter vector. The error term εn is an n × 1 vector with
E(ε) = 0 and E(εε ′) = δ2I .
The OLS specification typically follows the assumption of no spatial
interdependence or spatial correlation. However, spatial dependence
associated with social interactions or unobserved common shocks has
been widely recognized. On the one hand, considerable research has
been done to explore the implications of social or spatial interactions
in terms of neighbourhood effects, spatial spillovers or networks effects
(Manski, 2000; Brock and Durlauf, 2001). The fact that one agent’s deci-
sion variable is affected by those of other agents is typically formulated
as a spatial lagged dependent variable, or a spatial lag term to be included
in the right-hand side of the regression model. In the context of finan-
cial liberalization and reform, Abiad and Mody (2005, henceforth AM)
find that regional diffusion in terms of the liberalization gap from the
regional leader is significantly associated with the policy change.
On the other hand, in a globalized world, common shocks – either
observed global shocks like macroeconomic shocks or unobserved global
shocks like technological shocks – are believed to cause closer interdepen-
dence across countries. Andrews (2005) analyses the impact of common
shocks in the cross section regression in which the observations are i.i.d.
across population units conditional on common shocks, providing a
general framework for spatially correlated errors.106 In examining the
origins of financial openness, Quinn and Inclán (1997) argue that the
common trend, such as changes in consumer tastes and technology, may
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substantially affect government liberalization policies as “fundamental
but unobservable forces”.
Obviously, the OLS estimation provides the foundation for spatial
analysis. This research incorporates the spatial correlation structure into
the basic linear model to account for both spatial lag dependence and
spatial error dependence.
A spatial lag model is a formal specification of spatial lag dependence
due to the presence of social and spatial interactions. Its basic form is the
mixed regressive, spatial autoregressive model:107
Yn = X′nβ + λWnYn + εn, |λ|<1 (6.2)
where λ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient or spatial interdepen-
dence coefficient, measuring the dependence of Yi on neighbouring Yn.
Wn is an n × n spatial weighting matrix of known constants, reflect-
ing the neighbouring relationships with zero across diagonals and a
row-standardized form. The added variable, λWnYn, an average of
the neighbouring values, is referred to as a spatially lagged dependent
variable, or a spatial lag of Yn. The error term, εn, is an n × 1 idiosyn-
cratic error vector, assumed to be distributed independently across the
cross-sectional dimension with zero mean and constant variances σ2ε .
When the spatial dependence exists in the error term due to unob-
served effects of common shocks (for example, macroeconomic shocks,
political shocks or environmental shocks), a spatial error model can be
used as follows:108
Yn = X′nβ + un
un = ρMnun + εn, |ρ|<1 (6.3)
where ρ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient, measuring the amount of
spatial correlation in the errors. Mn is the spatial weighting matrix, may
or may not be the same as Wn. un is spatially correlated residuals and
εn is the independent and identically distributed disturbances with zero
mean and constant variances σ2ε . Mnun is known as a spatial lag of un.
By plugging the error term of the spatial error model (6.3) into the
spatial lag model (6.2), one can generate the spatial autoregressive model
with autoregressive disturbances of order (1,1), that is the SARAR(1,1)
model, as follows,
Yn = Xnβ + λWnYn + un, |λ|<1
un = ρMnun + εn, |ρ|<1 (6.4)
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The above model is believed to be very general in the sense that
it allows for spatial spillovers stemming from endogenous variables,
exogenous variables and disturbances. It can be rewritten as:
Yn = Z′nδ + un
un = ρMnun + εn (6.5)
where Z
′
n = [Xn, WnYn], δ = [β
′
, λ]′
The corresponding transformed model can be obtained by pre-
multiplying (6.5) by In − ρMn,
Yn∗(ρ) = Z′n∗(ρ)δ + εn (6.6)
where Yn∗(ρ) = Yn − ρMnYn and Zn∗(ρ) = Zn − ρMnZn.
To estimate a general spatial model like (6.4), a number of approaches
have been proposed in the literature, for example, Kelejian and Prucha
(1998, 1999), Kelejian et al. (2004), Lee (2003, 2007) and Lee and Liu
(2006). However, these approaches in general assume that the inno-
vations in the disturbance process are homoscedastic, which may not
hold in many applications. To fill this gap, Kelejian and Prucha (2010)
develop a Generalized Spatial Two-Step Least Square (GS2SLS) estimator
with a three-stage procedure of inference for the SARAR(1,1) model that
allows for unknown heteroscedasticity in the innovations. Arraiz et al.
(2010) provide simulation evidence showing that, when the disturbances
are heteroscedastic, the GS2SLS estimator produces consistent estimates
while the ML estimator produces inconsistent estimates.
This chapter examines the impacts of geography on CDM development
within a general SARAR(1,1) framework. To estimate the SARAR(1,1)
model, it employs the three-stage procedure of Kelejian and Prucha
(2010), which can be summarized in the following.
In the FIRST step, the model (6.5) is estimated by the Two-Stage Least
Square (2SLS) estimator using the instrument Hn. The instrument Hn is
the matrix of instruments which is formed as a subset of linearly inde-
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In the SECOND step, ρn and σ2ε are estimated, where ρn is the spatial
autoregressive parameter and σ2ε is the variance of the innovation term
εn. They are estimated by applying GMM to the model (6.5), based on
the 2SLS residuals
∼





ρn = arg min










n is an estimator of the variance-covariance matrix of the





























































































In the THIRD step, δ in the transformed model (6.6) can be estimated
by a generalized spatial 2SLS procedure (GS2SLS) after replacing ρ by
∼
ρn.






























This section presents the empirical evidence for the impacts of various
geographic variables on CDM credit flows. Before proceeding to detailed
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econometric analysis, we briefly test for spatial dependence of CDM
credit flows across countries with evidence presented in Figure 6.3 and
Table 6.1.
Figure 6.3 plots the averaged CDM credit flows of all sample countries
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CDM and distance to smallest host country  
Figure 6.3 CDM and distance to biggest and smallest host countries
Note: Variables and data sources are described in the text. These figures show
scatter plots of the distances to the biggest CDM host country (China) and to the
smallest host country (Paraguay) against CDM credit flows (CERs).
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the upper chart, and the distance to the country with the smallest CDM
credit flows in the lower chart. Data on the great circle distances are from
Gleditsch et al. (2001). This figure clearly shows that countries closer to
the biggest CDM host country, which is China, tend to have more CDM
credit flows, whereas countries closer to the smallest CDM host country,
which is Paraguay, tend to have fewer CDM credit flows.109 Countries
with more (fewer) CDM credit flows appear to be geographically clustered
with other larger (smaller) CDM host countries.
By using two different spatial weighting matrices, an inverse-distance
spatial weighting matrix and a binary spatial weighting matrix, two
standard test statistics of spatial autocorrelation have been calculated
(Table 6.1). The inverse-distance spatial weighting matrix gives the
inverse of the distance to each sample point within a 4000 km neigh-
bourhood, and zero otherwise, while the binary spatial weighting matrix
gives a weight of 1 to all sample points within a 4000 km neighbourhood,
and zero otherwise.110 Both matrices are row-standardized of one. Fol-
lowing Kelejian and Prucha (1999), the spatial weighting matrices have
been “idealized” so that each unit has the same number of neighbours
with “one neighbour ahead and one neighbour behind” in a wraparound
world.
Table 6.1 contrasts Moran’s I and Gearcy’s C statistics for CDM credit
flows. Both Moran’s I and Gearcy’s C statistics examine the null hypoth-
esis of no spatial dependence. No matter which matrix is chosen, the
two Moran’s I statistics are greater than the expected value (−0.021)
and the two Gearcy’s C statistics are smaller than the expected value
(1.000), suggesting positive spatial dependence of CDM credit flows
Table 6.1 Moran’s I and Geary’s C for CDM
Moran’s I E(I) SD(I) z-statistic p-value
Inverse-distance Weights 0.086 −0.021 0.084 1.250 [0.102]
Binary Weights 0.094 −0.021 0.067 1.714 [0.043]∗∗
Gearcy’s C E(C) SD(C) z-statistic p-value
Inverse-distance Weights 0.902 1.000 0.092 −1.064 [0.144]
Binary Weights 0.870 1.000 0.074 −1.748 [0.040]∗∗
Notes: This table reports Moran’s I and Gearcy’s C tests for spatial autocorrelation for the
averaged CDM credit flows in logs for 48 CDM host countries listed in the Appendix Table
A6.1. The test statistics are calculated using an inverse-distance weighting matrix and a binary
weighting matrix, respectively, as described in the text.
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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across countries.111 Moreover, both Moran’s I and Gearcy’s C statistics
reject the null at about 10% significance level with an inverse-distance
spatial weighting matrix, and at 5% significance level with a binary spa-
tial weighting matrix. This shows that the positive spatial dependence
of the CDM credit flows is significant across countries.
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 investigate whether countries with particular geo-
graphic endowments are more likely to attract CDM projects, for which
eight geographic endowment variables, as explained earlier, are selected
from various sources.112
Column 1 of Table 6.2 reports the OLS estimates for the non-spatial
model (6.1). Firstly, an OLS heteroscedasticity test following White
(1980) and Koenker (1981) is conducted to examine whether there is het-
eroscedasticity in the estimation regression which is related to any of the
geographic variables we examine.113 The White/Koenker test rejects the
null at 10% significance level, indicating that heteroscedasticity exists in
the estimations and should be taken into account for this context.
To test for which type(s) of spatial dependence, spatial lag dependence
or spatial error dependence or both, exist(s) in this context, we carry out
two simple Lagrange Multiplier tests (LM) separately. The hypothesis of
no spatially lagged dependent variable is rejected at about 10% signifi-
cance level while the hypothesis of no spatially autocorrelated error term
can not be rejected. Furthermore, the p-values for the robust LM tests fol-
lowing Anselin et al. (1996) and the log-likelihood statistics are reported
to test for whether a spatial lag model is more appropriate than a spa-
tial error model for this context. The evidence that the robust LM test
doesn’t reject the null hypothesis of no spatially autocorrelated error
term, but does reject the null of no spatially lagged dependent variable
(at about 10% significance level), together with the evidence that the
log-likelihood statistic for the spatial lag model (-41.03) is bigger than
that for the spatial error model (-41.61), suggest that a spatial lag model
is preferred to a spatial error model.
Columns 2 to 4 report the ML estimates for the spatial lag model
(6.2) and spatial error model (6.3), and the GS2SLS estimates following
Kelejian and Prucha (2010) for the SARAR(1,1) model (6.4). An inverse-
distance spatial weighting matrix has been used to calculate the ML
estimates and GS2SLS estimates.114
The spatial autocorrelation parameter, “ρ” appears to be insignificant
in both the spatial error model and the SARAR(1,1) model. For the spatial
autoregressive parameter, “λ”, ρ has been found weakly significant in the
spatial lag model and significant in the SARAR(1,1) model, with larger
coefficient in the SARAR(1,1) model. The GS2SLS estimate of “λ” in the
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Table 6.2 Geography and CDM (by inverse-distance weights)






LATITUDE 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.018
[0.090]∗ [0.088]∗ [0.111] [0.140]
ELEVATION 0.276 0.270 0.255 0.274
[0.048]∗∗ [0.008]∗∗∗ [0.012]∗∗ [0.031]∗∗
AREA 0.155 0.135 0.125 0.118
[0.150] [0.173] [0.219] [0.331]
EXPSERV 0.965 0.888 0.851 0.860
[0.004]∗∗∗ [0.002]∗∗∗ [0.004]∗∗∗ [0.020]∗∗
EXPPRIM −0.287 −0.320 −0.337 −0.307
[0.368] [0.211] [0.184] [0.333]
RESPOINT −1.587 −1.642 −1.565 −1.678
[0.013]∗∗ [0.000]∗∗∗ [0.000]∗∗∗ [0.002]∗∗∗
RESDIFF −1.059 −1.098 −0.998 −1.147
[0.013]∗∗ [0.002]∗∗∗ [0.005]∗∗∗ [0.010]∗∗∗
RESCOFF −1.368 −1.484 −1.435 −1.525
[0.022]∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗ [0.011]∗∗
GDP03 0.258 0.236 0.279 0.185
[0.259] [0.090]∗ [0.056]∗ [0.264]
POP03 0.360 0.366 0.367 0.360
[0.004]∗∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗ [0.007]∗∗∗
ETHNIC 1.336 1.467 1.367 1.606
[0.050]∗ [0.015]∗∗ [0.031]∗∗ [0.027]∗∗
REGLIGION 2.077 2.067 2.061 2.001
[0.013]∗∗ [0.000]∗∗∗ [0.000]∗∗∗ [0.004]∗∗∗
COMLEG 0.557 0.541 0.520 0.552
[0.261] [0.117] [0.135] [0.190]
CIVLEG 1.278 1.354 1.393 1.331
[0.046]∗∗ [0.004]∗∗∗ [0.003]∗∗∗ [0.022]∗∗
Constant −4.312 −5.175 −4.064 −5.571
[0.074]∗ [0.003]∗∗∗ [0.018]∗∗ [0.006]∗∗∗
Observations 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.73 0.74 0.72








Notes: Dependent variable is the averaged CDM credit flows (2012 kCERs) in logs. Robust p-values are reported
in brackets. Variables and data sources are described in text. λ is the spatial autoregressive parameter in
dependent variable in the spatial lag model and SARAR (1,1) model, whilst ρ is the spatial autoregressive
parameter in the disturbance in spatial error model and SARAR(1,1) model. The White/Koenker test is to
examine the null of no heteroscedasticity. The spatial weighting matrix used here is a row-standardized
inverse-distance weighting matrix described in the text. Robust p-values are reported in brackets.
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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SARAR(1,1) model shows that the CDM credit flows in a country increase
by 0.34 units if those in its neighbouring countries increase by one unit.
The explanatory variables described in Section 6.2, except for
EXPMANU , have been found to be closely related to CDM credit flows
with the expected signs. In particular, the GS2SLS estimates show that
the the geographic variables LATITUDE and ELEV are positively associ-
ated with CDM development. For the resource and commodity exporter
dummies, EXPSERV is positively related, while RESPOINT , RESDIFF and
RESCOFF are negatively related, to CDM development. All of the control
variables including GDP03, POP03, ETHNIC, RELIGION and legal origin
dummies (CIVLEG, COMLEG) are in general found significantly associ-
ated with CDM development and should be included in the model.115
With a row-standardized binary weighting matrix, Table 6.3 in
general confirms the findings of Table 6.2 in terms of positive
impacts of LATITUDE, ELEV and EXPSERV , and negative impacts of
RESPOINT , RESDIFF and RESCOFF on CDM credit flows. Table 6.3 seems
to provide stronger evidence than Table 6.2, especially for the spatial
autoregressive coefficients, “λ” and “ρ”. According to the SARAR(1,1)
model, the degree of neighbourhood effects for the CDM credit flows
increases to 0.48.
The finding on the positive association between absolute latitude and
CDM credit flows is consistent with the literature. On the one hand,
research by Diamond (1997), Gallup et al. (1999) and Sachs (2003a) sug-
gests that countries in a tropical location in terms of a smaller absolute
latitude are often associated with poor crop yields and production due to
adverse ecological conditions such as fragile tropical soils, unstable water
supply and prevalence of crop pests. On the other hand, tropical location
can be characterized as an inhospitable disease environment, believed
to be a primary cause for “extractive” institutions, in conjunction with
weaker institutions according to the settler mortality hypothesis of Ace-
moglu et al. (2001). Countries further from the Equator are more likely
to have better climate conditions and stronger institutions, which are
conducive to CDM project development.
The finding on the positive association between elevation and CDM
credit flows is in line with recent research. It is widely known that the
Earth’s average surface temperature rose by approximately 0.6◦C in the
twentieth century and will rise a few degrees C in this century. Global
warming is likely to raise the sea level and change the land area and
elevation above sea level for many countries. Countries with higher ele-
vations are therefore supposed to have more potential to attract CDM
projects.
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Table 6.3 Geography and CDM (by binary weights)






LATITUDE 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.020
[0.090]∗ [0.065]∗ [0.094]∗ [0.108]
ELEVATION 0.276 0.255 0.232 0.256
[0.048]∗∗ [0.011]∗∗ [0.018]∗∗ [0.047]∗∗
AREA 0.155 0.115 0.118 0.087
[0.150] [0.244] [0.232] [0.479]
EXPSERV 0.965 0.831 0.779 0.796
[0.004]∗∗∗ [0.004]∗∗∗ [0.006]∗∗∗ [0.034]∗∗
EXPPRIM −0.287 −0.334 −0.401 −0.319
[0.368] [0.187] [0.118] [0.306]
RESPOINT −1.587 −1.671 −1.574 −1.717
[0.013]∗∗ [0.000]∗∗∗ [0.000]∗∗∗ [0.002]∗∗∗
RESDIFF −1.059 −1.127 −1.023 −1.182
[0.013]∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗ [0.003]∗∗∗ [0.008]∗∗∗
RESCOFF −1.368 −1.515 −1.529 −1.546
[0.022]∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗ [0.009]∗∗∗
GDP03 0.258 0.220 0.267 0.162
[0.259] [0.111] [0.063]∗ [0.325]
POP03 0.360 0.382 0.358 0.392
[0.004]∗∗∗ [0.000]∗∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗ [0.004]∗∗∗
ETHNIC 1.336 1.581 1.395 1.765
[0.050]∗ [0.009]∗∗∗ [0.027]∗∗ [0.018]∗∗
REGLIGION 2.077 1.940 2.011 1.834
[0.013]∗∗ [0.000]∗∗∗ [0.000]∗∗∗ [0.006]∗∗∗
COMLEG 0.557 0.559 0.482 0.602
[0.261] [0.101] [0.150] [0.155]
CIVLEG 1.278 1.407 1.408 1.457
[0.046]∗∗ [0.002]∗∗∗ [0.002]∗∗∗ [0.014]∗∗
Constant −4.312 −5.591 −3.544 −6.221
[0.074]∗ [0.001]∗∗∗ [0.042]∗∗ [0.003]∗∗∗
Observations 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.73 0.75 0.71








Notes: The spatial weighting matrix used for the spatial lag model, spatial error model and SARAR(1,1) model
in this table is arow-standardized binary weighting matrix described in the text. See Table 6.2 for more notes.
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Some growth literature indicates that natural resource abundance is
connected with social and economic instability and weak institutional
quality, which hamper CDM project development. Isham et al. (2005)
find that, in comparison to manufacturing exporters, the exporting
countries of “point source” natural resources (e.g. oil, diamonds, plan-
tation crops) and coffee/cocoa natural resources are more likely to have
severe social and economic divisions, and less likely to develop socially
cohesive mechanisms and effective institutional capacities for managing
shocks.
In sum, this research produces the following significant findings. First,
it provides evidence for the presence of positive spatial dependence
amongst observations for this context, especially the spatial lag depen-
dence associated with neighbourhood effects and social interactions.
CDM credit flows in a country are significantly affected by those of its
neighbouring countries, more specifically, the CDM credit flows in a
country increase by about 0.34 to 0.48 units if those in its neighbouring
countries increase by one unit. Second, by allowing for spatial depen-
dence and accounting for the size of the economy (initial population
and initial GDP per capita), this research finds that the absolute latitude
and elevation have positive impacts on CDM credit flows, suggesting that
countries further from the Equator and having a higher elevation tend to
initiate more CDM projects and issue more CDM credit flows. Countries
with more exports of services seem to have more advantages in attracting
CDM projects, whilst in contrast countries with more exports of natural
resources have smaller CDM credit flows, indicating that natural resource
abundance may not necessarily be conducive to CDM development.
6.5 Concluding remarks
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
is designed to provide the non-Annex I countries (developing countries
and transition economies) with access to the flows of technology and
capital which could contribute to their sustainable development objec-
tives, whilst allowing Annex I countries to earn credits to meet their
Kyoto commitments by investing in GHG emission reduction projects
in non-Annex I countries.
This chapter investigates whether the cross-sectional differences in
geographic endowments can explain the cross-sectional differences in
CDM credit flows. It conducts a cross-country study allowing for both
spatial error dependence and spatial lag dependence for 48 CDM host
countries over December 2003–September 2008.
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This research leads to two significant findings. First, it provides evi-
dence for a positive relationship between CDM credit flows in a country
and those in its neighbours, more specifically, the CDM credit flows
in a country increase by about 0.34 to 0.48 units if those in its neigh-
bours increase by one unit. Countries with larger (smaller) CDM credit
flows have been found to be geographically clustered with other larger
(smaller) CDM host countries. Second, by allowing for spatial depen-
dence and accounting for the size of the economy (initial population
and initial GDP per capita), this research finds that absolute latitude and
elevation have positive impacts on CDM credit flows, suggesting that
countries further from the equator and having higher elevations are in
better positions to attract CDM projects. Countries with more exports of
service are more associated with larger CDM credit flows, whilst in con-
trast countries with more exports of natural resources have fewer CDM
credit flows, indicating that natural resource abundance doesn’t neces-
sarily play a large role in promoting CDM development. These findings
are robust to the choices of different spatial weighting matrices – an
inverse-distance spatial weighting matrix and a binary spatial weighting
matrix. The research also controls for an ethnic fractionalization index,
a religious fractionalization index and legal origin dummies.
This finding sheds light on the geographic determinants of uneven
CDM project development across countries, and has rich implications for
developing countries in terms of international cooperation and national
capacity building to access effectively CDM for their national sustainable
development objective. This research may contribute to our understand-
ing of the cross-country differences in CDM development and contain
some merits for the UNFCCC in terms of improving the geographic dis-
tribution of CDM project activities and capacity building. This research
also suggests that geographic considerations should be introduced into
the econometric and theoretical cross-country studies of climate change
and mitigation.
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Appendix table
Table A6.1 The list of countries in the full sample
Code Country name Code Country name
ARE United Arab Emirates KHM Cambodia
ARG Argentina KOR Korea, Rep.
ARM Armenia LKA Sri Lanka
AZE Azerbaijan MAR Morocco
BGD Bangladesh MDA Moldova, Rep.
BOL Bolivia MEX Mexico
BRA Brazil MNG Mongolia
BTN Bhutan MYS Malaysia
CHL Chile NGA Nigeria
CHN China NIC Nicaragua
COL Colombia PAK Pakistan
CRI Costa Rica PAN Panama
CYP Cyprus PER Peru
DOM Dominican Rep. PHL Philippines
ECU Ecuador PRY Paraguay
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. SGP Singapore
GEO Georgia SLV El Salvador
GTM Guatemala THA Thailand
HND Honduras TZA Tanzania
IDN Indonesia UGA Uganda
IND India URY Uruguay
ISR Israel UZB Uzbekistan
JOR Jordan VNM Vietnam
KEN Kenya ZAF South Africa
Note: This table lists the country codes and country names for 48 CDM
host countries considered in this analysis. Data are from the UNEP
Risoe Centre CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database (2008).
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Conclusion
This research studied the fundamental issues related to financial market
development and carbon market development in the context of global-
ization, using recently developed econometric and statistical methods.
Chapter 1 contained an overall review of the literature on the devel-
opment of financial markets. Chapters 2 to 5 examined specific issues
related to financial development whilst Chapter 6 was about the geo-
graphic determinants of CDM development, which is an important part
of carbon markets, especially for developing countries.
Chapter 2 sought to investigate the political, economic and geographic
determinants of the development of financial markets. By jointly apply-
ing two prominent tools for addressing model uncertainty, BMA and
Gets approaches, it suggested that initial GDP, initial population, legal
origin and institutional quality are fundamental determinants of the
cross-country differences in financial development.
Chapters 3 and 4, respectively specifically focused on the economic
and political determinants of financial development in the context of
globalization. By using GMM estimation on averaged data and a com-
mon factor approach on annual data, Chapter 3 indicated a positive
causal effect going from aggregate private investment to financial devel-
opment, and vice versa. From a political viewpoint, Chapter 4 revealed
a positive effect of institutional improvement on financial development
at least in the short run, and an increase in financial development after
democratic transformation.
Chapter 5 analysed what induces governments to undertake financial
reforms, and what causes financial development. Starting from AM and
allowing for error dependence across countries and over time, Chapter
5 found that some of the AM findings are robust, but others are fragile.
It also identified a negative effect of the extent of democracy on policy
reform. Together with Chapter 4, it seems to indicate that a short-run
increase in financial development emerges after democratization, but
that once democracy has been established and enhanced, its extent may
exert negative effects on the likelihood of financial reform.
The last chapter found that countries with larger (smaller) CDM credit
flows tend to be geographically clustered with other larger (smaller)
CDM host countries and countries with higher absolute latitude, higher
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elevations and more exports of services tend to have more CDM credit
flows than others.
This research to some extent contributes to our understanding of the
causes of financial development, and adds to the growing research in this
area. However, what I have done so far merely represents a start being
made in this direction, much remains to be done. A number of areas for
further research are summarized below:
1. While it is suggested that the level of financial development in a
country is determined by its institutional quality, macroeconomic poli-
cies and geographic characteristics, as well as the level of income and
cultural characteristics, further research into the more fundamental fac-
tors behind these characteristics is obviously worthwhile. To this end,
other approaches may be considered, for example, recursive methods or
dynamic programming applied to the theoretical models.
2. This research suggests that economic reforms with more open trade
policies and attractive investment policies, and political reforms aimed
at a more democratic society, should be conducive to financial develop-
ment. Other research suggests that legal and regulatory reforms boost
financial development. However, how to undertake these reforms, and
in what sequence, has not yet been fully understood.
3. Although this research takes into account in Chapters 3 and 4, the
effects of globalization on financial development, much work is still
needed to explore the link between domestic and international financial
markets, the impact of financial market integration on the develop-
ment of domestic financial markets and the role of foreign financial
institutions in domestic financial development.
4. As time goes, with more data available on the number of CDM
projects and/or the volume of CDM credit flows, time series studies or
panel data studies can be carried out to find whether or not a more
open trade policy is conducive to CDM development, whether or not
institutional quality is important for CDM, whether or not financial
development promotes CDM development, and so on.
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Notes
1. See Levine (1997, 2005) for a review.
2. The 39 potential determinants considered for this analysis are grouped under
four headings: institutions, policy, geography and others. See Section 2.2.3
for details.
3. The description of these measures relies heavily on Demirgüç-Kunt and
Levine (1996, 1999).
4. Since data for the efficiency of the bond market are not available whilst data
for the size of the bond market are mainly available for developed coun-
tries in the World Bank’s Financial Structure and Economic Development
Database (2008), to avoid resulting in smaller sample sizes in the principal
component analysis, bond market development is not included here. A sim-
ple analysis of the determinants of bond market development (for a smaller
sample) is presented in Appendix Table A2.8.
5. Measures of financial liberalization and financial openness are not used
here due to the concern that the effects of other variables on financial
development may work through them.
6. ccounting standards data in La Porta et al. (1998) forms another interest-
ing variable, but this variable has to be excluded due to its limited country
coverage.
7. To some extent, absolute latitude serves as an alternative indicator for the
zero-one tropical dummy in the GDN.
8. The EBA proposed by Leamer (1983, 1985) regards a variable to be robust if
its extreme bounds lie strictly to one side or the other side of zero, where
the extreme bounds for the coefficients of a particular variable are defined as
“the lowest estimate of its value minus two times its standard error and the
highest estimate of its value plus two times its standard error, respectively”.
The interval formed by two extreme bounds constitutes the maximum scope
by which a variable may vary in the presence or absence of others, and
indicates the confidence one may have in the coefficient estimates.
9. A computer program for the Bayesian approach to model uncertainty has
been developed by Raftery et al. (1997).
10. A computer algorithm designed for implementing the general-to-specific
approach, called PcGets, has been developed by Krolzig and Hendry (2001),
following earlier work by Hoover and Perez (1999).
11. As argued by Granger and Hendry (2005) and echoed by Hansen (2005),
none of the model selection methods currently available is immune from
four possible conceptual errors of model selection methods: parametric
vision, the assumption of a true data generating process, evaluation based
on fit and ignoring of the impact of model uncertainty on inference.
12. Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b) criticizes the standard of robustness employed
by Levine and Renelt (1992) as too restrictive, and suggests a different version
of extreme bounds analysis by saying that a variable is robust as long as 95%
or more of the distribution of estimates lies to one side of zero. By this
183
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methodology, relatively more variables are found to be robustly related to
growth. However, the methodology of Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b) is not
Bayesian, although it uses weights proportional to the likelihoods of each
model.
13. Fernandez et al. (2001) re-examine the Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b) dataset
using a full BMA explained below and Markov Chain Monte Carlo tech-
niques to deal with the huge range of possible models. The full BMA of
Fernandez et al. (2001) requires full specification of the prior distribution
for every parameter conditional on each possible model and calculates the
average of the parameter estimates across all possible models by using cor-
responding posterior model probabilities as weights. Their research has
produced findings in support of the conclusions of Sala-i-Martin (1997a,
1997b). However, fully specifying the prior distribution for all potential
parameters is very difficult and “essentially arbitrary” (Sala-i-Martin et al.
2004) when the number of possible regressors is large.
14. The computational procedure for the Occam’s Window technique is imple-
mented using the bicreg software for S-Plus or R written by Adrian Raftery
and revised by Chris Volinsky.
15. The Occam’s Window approach can be divided into two types, correspond-
ing to two approaches. One is the symmetric Occam’s Window in which
models “much less likely than the most likely model” are excluded, the
other is the strict Occam’s Window in which the models having “more likely
submodels nested within them” are excluded from the subset left in the
symmetric Occam’s Window (Raftery, 1995).
16. The modification used to calculate the sign certainty index is developed by
Malik and Temple (2009) based on the original bicreg code.
17. The summary below is heavily drawn from Hoover and Perez (1999), Krolzig
and Hendry (2001), Hendry and Krolzig (2005) and Granger and Hendry
(2005).
18. Since any variable removed at the pre-search stage is permanently elimi-
nated, the F pre-search testing (top-down) at step 1 in the “liberal strategy”
default setting has been increased from 0.75 to 1, so as not to risk omitting
any potential factor which is not significant in the GUM.
19. The effect of institutions, policy and geography on financial development
are also examined in isolation. The results are not reported here, but are
available from the author.
20. MC3 is essentially a shorthand for the Markov Chain Monte Carlo technique,
which is applied in this table only as a robustness test.
21. The Chow tests are F tests and used to test parameter constancy. The Nor-
mality test, a Chi-squared statistic, is used to check the normality of the
distribution of the residuals. The Heteroscedasticity test is for unconditional
heteroscedasticity.
22. The variable EURFRAC is closely associated with legal origins as noted earlier.
23. Many experiments suggest that the results are sensitive to the inclusion of
the variable EXPMANU .
24. It is the share of population who can speak one of the main European
languages.
25. It is the proportion of the population near a coast a river navigable to the
ocean.
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26. The sketch in this section heavily relies on Raftery (1995), Sala-i-Martin et al.
(2004) and Malik and Temple (2009).
27. A saturated model (Ms) in which each data point is fitted exactly can be also
used as a baseline model.
28. Financial intermediaries emerge endogenously under certain conditions, as
widely addressed by Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986), to avoid the
duplication of monitoring costs (to minimize the monitoring costs by pool-
ing projects), to channel savings from households to firms for use in the
production process and to pool risk.
29. Among others, Chapter 2 examines the long-run determinants of financial
development by using BMA and Gets approaches. That chapter suggests that
“the level of financial development in a country is determined by its insti-
tutional quality, macroeconomic policies, and geographic characteristics, as
well as the level of income and cultural characteristics”. Chapter 4 reveals
that institutional improvement is typically followed by a higher level of
financial development at least in the short run, while Chapter 5 suggests
that, once democracy has been established and enhanced, the extent of
democracy may exert negative effects on the extent to which governments
undertake reform aimed at financial development.
30. Among others, Doms and Dunne (1993) show that microeconomic lumpi-
ness is very important for aggregate investment. Bertola and Caballero (1994)
argue that microeconomic irreversibilities play an important role in smooth-
ing investment dynamics in the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty. In the
industrial organization literature, Dixit (1989), Leahy (1993) and Caballero
and Pindyck (1996) discuss the consequences of the entry (creation) decision
of new (incumbent) entrepreneurs and exit decisions of some incumbents
for variation in the aggregate stock of capital.
31. Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) show that financial development positively
influences the investment rate. Schich and Pelgrin (2002) indicate a positive
effect going from financial development to private investment in 19 OECD
countries over 1970–97. Ndikumana (2000, 2005) finds that the develop-
ment of banks and stock markets tends to stimulate domestic investment.
32. Details on these indicators can be found in Section 3.2.
33. Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) show that the overall volume of interna-
tional trade and gross private capital flows has increased dramatically over
the past three decades: in particular, “the growth of world trade has been
larger than that of world income in almost all years since 1970”.
34. This source could be the most reliable one for private investment ratio, while
we can calculate it by deducting the net inflows of FDI and public investment
from the gross fixed capital formation. Although data for private investment
are only for up to 1998, they are sufficient (or long enough) to conduct this
analysis.
35. Essentially, the principal component analysis takes N specific indicators and
produces new indices (the principal components) X1, X2,...XN which are
mutually uncorrelated. Each principal component, a linear combination of
the N indicators, captures a different dimension of the data. Typically the
variances of several of the principal components are low enough to be neg-
ligible, and hence the majority of the variation in the data will then be
captured by a small number of indices.
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36. The summary below is heavily drawn from Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine
(1996, 1999).
37. The precision of the principal component analysis used to derive this new
index depends on having a relatively large number of variables. Given that
there are only three indices on which the principal component analysis is
based, the new index of financial development is almost the mean of the
three individual indices.
38. Two measures for the efficiency of financial intermediation widely used are
Overhead Costs, the ratio of overhead costs to total bank assets, and Net
Interest Margin, the difference between bank interest income and interest
expenses, divided by total assets. Due to the incompleteness of the available
data, they are not included in this analysis.
39. In the growth and convergence context, both the panel data analysis of
Caselli et al. (1996) and the cross section analysis of Mankiw et al. (1992)
find a negative effect of initial income on growth, but the former identi-
fies a much larger effect than the latter, implying a 10% convergence rate
relative to 2–3% suggested by Mankiw et al. (1992).
40. Starting from a general model with three lags of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables and testing the null hypothesis of the coefficients being
zero for the longest lag, we end up with one lagged independent variable
and one lagged dependent variable appearing in the model for this context,
given that the relevant specification tests are satisfied.
41. Caselli et al. (1996) treat some variables like the investment rate and pop-
ulation growth rate as predetermined and argue that these variables are
potentially both causes and effects of economic growth.
42. Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) propose the symmetrically normal-
ized GMM estimator and the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood
estimator. Recently Kruiniger (2008) has developed the Maximum Likeli-
hood estimator and Newey and Windmeijer (2009) have proposed the new
variance estimator for the generalized empirical likelihood estimator.
43. Bond et al. (2001) and Bond (2002) illustrate that in principle the first-
differenced GMM estimates for the AR(1) coefficient should lie between the
within group estimates (being downwards biased) and the OLS estimates
(being upwards biased) from a straightforward pooled regression.
44. For the case of r=2, when ft = (1 ηt )′ and λ′i = (αi 1), we have λ
′
ift = αi + ηt ,
where αi and ηt are the individual effect and time effect, respectively.
45. Bai (2004) suggests that differenced data can also be used to calculate the
number of factors.
46. The normalization that 
k′k
N = Ik is used when T > N.
47. Bai and Ng (2004) recommend standardizing the data first, although the
PANIC approach does not require it.
48. The standardized FD and PI are used here and the rest of the study. The PANIC
approach essentially requires a balanced panel. To overcome the problem of
missing data, imputation within each region is conducted, since countries
in a region tend to have similar income levels, closer economic relations and
to be more dependent on each other. There are 49 observations imputed for
FD and 64 observations for PI, corresponding to 4% and 5% of complete
observations in the resulting balanced panels, respectively. Appendix Table
A3.3 presents the list of countries in each region.
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49. When time trends are included, the presence of a deterministic trend in
the data-generating process is assumed while the absence of such a trend
is assumed when time trends are not allowed. Including time trends is less
general than excluding them. In particular, including trends improves fit
to some extent but may cause a large loss of power and possibly severe
multicollinearity in the ADF regressions.
50. Four “panel” statistics are a “variance ratio” statistic (Zv̂NT ), a “panel-t”
statistic (ẐtNT ), a “panel-rho” statistic (Zρ̂NT−1) and a “panel-ADF” statistic
(Zâdf NT ).
51. Three “group mean” statistics are a “group-t” statistic (Z̃̂tNT ), a “group-rho”
statistic (Z̃ρ̂NT−1) and a “group-ADF” statistic (Z̃âdf NT ).
52. The Pedroni test based on defactored data should be interpreted with cau-
tion, since the defactored data are estimated and may be subject to particular
forms of measurement errors.




















54. To overcome the problem of missing data, imputation within each region is
conducted, since countries in a region tend to have similar income levels,
closer economic relations and be more dependent on each other. There are
49 observations imputed for FD and 64 observations for PI, corresponding
to 4% and 5% of complete observations in the resulting balanced panels,
respectively.
55. The short-run coefficients reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are in general less
informative. The CCEP and WG assume the short-run coefficients to be iden-
tical across countries, ignoring the heterogeneity widely recognized. The
CCEPMG and CCEMG (as well as PMG and MG) allow the short-run coeffi-
cients to vary across countries, which is a more realistic assumption to make.
However, the short-run coefficients reported are the cross-country averages,
and therefore they are highly influenced by the outliers.
56. The number of lags is constrained by the number of observations. As shown
by Pesaran et al. (1999), the PMG estimator seems quite robust to outliers
and the choice of ARDL order.
57. Data on GDP per capita and trade openness are taken from Heston et al.
(2006).
58. Countries are considered as experiencing a political transition when either
their “polity2” scores in the PolityIV Database by Marshall and Jaggers (2009)
change from negative values to positive values or when their “freedom”
indices, defined in this paper from the Freedom House Country Survey
(2008), change from “Not Free” to “Free” or “Partly Free”.
59. One of the channels through which democratization affects financial devel-
opment is property rights protection and contract enforcement. Olson
(1993) and Clague et al. (1996) argue that democracies tend to result in
better protection of property rights and more efficient contract enforce-
ment, which are conducive to financial development (La Porta et al., 1997,
1998).
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60. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) document that countries with a legal code like
Common Law tend to protect private property owners, while countries with
a legal code like Civil Law tend to care more about the rights of state and less
about the rights of the masses. Countries with French legal origins are said to
have comparatively inefficient contract enforcement and more corruption,
and less well-developed financial systems, while countries with British legal
origins enjoy higher levels of financial development.
61. They argue that incumbents have strong incentives to block the develop-
ment of a more transparent and competitive financial sector, although these
incentives may be weakened by openness to external trade and international
flows of capital.
62. Based on annual data on developed and developing countries over 1975–
2000, Girma and Shortland (2008) use approaches such as the system
GMM approach from Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998). In contrast to their study, this research uses the system GMM and
LSDVC approaches, based on averaged data on 90 developed and develop-
ing countries over 1960–99 to see if democratization brings about financial
development.
63. The main reason for this is that, data prior to 1990 for these countries gen-
erated by the centrally planned economy are largely incomplete, while data
after 1990 are highly problematic or doubtful since most of these countries
underwent severe economic disorder for several years in the early stage of
the transformation process to a market-oriented economy. A research area
in the future will be to see if the transition countries fit the pattern observed
for the sample countries of this study.
64. Data for the black market premium from the GDN are available up to 1998.
65. The description here is mainly from Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996,
1999).
66. Two measures for the efficiency of financial intermediation which are some-
times used are Overhead Costs, the ratio of overhead costs to total bank
assets, and Net Interest Margin, the difference between bank interest income
and interest expenses, divided by total assets. Due to the incompleteness of
the relevant data, they are not included in this analysis.
67. In this polity coding system, zero is the threshold by which a country with
a positive “polity2” score is regarded as a democracy whilst a country with
a negative “polity2” score is regarded as an autocracy.
68. The democracy and autocracy scores are derived from six authority charac-
teristics (regulation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment;
operational independence of chief executive or executive constraints and
regulation and competition of participation). Based on these criteria, each
country is assigned a democracy score and an autocracy score ranging from
0 to 10. The larger the democracy score, the fairer the election of executive
power, the more open the political process and the higher the extent of the
constraints on executive power. In contrast, a larger autocracy score reflects
a less open political process in a country in terms of less competitiveness
and fairness in election, narrower participation and fewer constraints on
executive power.
69. By experimenting with five-year and eight-year averages, respectively, I start
from a general model with three lags of the dependent and independent
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variables and test the null hypothesis of the coefficients being zero for the
longest lag. I end up with one lagged dependent variable, one lagged inde-
pendent variable, one lag of log GDP and one lag of the trade openness
measure appearing in the model with eight-year averages for this context,
given that the relevant specification tests are satisfied.
70. The series xi t−1 is defined as being predetermined with respective to vi, t
when xi t−1 is correlated with vi, t−1 and earlier shocks, but is uncorrelated
with vi t and subsequent shocks. The series xi t is strictly exogenous when
xi t is uncorrelated with earlier, current and future errors. See Bond (2002)
and Arellano (2003) for details.
71. For the multivariate autoregressive model, Blundell and Bond (2000) show
that a sufficient condition for the additional moment conditions to be valid
is the joint mean stationarity of all the series.
72. In this analysis the instrument set used is restricted (to avoid the possible
over-fitting bias) in the sense that all lagged values of y, x and z at dates t–2
and t–3 are used as instruments for yi,t−1, xi,t−1 and zi,t−1 in the first
difference equation.
73. Note that when the instrument set is not restricted, the lagged first dif-
ferences of the series (yit , xit , zit ) dated t–1 are used as instruments for the
untransformed equations in levels. Differences lagged two periods or more
are redundant as instruments for the levels equations because the corre-
sponding moment conditions are linear combinations of those already in
use. In this analysis, the lagged first-differences of the series (yit , xit , zit ) dated
t–1 and t–2 are employed due to the use of restricted instrument set.
74. Essentially, in the bias approximation of Bruno (2005), the within operator
is adjusted to include an exogenous selection rule which selects only the
observations with observable current and one-time lagged values, by which
missing observations for some individuals are allowed.
75. Since the freedom index has data starting from the period 1972–73, it is
not used for the panel data study, but is used for selecting the democratic
transition countries.
76. The event identification methodology of Papaioannou and Siourounis
(2008) has been found useful for selecting the democratic transition coun-
tries, but the selection method in this analysis differs from their method
in the following ways. First, for simplicity this analysis selects the sample
exclusively depending on the changes from autocratic rule to democratic
regimes without any further divisions, while Papaioannou and Siourounis
(2008) divide democratizations into “full”, “partial” and “borderline” with
different thresholds in terms of either the “polity2” or the “freedom” index.
Second, this analysis is interested in the effect of a stable regime change
on financial development. Hence, the sample includes only the countries
whose regime changes last for at least ten years.
77. The FD measure has been standardized. More specifically, it is divided by the
cross-country standard deviation of FD in 1999.
78. When we compare the five-year averages before and after democratization,
we find that the five-year average of standardized FD post-democratization
for 33 countries is larger by 0.015 cross-country standard deviations of FD
than before their democratization, and about two-thirds of the sample coun-
tries benefit from this process. Columns 7 to 9 show that the average of
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standardized FD five to ten years post-democratisation for 33 countries is
larger by 0.212 cross-country standard deviations of FD than ten to five years
before their democratization, and much more sample countries benefit from
this process. The median values of the increase in standardized FD for three
cases of comparison are positive.
79. Looking at the financial development performance of each individual coun-
try, we find enormous heterogeneity across countries, ranging from an
increase of 1.096 of a cross-country standard deviation of FD in the ten-year
average of standardized FD for Thailand to a decline of 0.415 of a cross-
country standard deviation of FD for Zambia. The Republic of Korea and
Madagascar also witnessed a drastic increase in the ten-year average of stan-
dardized FD, whilst Nicaragua and Uruguay experienced a tremendous drop
in FD following their democratization. Case studies on how democratiza-
tion helped the financial development process are interesting areas for future
research.
80. The regression is estimated by OLS in which the unobserved country spe-
cific effects, time effects and control variables such as trade openness, GDP,
aggregate investment and the black market premium are included.
81. The financial development performance in Asian countries and other eco-
nomic performances in East Asian and Pacific countries are largely different
from those in South Asian countries.
82. Results regarding the impacts on specific financial development measures
such as private credit, liquidity liabilities and commercial-central bank are
available from the author upon request.
83. The selection of these subsamples is mainly stimulated by Rodrik and
Wacziarg (2005) in which low-income countries, ethnically diverse countries
and Sub-Saharan African countries are studied. However, I find no evidence
in support of a positive/negative link between institutional improvement
and financial development for the Sub-Saharan African countries. Exper-
iments were also conducted for the Asian countries and Latin American
countries, again finding no evidence.
84. In addition, the ordered logit approach imposes strong distributional
assumptions relative to a linear model, and the estimates of individual
effects and other parameters may be inconsistent because of an incidental
parameter problem.
85. Other ways to address either cross section correlation or serial correlation
in this context have also been done (results are available from author upon
request).
86. FLit is generated by dividing the original AM financial liberalization index
by 18. The original financial liberalization index, ranging from 0 to 18, is
based on six policy dimensions (credit controls, interest rate controls, entry
barriers in the banking sector, operational restrictions, privatization in the
financial sector and restrictions on international financial transactions) with
each dimension taking on values between 0 and 3.
87. The democracy and autocracy scores are derived from six authority charac-
teristics (regulation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment;
operational independence of chief executive or executive constraints and
regulation and competition of participation). Based on these criteria, each
country is assigned a democracy score and an autocracy score ranging from
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0 to 10. The larger the democracy score, the fairer the election of executive
power, the more open the political process and the higher the extent of the
constraints on executive power. In contrast, a larger autocracy score reflects
a less open political process in a country in terms of less competitiveness
and fairness in elections, narrower participation and fewer constraints on
the executive.










89. Here θ1c, −θ1 and bθ1 are renamed as θ1, θ2 and θ3, respectively. β1, β ′2, β ′3
and β ′4 are reparameterized as θ4, θ ′5, θ ′6 and θ ′7, accordingly.
90. More specifically, IMFit has been found to be significant when country fixed
effects are excluded, while REG_FLi,t−1 −FLi,t−1 appears to be significant no
matter whether the country fixed effects are included or not.
91. Divided by 18, the original measure has been rescaled to get an index, FLi,t ,
ranging between 0 and 1.
92. This analysis first experiments with including time dummies in the original
AM models in the within group estimation to control for cross section corre-
lation. However, this approach is not as general as Pesaran’s (2006) approach
which, besides other advantages, allows common factors to have differen-
tial impacts across countries. Including time dummies controls only for a
common component, whose effect is common across countries.
93. Although serial correlation in the errors can be alleviated once country
fixed effects are included, it may not be fully removed. The standard
robust standard errors do not allow for serial correlation in errors, only for
heteroscedasticity.
94. The test statistic takes the form of −2
N∑
i=1
ln(piT ) in which piT is the p-value
corresponding to the unit root test of the ith individual cross section unit
for the cross-sectionally augmented DF regression. The critical values for the
Fisher P-test on a cross-sectionally augmented regression (Pesaran, 2007) are
provided by M. Hashem Pesaran.
95. Since the lagged dependent variable bias arising from the within group trans-
formation can be alleviated when T is large in a dynamic panel (Nickell,
1981).
96. FLi,t−1(1 − FLi,t−1) is reported here.
97. Although the coefficients on REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 and its interaction term
are negative and positive, respectively, the range of FLi,t−1 from 0 to 1
determines the derivative of FLit with respect to REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1,
−0.147 + 0.094 × FLi,t−1, is always negative.
98. The panel is unbalanced mainly because data on IMF programs are miss-
ing for the following six countries over period 1973–83: China, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, Portugal and Uruguay.
99. Data are from the UNEP Risoe Centre (2008).
100. For example, as the only two CDM host countries in Asia in 2003, India
and the Republic of Korea were immediately followed by four Asian host
countries in 2004 and nine other Asian host countries in 2005 (UNEP Risoe
Centre, 2008).
101. A country with k monthly non-zero observations (up to September 2008)
has its averaged CDM being its total CERs divided by k.
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102. CO2e is the Carbon Dioxide Equivalent, the unit of measurement used to
indicate the global warming potentials defined in decision 2/CP.3 of the
Marrakech Accords or as subsequently revised in accordance with Article 5
of the Kyoto Protocol.
103. Data on latitude, elevation and land area for Singapore are added to the
physical factors dataset of CID.
104. This inclusion is stimulated by the works of Alesina et al. (2003) and Stulz
and Williamson (2003), for example. Alesina et al. (2003) argue that the
ethnic and religious fractionalizations in a country are associated with its
economic success and institutional quality. Stulz and Williamson (2003)
show that culture, proxied by ethnic, religious and language differences,
explain why investor protection differs across countries and how investor
rights are enforced among countries.
105. The inclusion is due to La Porta et al. (1998) who suggest that the legal origin
of a country is helpful in explaining the extent to which investor rights are
protected in it. More specifically, countries with a Common Law tradition
tend to place more emphasis on private rights protection and less on the
rights of the state, while countries which have adopted a Civil Law tradition
do the opposite.
106. The Andrews (2005) approach is very general in the sense that the effects
of common shocks, which are ς -measurable, may differ across population
units, in a discrete or continuous fashion, and may be local or global in
nature.
107. The addition of the spatially lagged dependent variable results in a form
of endogenity, rendering the OLS an inapplicable method for spatial lag
model. To estimate the spatial lag model consistently, the Generalized 2SLS
and Maximum Likelihood approach (ML) have been proposed (Kelejian and
Prucha, 1998, 1999; Lee, 2003, 2007; Kelejian et al., 2004; Anselin, 2006).
108. Since the spatial error model is a special case of a regression specification with
a non-spherical error variance-covariance matrix, more specifically, the off-
diagonal elements are non-zero. OLS estimates remain unbiased whilst the
standard errors are biased. The OLS method can therefore be applied to this
model with the standard errors adjusted to allow for error correlation. The
spatial error model can be consistently estimated by GMM or ML (Kelejian
and Prucha, 1998, 1999; Anselin, 2006).
109. This evidence is preliminary. One might find that countries like Brazil, closer
to Paraguay, have large CDM credit flows. This suggests that, apart from geo-
graphic distance, other geographic variables are also important in the process
of CDM development, and so are the institutional variables and financial
variables.
110. Data on the great circle distances are also from Gleditsch et al. (2001).
111. If Moran’s I is greater (smaller) than its expected value, E(I), and/or Gearcy’s
C is smaller (larger) than its expected value, E(C), the overall distribution
of the variable in question can be reflected by positive (negative) spatial
autocorrelation.
112. In this analysis, we also explore the impacts on CDM credit flows of other
geographic factors such as being landlocked, the minimum distance from
one of the three capital-goods-supplying centres (New York, Rotterdam and
Tokyo), mean distance to the nearest coastline or a river navigable to the
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ocean, the proportion of a country’s total land area with 100 km of the
ocean or such a river, and the proportion of a country’s total land area in
Koeppen-Geiger temperate zones. In general we find no evidence to support
any significant associations between these factors and CDM credit flows.
This may suggest that, as more and more modern technologies have been
employed in the areas of transportation and telecommunications, and more
and more railways, automobiles, air transport and all forms of telecommuni-
cations become available, the geographic advantages in terms of easy access
to the sea and/or international trade centres tend to be diminish in the
process of economic development.
113. Under the null of no heteroscedasticity, the test statistic is distributed as
Chi-square with degree of freedom being the total number of the regressors.
114. The spatial weighting matrices, Wn and Mn, are treated as the same.
115. The GS2SLS estimates suggest that the impacts of AREA and EXPPRIM have
been less precisely estimated.
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